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This dissertation examines militarisation in Scotland and North America from the 
Jacobite Uprising of 1745-46 to the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War in 
1775. Employing a biographical, case study approach, it investigates the cultural 
paradigms guiding the actions and understandings of British Army officers as they waged 
war, pacified hostile peoples, and attempted to assimilate ‘other’ population groups 
within the British Empire. In doing so, it demonstrates the impact of the Jacobite Uprising 
on British imperialism in North America and the role of militarisation in affecting the 
imperial attitudes of military officers during a transformative period of imperial 
expansion, areas underexplored in the current historiography. 
It argues that militarisation caused several paradigm shifts that fundamentally 
altered how officers viewed imperial populations and implemented empire in 
geographical fringes. Changes in attitude led to the development of a markedly different 
understanding of imperial loyalty and identity. Civilising savages became less important 
as officers moved away from the assimilation of ‘other’ populations towards their 
accommodation within the empire. Concurrently, the status of colonial settlers as Britons 
was contested due to their perceived disloyalty during and after the French and Indian 
War. ‘Othering’ colonial settlers, officers questioned the sustainability of an ‘empire of 
negotiation’ and began advocating for imperial reform, including closer regulation of the 
thirteen colonies. And, as the colonies appeared to edge closer to rebellion, those officers 
drew upon prior experiences in Scotland and North America to urge the military 
pacification of a hostile population group to ensure imperial security. Militarisation, 
therefore, provides important insights into how cultural imperialism was implemented in 
Scotland and how it was transferred and adapted to North America. Further, it 
demonstrates the longer-term interactions and understandings that influenced 
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The long eighteenth century, 1688-1815, was marked by a series of prolonged and 
expensive wars between Britain (England until 1707) and other European powers, most 
often France. Early in the century these wars were primarily concerned with maintaining 
the balance of power in Europe and dominating foreign trade markets. However, as 
British trade to its colonial possessions increased, any perceived threat to British imperial 
power became a catalyst for war to protect commercial interests. At the same time, the 
British state also faced an internal threat to its security as Jacobites sought to restore the 
Stuart monarchy ousted during the Revolution of 1688-89. Whilst the 1715 uprising 
represented the apex of military support for Jacobitism, it remained a constant threat over 
the following decades and another significant rising, this time originating in the Scottish 
Highlands, broke out in 1745.1 The defeat of the Jacobites at the Battle of Culloden in 
April 1746 was followed by a violent pacification undertaken by the British Army and 
the militarisation of the region in an attempt to prevent future hostilities by integrating 
Highlanders more closely within the British state and empire.  
The establishment of Britain’s fiscal-military state2 by the early eighteenth 
century contributed to its victory in the Seven Years’ War, known as the French and 
Indian War in North America,3 which led to significant British imperial expansion. In 
North America, the acquisition of Canada and the interior left Britain with two more 
potentially hostile population groups that required pacification. Again, militarisation was 
embarked upon as a deliberate process that sought to ensure imperial security and 
integrate populations within a much-altered empire. Whilst the steps taken by the British 
Army and ministry prevented further conflict with French-Canadians and Native 
                                                 
1 For the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion (the Fifteen), see Daniel Szechi, 1715: The Great Jacobite Rebellion 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).  
2 A fiscal-military state is a model that describes any state capable of funding and fighting large-scale 
warfare through a domestic system of taxation, finance, and administration. Mark Knights, ‘Fiscal-
Military State’. Oxford Bibliographies, 2015. http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-
9780199730414/obo-9780199730414-0073.xml. 
3 The conflict began in North America in 1754 but war was not officially declared between Britain and 
France until 1756, continuing until the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Both terms are used throughout this 
dissertation. French and Indian War is used when discussing the war in North America whilst Seven 
Years’ War is used when discussing its progress in Europe, the discussion of it by the ministry, or to refer 
to the conflict more generally. 
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Americans (after Pontiac’s War of 1763-65), internal conflict once again broke out in 
1775 with the American Revolutionary War, which led to the loss of Britain’s thirteen 
older colonies. Lawrence Gipson and, more recently, Peter J. Marshall and Fred 
Anderson, have highlighted the impact of the Seven Years’ War and the resultant 
territorial expansion of empire in North America and elsewhere on the coming of the 
American Revolution.4 The cost of the war, both in financial and manpower terms, 
contributed to the decision of successive ministries to introduce taxation to recover some 
of the costs of managing the empire. Such a step illuminated the different interpretations 
of the imperial relationship fostered by the recent war on both sides of the Atlantic. These 
interpretations were closely tied to national identity, recent understandings of which have 
been influenced by the new British history of J. G. A. Pocock and his advocacy of the 
concept of ‘Greater Britain’ and the work of Linda Colley who persuasively argued that 
a sense of British national identity was forged through common experiences of warfare, 
as well as religion and empire building, from 1707.5 
I. Aims and Objectives 
This dissertation draws upon studies that consider the impact of war on national 
identity and understandings of empire to analyse British cultural attitudes towards 
indigenous peoples and settlers of the imperial fringe during this transformative period 
of military conflict and imperial growth. Concerned with the experiences and encounters 
of the British Army in Scotland and North America, it aims to highlight how these 
experiences shaped the attitudes of the army officers involved. The main objective of the 
research is to understand the impact of the Jacobite rebellion of 1745-46 (the Forty-Five) 
on British imperialism in North America. It considers the cultural paradigms of British 
Army officers following the Forty-Five as they sought to overcome the challenges of 
waging war and pacifying hostile peoples in two imperial fringes. Fundamentally, it is a 
                                                 
4 Lawrence H. Gipson, ‘The American Revolution as an Aftermath of the Great War for the Empire, 
1754-1763’. Political Science Quarterly 65, no. 1 (1950): 86–104. https://doi.org/10.2307/2144276; 
Lawrence H. Gipson, The British Empire before the American Revolution. 15 Vols. (New York: Knopf, 
1936-70); Peter J. Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India and America, c.1750-
1783 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War 
and the Fate of Empire in British North America (London: Faber and Faber, 2000).  
5 J. G. A. Pocock, ‘British History: A Plea for a New Subject’. The Journal of Modern History 47, no. 4 
(1975): 601–21. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1877393; J. G. A. Pocock, ‘AHR Forum: The New British 
History in Atlantic Perspective: An Antipodean Commentary’. AHR 104, no. 2 (1999): 490–500. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2650377; Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1992). 
16 
 
study of how British imperial attitudes were culturally altered by militarisation in the 
decades prior to the American Revolution. Exploring the cultural paradigms driving 
imperialism will develop historians’ understanding of the formation of imperial attitudes 
and emphasise the role of military interactions on the transformations in eighteenth-
century British imperial policy. Significantly, it focuses on a group under-represented in 
the current scholarship, British Army officers, and considers the attitudes, actions, and 
impact upon imperial policymaking of these important agents of empire.  
II. Research Questions 
The main research questions the dissertation will address are concerned with the 
experiences and encounters of the British Army in Scotland and North America and are 
based on a hypothesis that, by the onset of the American Revolution, British imperial 
attitudes had been culturally altered by experiences of warfare, militarisation, and the 
attempted pacification of hostile peoples. The first research question this dissertation 
aims to answer is: what was the impact of the Jacobite Uprising of 1745-46 on British 
imperialism in North America? The Forty-Five set an important precedent for the British 
Army: informing how officers directed military operations in a geographical fringe, 
providing a benchmark for the pacification of hostile peoples throughout the empire, and 
acting as a testing ground for militarisation strategy. This question will consider how the 
challenges of waging war in Scotland influenced how the British Army approached 
similar challenges in North America. Although Peter Russell and Matthew Ward made 
connections between the army’s use of irregular warfare in Scotland and its later 
adaptation in North America, little work has been undertaken to link the Forty-Five and 
the French and Indian War.6  This dissertation will consider a number of operational 
issues including irregular warfare, logistics, recruitment, and quartering to understand 
whether the British Army learnt any lessons during the Forty-Five that it then applied in 
its response to the French and Indian War.  
Questioning whether the British Army drew parallels between the Highlands and 
North America, this dissertation will also consider how army officers’ experiences of 
pacifying the Scottish Highlands in the aftermath of the Battle of Culloden affected how 
                                                 
6 Peter E. Russell, ‘Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and 
America, I740 to 1760’. WMQ 35, no. 4 (1978): 629–52. https://doi.org/10.2307/1923208; Matthew C. 
Ward, ‘The European Method of Warring Is Not Practiced Here’: The Failure of British Military Policy 
in the Ohio Valley, 1755-1759’. War in History 4, no. 3 (1997): 247–63. 
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they approached the pacification of hostile (or potentially hostile) groups in North 
America. Geoffrey Plank illustrated that the Forty-Five raised the political power and 
public stature of the British Army, allowing officers to pursue a more deliberate imperial 
agenda where they could take on the role of reformers in the places they were active.7 He 
explored the difficulties the British had defining groups of ‘others’ within the empire, 
finding that the army tended to be most violent when classification attempts failed. 
Investigating both pacification in the immediate aftermath of conflict and the 
implementation of longer-term militarisation strategy, this dissertation will extend 
Plank’s work by examining how cultural imperialism was implemented in Scotland and 
how it was transferred and adapted to North America. In doing so, it will investigate what 
continuing impact, if any, the Forty-Five had on British imperialism in North America in 
the years preceding the American Revolution.  
The second main research question of the dissertation is: what do interactions 
between British Army officers and various imperial populations reveal about the cultural 
attitudes of the British imperial elite in the mid-to late-eighteenth century? Interactions 
between the British Army and indigenous peoples and colonial settlers were complex, 
evolving over the period under investigation. Colin Calloway and Geoffrey Plank 
highlighted that, in the mid-eighteenth century, indigenous peoples in both the Scottish 
Highlands and in North America were often viewed as barbarous savages and were 
subject to state-sponsored civilisation and commercialisation programmes intended to 
promote cultural assimilation.8 In contrast, colonial settlers were generally viewed as 
civilised Britons at that juncture, although less than three decades after the Forty-Five 
many would be in open rebellion against the Crown. Interactions between the military 
and colonial settlers both during and after the French and Indian War highlighted tension 
between the civil and military spheres in North America and army officers were left 
frustrated at perceived colonial indifference to, or obstruction of, the war effort. This 
dissertation will question how interactions between the military and indigenous 
populations compared to those between the military and colonial settlers. Investigating 
the cultural paradigms that governed these interactions will illuminate the attitudes of 
British Army officers towards the various population groups. In addition, evaluating the 
                                                 
7 Geoffrey Plank, Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 5.  
8 Colin G. Calloway, White People, Indians, and Highlanders: Tribal Peoples and Colonial Encounters 
in Scotland and America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Plank, Rebellion and Savagery.  
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militarisation of both imperial fringes will highlight why officers acted as they did and 
whether any paradigm shifts occurred which altered their attitudes towards those they 
encountered.  
The final research question this dissertation will address is: how did the 
experiences and encounters of British Army officers shape their attitudes regarding how 
the empire ought to be governed? Peter J. Marshall found that the French and Indian War 
caused Britons and colonists to develop fundamentally different attitudes towards the 
process of empire. Whilst before the war empire had been a process of negotiation 
between colonial governors and colonial assemblies, the war caused the British imperial 
elite to believe that an empire of negotiation was neither sustainable nor desirable. 
Colonists, on the contrary, had had their view of an empire of partnership reinforced by 
the war.9 The formation of such different concepts of empire was a major factor in the 
crisis that led to the disintegration of empire in North America. Marshall’s work provides 
the contextual framework for this dissertation. Focusing on a much narrower group, 
British Army officers, this dissertation will examine their individual experiences 
implementing militarisation and the army’s role as an instrument of empire. It will 
examine how these lived experiences influenced both officers’ personal attitudes and the 
shared understandings of the army as an institution towards the empire. Considering the 
army officers as agents of empire, it questions what wider influence they had on British 
imperial policy-making more generally in the pre-revolutionary period.  
III. Definitions, Methods, and Boundaries 
This dissertation considers the attitudes of the British imperial elite, who were 
those involved in the planning and/or implementation of policy and legislation 
concerning the British Empire. This includes government officials, army and naval 
officers, members of the Board of Trade, and colonial governors and officials, including 
the Superintendents for Indian Affairs.10 Through biographical case studies, the 
dissertation primarily focuses on the experiences of select British Army officers and 
considers how these experiences affected their attitudes towards various imperial 
                                                 
9 Marshall, Making and Unmaking, 99-105. See also Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: 
Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-
1788 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), 79–152.  
10 The Superintendent positions were created in 1755 in an attempt to centralise Indian affairs and 
diplomacy during the French and Indian War.  
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populations and regarding the implementation of imperial policy. It further investigates 
the extent to which the attitudes of these individual officers spread throughout the army 
as an institution and whether they influenced the attitudes and actions of government 
officials. The British Army is an appropriate context through which to consider imperial 
attitudes in the mid-to late-eighteenth century as it was an important instrument of 
empire, used by governments to implement change in imperial fringes. More 
significantly, in both Scotland and North America officers also acted as agents of empire, 
keeping ministers informed of developments far from the imperial centre, deciding how 
to transform the broad outlines of policy determined at Whitehall into functional 
measures on the ground, and helping to influence the direction of imperial policy by 
providing ministers with information and advice. Although other members of the British 
imperial elite are not the focus of this study, they do feature within it through their 
correspondence with army officers and more generally in the wider context of the study 
of militarisation and governance in the eighteenth-century British Empire.  
Concerned with British cultural attitudes towards the empire and various groups 
within it including Scottish Highlanders, Native Americans, French-Canadians, and 
colonial North American settlers, this dissertation seeks to understand the cultural 
paradigms that governed interactions between the army and these peoples and to ascertain 
whether any paradigm shifts took place during the period 1745-75. In the humanities, a 
cultural paradigm is a framework of the values, assumptions, and beliefs that affects how 
an individual or group interprets and interacts with aspects of the world or with other 
groups.11 They are dominant cultural beliefs or prevailing cultural assumptions that 
project dichotomous perceptions of the self in relation to others, normalising these in 
ideology. In the context of imperialism, cultural paradigms regulate the interactions of 
the colonisers, colonised, and colonists but are inherently hegemonic; sustaining 
imperialism in politics and social organisation and seeking cultural domination of the 
colonised. A paradigm shift occurs when a fundamental change in the framework of 
values, assumptions, and beliefs causes an individual or group to interact with the same 
aspects of the world in a different way. Such shifts do not occur immediately but rather 
                                                 
11 The idea of a paradigm comes from Thomas Kuhn. According to Kuhn, a paradigm is the current 
dominant example or model within a scientific area that provides a guide for scientists regarding how 
they ought to carry out research. See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 4th ed. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012). Others, including Clifford Geertz, have adapted 
Kuhn’s theory of a paradigm, which he did not recognise to exist except in the scientific field, to fit the 
social sciences and arts and humanities. 
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take place over time as inconsistencies within the existing framework cause that 
framework to be questioned and eventually replaced.  
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz influenced the study of culture and cultural 
paradigms for historians as well as anthropologists. Geertz’s work primarily focused on 
symbolic anthropology and was based around his belief in a semiotic theory of culture. 
He believed culture to be a pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, “a system of 
inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, 
perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes towards life.”12 
According to Geertz, it is the job of anthropologists to interpret these symbols and the 
patterns of meanings they represent in order to explain social processes, events, or 
behaviours within a particular group.13 Cultural historians have used Geertz’s 
interpretation of culture as being concerned with understanding the meaning of symbols 
when studying societies and traditions of the past. Gordon Wood recently demonstrated 
how Bernard Bailyn’s Origins of the American Revolution identified the ideologies and 
ideas that constituted a “powerful array of accessible meanings that the patriots could 
draw upon to explain, understand, justify, and rationalize their resistance to British 
actions.”14 Geertz’s work, and the increasing influence of anthropology in general on the 
study of history from the 1970s, encouraged historians to investigate people’s 
understandings of transformative experiences as they lived through and made sense of 
them.  
Geertz’s definition of culture as a system of symbols through which people 
develop and communicate their attitudes towards life informs this study of the cultural 
paradigms of British imperialism. The cultural paradigms this dissertation will 
investigate are civility, loyalty, benevolence, and superiority. The civility paradigm was 
underpinned by the assumption that civility can only be acquired by people if they submit 
to the British state, which can be achieved through subjugation. The self-perception 
guiding the civility paradigm on the part of the colonisers was that they themselves, as 
                                                 
12 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (London: Hutchinson, 1975), 89.  
13 Geertz argued that this should be achieved through ethnography, or “thick description”. Clifford 
Geertz, ‘Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight’. The MIT Press on Behalf of American Academy of 
Arts & Sciences 134, no. 4 (2005): 56–86. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20028014; Geertz, Interpretation 
of Cultures, 6.  
14 Gordon S. Wood, ‘Reassessing Bernard Bailyn’s The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 
on the Occasion of Its Jubilee’. NEQ 91, no. 1 (2018): 78–109. See also Joanne B. Freeman, ‘Political 
History and the Tool of Culture’, in A Companion to American Cultural History, ed. Karen Halttunen 
(Malden: Blackwell, 2008), 416-24.  
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white, English-speaking Protestants participating in a commercial society, were civilised 
in contrast to those they encountered who were in a state of barbarity. The civility 
paradigm has been pervasive in all imperial movements from the Elizabethan era right 
up to the present day. For example, Nicholas Canny highlighted how it was used as a 
justification for the subjugation of the barbarous Gaels in Ireland.15 During the eighteenth 
century, the civility paradigm was influenced by the ideas and values of progress and the 
development of man being consolidated in the Enlightenment, which contributed to the 
emergence of theories of stadial development.16 Stadial theory argued that society passed 
through four separate stages in its progress from savagery to civilisation: hunter-gatherer, 
pastoral, agriculture, and commerce and it identified the mode of subsistence as the 
primary attribute for classifying societies.17 It posited that whilst Britons generally had 
reached the civilised state of a commercial society, others within the British Empire, 
including Scottish Highlanders and Native Americans, remained stuck at the pastoral and 
hunter-gatherer stages, although they had the potential to progress to civility. The civility 
paradigm suggested that those who stood in the way of progress had to be removed, 
whether through military execution during periods of conflict or through subjugation 
followed by progression towards civility by way of assisted commercialisation and 
improvement. The civility paradigm was manifest during the Forty-Five and in the 
pacification of the Highlands which followed. As such, it is investigated in the first 
chapter of the dissertation which explores the Forty-Five, but it is also investigated in 
other chapters which question its role in shaping the British response to conflict with 
French-Canadians and Native Americans.  
                                                 
15 See Nicholas P. Canny, Making Ireland British, 1580-1650, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003).  
16 Robert Wokler, ‘Anthropology and Conjectural History in the Enlightenment’. In Inventing Human 
Science: Eighteenth-Century Domains, ed. Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler (California: 
University of California Press, 1995), 38. Wokler highlighted that early discussions of the development 
of man were influenced by the work of Samuel von Pufendorf and his theories regarding the relationship 
between moral ideas and social relations. Regarding the emergence of the enlightenment theory of 
progress see: Clare Jackson, ‘Progress and Optimism’, in The Enlightenment World, ed. M. Fitzpatrick et 
al. (London: Routledge, 2004), 178; David Spadafora, The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century 
Britain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 253–320.  
17 See: Christopher J. Berry, Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1997); Ronald L. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976); Ronald L. Meek, ‘Smith, Turgot and the “Four Stages” Theory’, 
History of Political Economy 3, no. 1 (1971): 9-27; H. Hopfl, ‘From Savage to Scotsman: Conjectural 
History in the Scottish Enlightenment’, JBS 17, no. 2 (1978): 19–40. https://www.jstor.org/stable/175389.  
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The loyalty paradigm equated with submission and adherence to the British state. 
Underpinned by a belief that loyalty was a necessity for imperial security and stability, it 
assumed that loyalty could only be achieved through assimilation and Anglicisation. The 
self-perception guiding the loyalty paradigm on the part of the colonisers was of 
themselves as Britons participating in the imperial venture, in contrast to ‘others’ who 
did not imbibe the sense of Britishness and therefore did not benefit from being a member 
of the British state. The loyalty paradigm demanded the allegiance of all within the 
empire (colonisers, colonised, and colonists) to the Crown and placed the needs of the 
imperial state as paramount. Assimilation of the ‘other’ was sought on the coloniser’s 
terms as Britishness was thought a necessary goal for imperial populations. Disloyalty 
was evident through rebellion and through the failure of the ‘other’ to adhere to the British 
state as expected by contributing to the realisation of the state’s aims. Loyalty was thus 
attained through an initial submission of disloyal ‘others’ and by a process of assimilation 
whereby those ‘others’ demonstrated continuing adherence to the British state. 
Submission could be achieved through the military defeat and absorption into the empire 
of enemy peoples, the prosecution or conquest of internal rebels, or through negotiation 
where appropriate. Military intimidation and closer regulation over imperial populations 
likewise sought to secure submission and adherence in the long-term whilst 
simultaneously encouraging assimilation. The loyalty paradigm played an important role 
in the militarisation process embarked upon in Scotland and North America, guiding 
interactions between the military and all imperial populations they encountered 
throughout the period of this investigation. As such, it is considered in all the following 
chapters, although it forms a particularly important aspect of the investigations regarding 
the interactions of both John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, and Thomas Gage with 
colonial settlers, examined in chapters two and five respectively.  
The benevolence paradigm equated with establishing dominance over a 
conquered population. It was underpinned by an assumption that imperial security during 
a conflict could best be achieved by reconciling the conquered to their new masters, even 
if the conquest proved only temporary. In turn, it posited that reconciliation could best be 
achieved through a demonstration of the justness of the conqueror. The self-perception 
guiding the benevolence paradigm on the part of the colonisers was of themselves as 
honourable conquerors ruling mildly in contrast to those they had conquered who had 
previously been subject to arbitrary rule. The benevolence paradigm demanded the 
temporary, or local, allegiance of the conquered as subjects for so long as they continued 
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to reside within the sovereign’s dominion.18 Should they chose to leave the conquered 
territory, or should the territory be surrendered back through arms or negotiation, there 
was no continuing demand for allegiance. It was inspired by Frances Hutcheson’s theory 
of moral philosophy,19 which argued that humankind harboured a natural instinct towards 
benevolence, and Emmerich de Vattel’s emphasis on moderation in conflict.20 Reflecting 
these thinkers, the benevolence paradigm recognised that whilst subjugation was the right 
of the conqueror as per the law of conquest,21 moderation and the granting of civil rights 
to the conquered could affect quicker and more permanent acceptance from that populace, 
thereby establishing dominance. In practice, this could be achieved through a process of 
cooperative submission whereby subjugation continued to be threatened, and 
implemented, as required, but where compliance was sought by exemplifying fairness in 
rule and allowing the retention of the populations’ prior rights. Acting mildly sought to 
overcome entrenched perceptions in the minds of the conquered about the conquerors’ 
barbarity and the expected cruelty of their rule. The benevolence paradigm played an 
important role in the pacification of Quebec and Canada from 1759 to 1763 after the 
British victories in the French and Indian War. As such, it is examined in more detail in 
chapter three, which investigates how it guided the actions of James Murray as he sought 
to establish dominance over the French-Canadians whilst the wider conflict with France 
continued.  
The superiority paradigm equated with cultural imperialism. The self-perception 
guiding the superiority paradigm on the part of the colonisers was of themselves as 
ethnically, morally, socially, culturally, and politically superior as a result of their 
Britishness. Those they encountered, particularly the colonised, were in contrast 
perceived as inferior. Underpinned by the assumption that the colonisers’ state of being 
                                                 
18 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Books 1-4 (1765-1769) (Oxford: Lonang 
Institute, 2003), 358. https://lonang.com/library/reference/blackstone-commentaries-law-england/  
19 Francis Hutcheson, Hutcheson: Two Texts on Human Nature, ed. Thomas Mautner (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 91-147.  
20 Emmerich De Vattel, The Laws of Nations: Or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct 
and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, 6th ed. (Philadelphia: T & J W Johnson, 1844), bk. 3, 291-427.  
21 Regarding the rights of the conqueror, see A. M. Campbell, The Rights of War and Peace Including the 
Law of Nature and of Nations: Translated from the Original Latin of Grotius (New York: M. Walter 
Dunne, 1901), bk. 3, 348-50. Sharon Korman highlighted that Vattel’s 1758 The Laws of Nations 
questioned Grotius’ interpretation that the conqueror could act as they liked. He argued the conqueror did 
not have the right to deprive the conquered of their lives, liberty, property, or freedom. Sharon Korman, 
The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice (Oxford: 
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was intrinsically preferable, it advocated the imposition of the colonisers’ culture on the 
inferior population. The superiority paradigm has been prevalent in every empire from 
Ancient Rome to the present day, through an active or passive assumption of superiority 
on the part of the colonisers. It has been used to justify imperialism as a noble venture. 
In the nineteenth century, Rudyard Kipling’s White Man’s Burden epitomised the 
superiority paradigm, arguing that the white man has a moral obligation to rule the non-
white peoples of the earth, who can only emerge from a state of inferiority and incivility 
with British guidance.22 Similar to Edward Said’s depiction of Orientalism, the 
superiority paradigm depicted the colonised as primitive, violent, and essentially 
inferior.23 Their enlightenment was only thought possible when traditional values and 
culture were replaced by those of the colonisers. In the eighteenth century, positing that 
inferior peoples had little choice but to accept subjugation, the superiority paradigm 
demanded they demonstrate their submission to British imperial authority and protection. 
Advancement was to be achieved through initial subjugation followed by the forced 
acculturation of a subject population or that populations’ voluntary embrace of the culture 
of the colonisers. Closely related to the civility paradigm, advancement was thought a 
necessary prerequisite for the inferior populations’ eventual assimilation within the 
empire as imperial subjects. The superiority paradigm was manifest in Jeffrey Amherst’s 
interactions with Native Americans after the conquest of Canada. As an English 
Protestant with beneficial family connections and patrons, Amherst had an inherent sense 
of moral superiority that defined his worldview, evident in his interactions with all the 
population groups he encountered during his military career. The superiority paradigm 
was particularly important in guiding Amherst’s strategy for the pacification and 
militarisation of the North American interior from 1760 to 1763, as well as his initial 
response to Pontiac’s War. As such, it is explored further in chapter four.  
These cultural paradigms represent the meanings that British Army officers drew 
upon to understand, guide, and legitimise their actions in Scotland and North America. 
This dissertation will consider how these paradigms guided the British Army in their 
interactions with imperial population groups. It aims to understand how these cultural 
paradigms were shaped by the process of militarisation in Scotland and North America 
                                                 
22 Rudyard Kipling, ‘The White Man’s Burden’, Fordham University Internet Modern History 
Sourcebook, 1997, https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/kipling.asp.  
23 Edward Said, Orientalism, 5th ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 7 and passim; Edward Said, 
Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1993), xiv and passim.  
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and whether any paradigm shifts took place over the course of the period under 
investigation, in turn shaping British imperial attitudes.  
This dissertation considers the militarisation of the Scottish Highlands and North 
America in the mid- to late-eighteenth century. Militarisation is the process by which a 
society readies itself for, engages in, or responds to conflict and violence (whether 
internal or external) and it encompasses all levels of society: the army, the government, 
and the civil sphere. As such, it is not simply the act of engaging in warfare but includes 
the preparation for war through financial investment and training, the pacification of 
hostile groups and the subjugation or assimilation of defeated enemies, the recruitment 
of men into the armed forces and the engagement of different groups of society with the 
recruitment process, the physical presence of soldiers and their distribution to quell civil 
disorder, and the ideology that a strong military provides security for a state. In the 
eighteenth century, Britain relied upon its army and navy for domestic, imperial, and 
commercial security. The frequent warfare of the period caused Britain to remain in a 
constant state of war-readiness. Internal security was of paramount importance, both 
within Britain and the wider empire, at a time when other states would exploit internal 
divisions such as Jacobitism for their own military and/or imperial aims.  
Britain engaged in a deliberate militarisation process in response to conflicts in 
both the Highlands and North America to ensure imperial security. This process involved 
the pacification and attempted assimilation of Scottish Highlanders during and after the 
Forty-Five and of French-Canadians and Native Americans during and after the French 
and Indian War. In both imperial fringes, violent pacification was undertaken during and 
immediately after periods of warfare whilst longer-term measures centring around 
Anglicisation and commercialisation sought to provoke deep structural changes within 
the societies targeted. A militarisation strategy was implemented to prevent the 
recurrence of hostilities. Logistics and communication systems were strengthened 
through the building of forts, roads, and bridges and the improvement of portages in 
North America. Troops were strategically distributed in forts and towns to secure British 
interests through intimidation, regular patrols, and mapping endeavours. Some 
indigenous and colonial figures were integrated within the imperial establishment as 
military recruiters to further encourage assimilation. Militarisation was a process that 
ensured the consistent presence of the army in numerous aspects of imperial life: 
physically through the stationing of soldiers in towns and upon the frontier, economically 
due to the resultant costs the government either had to absorb or meet through taxation, 
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politically through an increase in regulations and acts related to military affairs, and 
socially as a result of an increase in interactions between the military and civil spheres. 
This dissertation questions how the process of militarisation shaped eighteenth-century 
British imperialism. Studying the correspondence of army officers documenting their 
imperial encounters will illuminate the cultural paradigms guiding those encounters and 
whether these were altered over time. This dissertation will further question whether the 
experiences of these select British Army officers altered their imperial attitudes and 
contributed to the transformations in British imperial policy from the 1760s.  
Imperial attitudes are the attitudes of a particular group towards the empire and 
towards peoples within that empire. Whilst these attitudes can be those of the colonisers, 
the colonised, or the colonists, this dissertation focuses on the attitudes of the colonisers 
(the British imperial elite). This provides a consideration of the experiences and attitudes 
driving the imperial crisis from the British perspective, rather than the colonial or 
indigenous perspectives. Cultural paradigms and imperial attitudes are closely linked as 
paradigms inform attitudes. Therefore, if a cultural paradigm is altered or there is a 
paradigm shift this, in turn, affects the attitudes of a particular group. This dissertation 
will argue that militarisation in Scotland and North America in the mid-to late-eighteenth 
century caused several paradigm shifts that influenced how British Army officers 
interacted with various imperial populations. It will suggest that these changes led to an 
evolution in officers’ own imperial attitudes regarding these populations as well as 
influencing a fundamental change in the British imperial elite’s conception of the 
imperial relationship, causing questions to be asked about what exactly the empire 
represented and how it ought to be governed.  
Except for the first chapter, the dissertation employs a biographical, case study 
approach, collecting data from a variety of sources and using qualitative analysis to 
answer the stated research questions. It examines four British Army officers who played 
a commanding role in the military conflict in North America in the mid- to late-eighteenth 
century: John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, James Murray, Jeffrey Amherst, and 
Thomas Gage. A biographical approach allows focus on the specific cultural paradigms 
that informed the interactions of each officer, all of whom were commanding officers in 
North America and enjoyed at least some autonomy when implementing militarisation 
there. As such, their experiences illustrate the attitudes driving imperialism at the highest 
level of the army in its operational setting. Comparing the attitudes of these officers with 
the attitudes of others within the British Army and the wider British imperial elite, a 
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biographical approach enables an understanding of how typical, or atypical, these 
commanding officers were and whether their imperial attitudes or understandings of 
empire influenced others within the British imperial elite.  
The four officers have been chosen based on the important role each played in the 
militarisation of North America during and/or after the French and Indian War. Loudoun, 
Amherst, and Gage all held the position of commander-in-chief of the British forces in 
North America for different lengths of time (approximately two years for Loudoun, five 
for Amherst, and eleven and a half for Gage) and in that position were able to oversee 
and implement militarisation and advise the government regarding North American 
affairs. Whilst Murray did not enjoy the position of commander-in-chief, after the 
conquest of Quebec in 1759 he was given much freedom to direct the pacification of that 
region until the Treaty of Paris in February 1763. He also played an important role 
implementing militarisation and overseeing governance in Canada as its first civil 
governor after the treaty and advised the ministry of his opinion regarding its future 
governance until his recall in 1766. Other British military officers played an important 
role in North America during or after the war. These included John Forbes, whose focus 
on overcoming logistical difficulties during the 1758 campaign against Fort Duquesne 
was influenced by his time as Loudoun’s adjutant-general, Henry Bouquet, who held a 
key understanding of Native Americans and irregular warfare, and James Wolfe, who 
commanded the expedition to take Quebec in 1759. Whilst this dissertation does, at times, 
discuss the experiences of these and other officers in North America, a desire to focus on 
those who were responsible for directing and implementing policies related to 
militarisation and governance drove the selection of the four case studies.  
All four officers were also closely connected to the Forty-Five, though not all 
were directly involved in the conflict itself. Both Loudoun and Gage took part in the 
military campaign against the Jacobites and in the pacification of the Highlands which 
followed. Amherst spent the majority of the rising on the continent engaged in the War 
of the Austrian Succession, but he was briefly recalled to England as the army attempted 
to intercept the Jacobites upon their march to Derby. Amherst was also close to the Duke 
of Cumberland, who commanded the British Army in Scotland from October 1745 until 
July 1746, serving upon his staff for a decade, and he shared a similar attitude towards 
the Jacobites as his superior.24 James Murray was not active in Scotland at any point 
                                                 
24 See Chapter One and Chapter Four.   
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during the Forty-Five or the pacification that followed it. However, in addition to the 
indirect experiences of the conflict passed on from those he served with in North 
America, not least James Wolfe, Murray also had a personal connection to Jacobitism 
that ensured he was aware of the attitudes driving the actions of the army in the Highlands 
as two of his brothers were strongly suspected of Jacobitism.25  
Information, knowledge, and understandings spread throughout the eighteenth-
century British Army as both soldiers and officers frequently moved regiment, taking 
experiences and attitudes with them. In addition, due to the prevalence of warfare, troops 
spent most of their time in garrison or on campaign in Scotland, Europe, North America, 
or the Caribbean.26 Prior experiences, anecdotes, and stories were shared informally 
whilst the lessons learnt in campaigns were reflected in updated training manuals and 
drilling techniques. Furthermore, a common sense of the army’s role as a civilising entity 
was developed during the Forty-Five and quickly came to influence Britain’s military 
establishment.27 Enlightenment ideas and ideals encouraged the spread of knowledge 
throughout the army as they refocused attention on the rules of war and notions of 
‘civilised’ warfare, contributed to the increase in volume and popularity of newspapers, 
and encouraged officers to publish tracts on topics including military training, tactics, and 
discipline which were widely read amongst the officer class. Both the military response 
to the Forty-Five, and the pacification that followed it, were widely reported in the British 
and colonial press which would have been read by army officers as well as the public.28 
This proved the same during the Seven Years’ War as events from all theatres received 
press coverage, particularly important campaigns and battles such as James Wolfe’s 1759 
victory at Quebec. Officers aspiring to top-level positions within the British Army studied 
the art of warfare through the hundreds of available books and tracts on the subject by 
both British and Continental authors throughout the eighteenth century. They not only 
kept themselves updated with the most recent publications and developments in the art 
of war but also recommended, and often insisted, that junior officers also studied those 
                                                 
25 See Chapter Three.  
26 Soldiers whose regiments were disbanded at the end of one conflict would not necessarily join up to 
the same regiment if they mobilised upon the outbreak of another war. In addition, during conflicts it was 
not unusual for men to be drafted from one regiment to another. Officers tended to move regiment in 
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27 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 127-29.  
28 The Forty-Five was widely reported in the London Gazette, London Magazine, Scots Magazine, and 
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books that were thought to be the most authoritative.29 Other publications read included 
narratives of specific campaigns and epics describing ancient warfare, which highlights 
the depth of understanding of warfare amongst the British officer class. Publications 
ensured officers could keep their troops prepared for war during periods of peace and 
provided instruction in the art of war that helped officers decide how to conduct 
campaigns, sieges, and battles during conflicts. These factors combined to ensure that 
even those who were not personally involved in the Forty-Five, or in other campaigns or 
theatres, shared the indirect experiences of the army and were part of a common military 
understanding and ethos.  
The term British is used throughout this dissertation to describe the army, 
government, nation/state, and empire. Whilst some prefer to use the terms Hanoverian or 
loyalist when describing the events of the Forty-Five, the army of King George II, and 
Scots/Highlanders who did not join the Jacobites, this has tended to encourage a 
dissociation between Britain and the actions of the army in the Highlands. The Anglo-
Scottish Union of 1707 created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and a single ministry 
was concerned with policy-making for both England and Scotland. Further, despite the 
perseverance of local identities and rampant Scotophobia, a British sense of national 
identity was actively being crafted throughout the eighteenth century. As such, 
throughout this dissertation Jacobites are termed Jacobites or the Jacobite Army to make 
clear their difference from the British Army and loyal Britons and Highlanders are only 
denoted specifically thus because of the difference accorded to them by the majority of 
the British Army, government, and public throughout the eighteenth century.  
Although the 1715 rising (the Fifteen) enjoyed the most Jacobite support, with the 
army reaching up to twenty thousand compared to a maximum of eleven to fourteen 
thousand during the Forty-Five, it is not considered in this study.30 The focus of this 
dissertation is on two generations of the British Army who were involved in warfare in 
Scotland and/or North America. Few British Army officers who fought in the Fifteen 
were still serving when regiments were sent to North America in 1754 and it is unlikely 
that many remained alive upon the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War in 1775. 
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Furthermore, the Fifteen was not viewed primarily as a Highland rebellion in the same 
way that the Forty-Five was, despite more Highlanders enlisting in the Jacobite Army 
during the Fifteen and despite significant Jacobite support in the North-East and the 
Lowlands during the Forty-Five.31 As explored in chapter one, the British decision to 
view and label the Forty-Five as a Highland rebellion was vitally important for 
influencing how the army and ministry reacted to it, ensuring that repercussions were 
most strongly felt in that region. A similar pacification and subsequent strengthening of 
British military influence did not follow the Fifteen. Similarly, this dissertation limits its 
consideration of the British Army to actions in Scotland and North America. Whilst there 
are parallels with earlier episodes of violence and pacification in Ireland, these again took 
place outside the lives of the two generations of the army that this study is concerned 
with. Both the Plantation and the Williamite Wars in Ireland took place before the Anglo-
Scottish Union of 1707 and the ‘flight of the wild geese’ saw the majority of Irish 
Jacobites depart to France in 1691 as part of the Treaty of Limerick.32 Whilst a significant 
military establishment remained in Ireland throughout the period under investigation, and 
subjugatory rule continued over the Catholic population, these measures had been put in 
place well before the start date of this investigation. Consideration of the colonies has 
been restricted to those on the North American mainland because the West Indies 
remained primarily commercial colonies. Whilst the army was utilised to intimidate slave 
populations into remaining quiet or to quell rebellions such as Tacky’s Revolt in Jamaica 
in 1760, it did not implement the same process of militarisation or have the same 
encounters with indigenous peoples and colonial settlers as it did on the mainland.33 
Focus on Scotland and North America has been determined to give the study coherence 
through a concentration on areas where a deliberate militarisation strategy sought to 
prevent rebellion from imperial, rather than slave populations.  
                                                 
31 Pittock, Myth of the Jacobite Clans, 43-87.  
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IV. Current Historiography  
Investigating the cultural paradigms guiding the actions, attitudes, and encounters 
of select British Army officers in Scotland and North America between 1745 and 1775, 
this dissertation brings together three strands of historiography: Scottish history, early 
American history, and British imperial history, and investigates them through the lens of 
militarisation. To set the dissertation in context this section will first provide a brief 
overview of the relevant historiography relating to British imperial expansion in the 
eighteenth century, highlighting the key themes and findings and explaining their 
relevance to the dissertation. It will then focus on the scholarship connected to the four 
cultural paradigms explored in the dissertation and to militarisation in the three 
historiographical fields. Emphasis will be placed on the key findings of the current 
scholarship, how this dissertation fits within the current scholarship, and the gaps this 
dissertation aims to fill.  
By 1763, British imperial expansion questioned whether the seventeenth-century 
imperial ideal of an ‘empire of the seas’ remained fit for purpose. Peter J. Marshall 
highlighted that this conception of empire desired colonies that were private ventures 
established for, and dominated by, trade, populated by white, Protestant Europeans, and 
supported by naval supremacy.34 Advocation of commercial empire did not disappear in 
the eighteenth century. However, territorial expansion and population growth, which saw 
Britain’s North American empire increase from a population of approximately 265,000 
in eleven colonies in 1700 to a population of over 2,000,000 in seventeen colonies by 
1770, questioned the validity such a conception of empire.35 Richard Middleton 
demonstrated that Britain’s victory in the Seven Years’ War rested upon its ability to fund 
war more effectively than France.36 It was able to do so due to the creation of a stronger, 
more stable fiscal-military state than its European rivals. John Brewer argued this was a 
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36 Richard Middleton, The Bells of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the Seven 
Years’ War, 1752-1762 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 216-17.  
32 
 
result of the Revolution of 1688-89, which curbed the power of the monarch and meant 
funding warfare relied upon negotiation with Parliament.37 Britain’s fiscal-military state 
facilitated the expansion of the navy and the deployment of increased troop numbers, 
from approximately 30,000 during periods of seventeenth-century warfare (except 1642-
59 when numbers were much higher) to approximately 90,000 during the Seven Years’ 
War.38 Accompanied by increased government borrowing and taxation, military and 
naval expansion enabled Britain to continue fighting despite early losses in the Seven 
Years’ War and victory in that conflict established Britain as the preeminent European 
military and naval power. The establishment of a fiscal-military state by the mid-
eighteenth century was essential to enable the implementation of militarisation strategy 
in Scotland and North America over the following decades, which this dissertation 
investigates. Furthermore, the development of Britain’s fiscal-military state caused 
military officers to become more involved in parliamentary affairs. The percentage of 
officers sitting in the House of Commons increased from 9.3% in the period 1715-22 to 
14.7% in the period 1754-90.39 This dissertation seeks to understand the impact serving 
military officers had as agents of empire at a time when the general influence of the 
military on policymaking can be seen to have been increasing, an area that has not been 
examined in current scholarship.    
Related to British imperial expansion was the move away from the ‘salutary 
neglect’ of the Walpolean era as Britain began to intervene more directly in imperial 
affairs.40 Lawrence Gipson proposed that Britain’s retention of Canada after the conflict 
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was a strategic decision to remove France from North America.41 This suggests 
commerce was no longer the driving force for empire and the British imperial elite were 
willing to embrace both extensive territorial empire and the absorption of Catholic 
French-Canadians into the imperial fold; contrary to the ideal of colonies populated by 
free, white Protestants. John Shy highlighted that the increase in territory to Britain’s 
empire after the war, alongside the threat posed by its newly absorbed populations, led 
the Bute ministry to retain a significant standing army in North America to ensure 
imperial security.42 Gipson argued that the cost of the Seven Years’ War and of securing 
Britain’s much-expanded empire in its aftermath were the driving factors in changes to 
British imperial policy43 and the subsequent imperial crisis as colonists resisted 
Parliament’s attempts to get them to contribute to the cost of maintaining the army.44 
However, Andrew Beaumont’s recent book demonstrated that a policy of non-
intervention ended with Halifax’s appointment to the Board of Trade in 1748 and that 
there had been several prior instances of state intervention even before then. Halifax was 
determined to transform North America from a collection of settlements into a uniform 
group of colonies subservient to the Crown’s interest.45 Although interrupted by the 
outbreak of war, Halifax’s reform programme highlights an early desire within the British 
imperial elite to make changes to the relationship between the colonies and the mother-
country. Focus on 1763 as a turning point emphasises the cost of war, in both military 
and monetary terms, on transformations in imperial policy. This dissertation, whilst not 
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questioning the importance of the war in affecting change, seeks to demonstrate some of 
the cultural reasons for transformations in imperial policy and the imperial relationship.  
This dissertation’s investigation of the role of the paradigm of loyalty in guiding 
militarisation intersects with historiography related to national identity and Anglicisation 
in the eighteenth-century British Empire. Linda Colley’s investigation of national identity 
convincingly argued that frequent warfare and a common adherence to Protestantism 
encouraged the development of a sense of British national identity in the decades 
following the 1707 Anglo-Scottish Union. Colley demonstrated that the construction of 
an ‘other’, Catholic France, helped forge this sense of Britishness as Britons constructed 
their own shared identity based on what they were not.46 Stephen Brumwell and Stephen 
Conway likewise concluded that service in the army contributed to the development of a 
British identity amongst soldiers.47 A sense of shared identity developed slowly over the 
course of a century and did not replace the more personal and local identities people held 
but rather added an extra dimension to their identity.48 Whilst some divisions remained, 
warfare and empire building enabled Britons to focus on their shared experiences rather 
than on their differences.49 Colley did not investigate how Britons reacted to those within 
Britain they thought failed to imbibe Britishness. Such groups, like the Jacobites during 
the Forty-Five, were consequently considered disloyal rebels.  This dissertation will 
examine the connection between loyalty and Britishness during the Forty-Five to 
highlight how British Army officers sought to overcome Jacobite disloyalty. 
Additionally, it will investigate how the Scottish precedent influenced understandings of 
how loyalty and Britishness were connected in North America and the measures 
implemented to overcome disloyalty and encourage imperial populations to become 
British.  
Colley argued that Britons viewed the North American colonies as an extension 
of the metropole and the colonists, therefore, as fellow Britons. Likewise, the colonists 
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thought of themselves as Britons. She suggested that the removal of the French ‘other’ 
from North America after the French and Indian War caused the colonists to begin to 
view the state and its agents as an ‘other’ instead and to form their own sense of identity 
as separate from Britain in the lead up to the American Revolution.50 Historians have 
developed Colley’s work on national identity, considering how the perception of 
colonists as Britons changed during the revolutionary era. Eliga Gould argued that after 
the American Revolutionary War British people began to foster a much clearer definition 
of what it was that distinguished them (in England, Scotland, and Wales) from others 
living elsewhere in the British Empire.51 He argued that during the war most Britons came 
to accept that American colonists were inherently different to them and, in the aftermath 
of the war, no part of the empire would be thought of as an extension to Britain in the 
way that the American colonies had been. Peter J. Marshall dated the change in attitude 
earlier, arguing that by the time the war began in 1775 most Britons felt the colonists had 
forfeited their right to be classified as Britons as a result of their resistance during the 
imperial crisis. Stephen Conway generally agreed with Marshall’s interpretation that the 
roots of this change in attitude had been laid during the French and Indian War and 
strengthened during the imperial crisis, although like Gould he concluded that it was the 
war that caused the majority to make the final break from viewing the colonists as 
Britons.52 All of these historians predominantly considered the changing attitudes of 
Britons living at home who did not regularly interact with the colonists. They did not 
consider the attitudes of the army officers who had directly experienced the militarisation 
of that imperial fringe and it is this gap in the current scholarship that this dissertation 
seeks to fill.  
Colin Kidd demonstrated that a vital aspect of the formation of a British identity, 
both at home and in the colonies, was Anglicisation, arguing that “Britain did not only 
unite against an external Other, but the emulation of Englishness acted – up to a point – 
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as a glue of integration.”53 Kidd argued that a shared sense of ancestral identity with 
England existed in the minds of both colonists and Protestant Irishmen, whilst Scots 
enthusiastically adopted the description North Britons. All groups focused on their 
natural rights as Britons, which embraced English liberties. T. H. Breen illustrated the 
‘empire of goods’ that provided a common framework of experience and consumption 
amongst colonists and Britons, contributing to the Anglicisation of the colonists and their 
more complete integration within the British Empire by the 1760s.54 Whilst Britain 
encouraged Anglicisation of colonists in North America through consumerism as a way 
of keeping and strengthening ties between Britons, it was more forceful with regards to 
disloyal populations in Scotland and North America as Anglicisation was generally 
viewed as a necessary prerequisite for such populations to assimilate as Britons. Whilst 
historians including Hilda Neatby and Philip Lawson identified Anglicisation as the 
guiding principle of the ministry’s initial strategy for Quebec,55 the connection between 
Anglicisation and the inculcation of loyalty in Native Americans and Scottish 
Highlanders requires investigation. Considering this connection, this dissertation 
questions whether the experiences of British Army officers led to a move away from the 
belief that Anglicisation was a necessity for the governance of imperial populations.  
The cultural paradigm of civility also played an important role in guiding 
militarisation in Scotland and North America. It is well established in the historiography 
that classification of Scottish Highlanders and Native Americans as savages led to their 
brutal treatment during and immediately after periods of warfare.56 However, little work 
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has been done to link the pacification of savages throughout the empire, with the notable 
exception of Geoffrey Plank’s Rebellion and Savagery. Plank convincingly argued that 
the difficulties the British had defining both the Jacobites and Scottish Highlanders, who 
as a population group were blamed for the Forty-Five, led to the army’s adoption of such 
violent measures during and after the rising. Plank drew parallels between the struggles 
of the British to define the Highlanders and later struggles to define the French and native 
populations in North America.57 Plank identified the importance of eighteenth-century 
understandings of civility in driving the actions of the British Army in the wider empire. 
Although an exemplary study, Rebellion and Savagery focused on periods of active 
warfare and the immediate pacification of those involved in conflict. This dissertation 
seeks to understand how army officers’ understandings of civility, and its role in driving 
pacification, were altered over time as a result of officers’ experiences of militarisation 
in Scotland and North America. In doing so, it will further historians’ understanding of 
the cultural paradigms guiding eighteenth-century British imperialism.  
The cultural paradigm of benevolence influenced the pacification of Quebec from 
1759, and the rest of Canada after its conquest the following year. Stephen Conway 
investigated British attempts to establish government in Quebec.58 Conway argued that, 
far from having no guide for establishing government over a predominantly Catholic 
population, the British actively pursued the Irish model of governance in Quebec as 
demonstrated by the Proclamation of 1763. It was only when it became clear that this 
would not work that the government instead turned to the Minorcan model, which left the 
majority population effectively ruled by their own Catholic elite.59 Conway focused on 
the establishment of government in Canada post-1763 from the perspective of the British 
government and did not examine the implementation of British policy on the ground by 
Governor James Murray. Other studies of the conquest have given some consideration to 
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Murray’s military governance of Quebec. Whilst most assessed his rule as mild compared 
to the general standard of an eighteenth-century conquering army,60 some French-
Canadian historians, including Francois Garneau, described it as tyrannical.61 Even in 
these studies, however, little attention has been given to the attitudes and understandings 
influencing the steps taken by Murray. Addressing this lacuna in the scholarship, this 
dissertation examines the role of the benevolence paradigm in guiding Murray’s 
pacification of Quebec from 1759-63, again highlighting the cultural paradigms driving 
eighteenth-century British imperialism.  
The superiority paradigm influenced Jeffrey Amherst’s attempts to pacify Native 
Americans in the West in the post-conquest period. Matthew Ward’s detailed analysis of 
the nature and impact of the French and Indian War in the Pennsylvanian and Virginian 
backcountry examined the role Native Americans played in that conflict and highlighted 
the war’s impact on both Native Americans and frontier inhabitants. Ward argued it was 
a turning point in the history of the backcountry that contributed both to Pontiac’s War 
and the American Revolution.62 Others including Richard Middleton and Gregory Dowd 
focused attention on Pontiac’s War, a series of pan-Indian uprisings that broke out in 
1763. These historians emphasised the failure of the British Army to establish military 
dominance in the interior and examined the role Amherst’s post-war policies played in 
sparking renewed conflict.63 Dowd argued that it was the conflicted status of Native 
Americans in the post-conquest British Empire that led Amherst to treat them as 
conquered peoples rather than as allies or subjects.64  Whereas these historians examined 
Britain’s post-war policies in the interior in the context of geopolitical realignment and 
native politics, this dissertation considers Amherst’s militarisation strategy in the context 
of the earlier militarisation of the Highlands. Investigating how Amherst’s sense of 
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cultural superiority was developed by his formative experiences will develop historians’ 
understanding of why the commander-in-chief pursued a subjugatory strategy that was 
not universally supported in Britain or in North America and why such a strategy was not 
followed by Amherst’s successor Thomas Gage. 
This dissertation examines British imperialism through the lens of militarisation. 
Militarisation was a deliberate strategy adopted by the British Army and state in Scotland 
from 1745, and in North America a decade later, that sought to enable Britain to wage 
war, pacify hostile peoples, and assimilate ‘other’ populations. Whilst numerous aspects 
of militarisation strategy in Scotland and North America have received attention from 
historians, little comparative work has been undertaken to highlight the influence of the 
army’s experiences in Scotland on militarisation in North America, with the exception of 
Geoffrey Plank’s study of pacification, discussed above. Jonathan Oates examined the 
structure, recruitment, and training of the British Army and analysed its response to the 
two major Jacobite risings.65 Likewise, important studies by Fred Anderson and Stephen 
Brumwell investigated the British Army’s role in the French and Indian War. Anderson 
illustrated the interactions and tensions between regulars and provincials during the war 
and the cultural lessons that both the British and the colonists took from the war.66 
Brumwell concluded that the British Army did not impose European methods of warfare 
on the colonial theatre. Rather, the army adapted to the unique conditions they faced, 
creating a “seasoned American Army” notably different to the British Army that fought 
on the Continent.67 All of these studies advanced understanding of how the British Army 
waged war during the eighteenth century. This dissertation seeks to add to this 
scholarship by examining whether the British Army learnt lessons engaging in warfare 
in Scotland that it applied during campaigns in North America.  
An important aspect of militarisation in Scotland was the attempted assimilation 
of Highlanders by the British state. Works by Andrew Mackillop and Matthew Dziennik 
investigated the recruitment of Highland soldiers into the British Army to fight in 
imperial theatres and the impact of the recruitment process on the soldiers and their home 
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communities. Both emphasised the important role of military service on integrating 
Highlanders more closely within the British Empire, with Dziennik noting that “the 
Gaels’ uncertain status in the British Isles stood in stark contrast to their own role of 
oppressors inside the larger boundaries of empire.”68 Whilst the militarisation process in 
Scotland appeared to encourage Highlanders’ assimilation within the empire, various 
historians have suggested that it had the opposite effect for colonists in North America. 
John Shy explored civil-military relations in North America during and after the French 
and Indian War. Shy found that although the anti-redcoat tradition, which stemmed from 
a fear the monarch would use the army against the civilian population, was even more 
established in America than it was in Britain, there were very few complaints in the 
colonies about the army in the immediate aftermath of the war. Such objections only 
began to seriously emerge from 1765 when the British attempted to raise funds to pay for 
the army by directly taxing the colonists.69 Ideological objections to the presence of the 
British Army were neither universal nor permanent and were often influenced by the 
actions of the army and the direction of British imperial policy. However, militarisation 
strategy in the post-war era led successive ministries to assert closer regulation over 
colonial affairs. Jeffrey Archer and Hiller B. Zobel highlighted that the army’s occupation 
of Boston from 1768 increased both opposition towards the British Army throughout 
colonial North America and civil-military tension, which culminated in the Boston 
Massacre.70  
In the interior, the army was concerned with avoiding renewed conflict with 
Native Americans by preventing colonial land encroachment and trade abuses. However, 
Britain’s western policy caused the army to come into more frequent contact with 
backcountry settlers and Native Americans. Patrick Spero considered the colonial 
reaction to the army’s involvement in implementing empire in the West. He found that 
the French and Indian War had fostered Indian hating, which led to the creation of 
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vigilante groups like the Paxton Boys and Augusta Boys who pre-emptively attacked 
Indians throughout the backcountry.71 Whilst these groups often blamed the colonial 
legislatures for failing to protect the frontier, frontier inhabitants also came to believe that 
the army was protecting Native Americans at their expense. Spero’s study demonstrated 
the important role the British Army played in the post-1763 interior and how this 
contributed to stirring up revolutionary sentiment in frontier inhabitants but did not 
examine how army officers themselves reacted to the militarisation of the interior. Jack 
Sosin’s Whitehall and the Wilderness did consider militarisation from the perspective of 
the British, highlighting the important role that information and advice from army 
officers, particularly the commander-in-chief, played in the formation of Britain’s 
western policy from 1763 to 1775.72 This dissertation seeks to increase historians’ 
understanding of how the militarisation process throughout North America affected 
British imperial attitudes by investigating Thomas Gage’s response to the developing 
imperial crisis. It will further question whether his attitudes influenced British imperial 
policy more widely in the years preceding the American Revolution.  
V. Sources and Structure 
The sources used for this dissertation were primarily official and private papers 
and correspondence of various British military officers, either published or unpublished, 
alongside correspondence of government officials, state papers, and military and 
government dispatches. The main strength of such sources for this project was that they 
provided a clear record of how the ministry ordered the army to act in its role as an 
instrument of empire, how officers reacted to, and implemented, their instructions, and 
the extent to which they kept the ministry updated about the situation on the ground. The 
main weakness of official correspondence and dispatches was that, as formal documents, 
their primary purpose was to inform or instruct rather than to provide opinion or influence 
policy. However, many of these documents contained valuable insights into various 
officers’ understanding of the militarisation process, particularly in North America, and 
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their attitudes towards those they encountered. For example, military dispatches from 
Lord Loudoun illustrated the problems he faced attempting to implement militarisation 
in North America and his early conceptualisation of the disloyalty of colonists with 
regards to the war effort. Further, all four of the officers examined in the dissertation’s 
case studies sought to influence the actions of the ministry in North America through 
their official correspondence and reports. Far from simply reporting the situation on the 
ground, all officers proved willing to provide their own thoughts on steps the ministry 
could take to more effectively implement militarisation or to reform colonial affairs. 
Whilst such sources do not always demonstrate how these ideas were received, the 
actions taken by the ministry can give some indication as to whether the opinions of army 
officers influenced British imperial policymaking.  
Personal or private correspondence and private journals provided the clearest 
evidence of the cultural paradigms guiding British Army officers. The language used in 
letters from Joseph Yorke and William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, during and after 
the Forty-Five gave glimpses of their understanding of Jacobite disloyalty and Highland 
savagery. Comparing these letters with those of government ministers in London 
suggested that whilst the same cultural paradigms defined how both groups understood 
the rising, army officers on the ground tended to have more extreme attitudes, although 
this was not universal. Further, the correspondence of Yorke and Cumberland granted 
insights into how the commander of the British forces believed the British Army should 
pacify an uncivil population. Again, the main weakness of such sources was the lack of 
evidence to show how the ministry received these ideas. However, on several occasions 
there were return letters from the Duke of Newcastle expressing agreement with 
Cumberland’s opinion, and the fact that some of his ideas were implemented suggests 
general agreement with his approach.  
Reflecting on the sources discussing the Forty-Five and those discussing North 
America from 1754-75 enabled comparisons to be drawn regarding how the British Army 
approached warfare, pacification, and militarisation in two geographically distinct 
imperial fringes. It was not expected that officers would directly compare the steps they 
took in North America to earlier precedents, although this was the case when Thomas 
Gage discussed the treatment of rebels during Pontiac’s War. This direct comparison 
highlighted that Gage still had a clear recollection of the events of the Forty-Five and was 
willing to use the earlier precedent to guide his actions in North America two decades 
later. It suggested that the earlier precedent would also have influenced him on other 
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occasions in North America. Comparing the actions of the army in Scotland and North 
America more generally highlighted clear similarities in practices adopted in both fringes. 
Lord Loudoun’s adaptation of irregular warfare in North America in particular illustrated 
development of his earlier experiences in Scotland, as did James Wolfe’s adoption of a 
fire and sword campaign during the 1759 campaign against Quebec.  
 The chapters that follow investigate the experiences of the eighteenth-century 
British Army in Scotland and North America and the cultural paradigms driving 
imperialism in the pre-revolutionary period. Chapter one considers the general 
experiences of the army in Scotland during the Forty-Five. It sets in context the cultural 
paradigms that guided the British Army in their campaign against the Jacobites and the 
militarisation of the Highlands that followed it. It also examines the British response to 
the Forty-Five, the pacification of the Highlands that followed it, and the longer-term 
militarisation of that region as the British attempted to ensure imperial security in that 
geographical fringe. Chapter two is a case study of John Campbell, fourth Earl of 
Loudoun, that connects his, and the British Army’s, experiences in Scotland and North 
America. It explores how Loudoun’s experiences during the Forty-Five influenced his 
command of the army in North America. Delving into Loudoun’s relationships with 
colonial assemblies and provincial soldiers in North America, the chapter also 
investigates how the paradigm of loyalty influenced Loudoun’s expectations regarding 
militarisation in North America and his attitudes towards those he interacted with. 
Chapter three, a case study of James Murray, expands upon the links between the Forty-
Five and the French and Indian War. Considering Murray’s command in Canada, it 
investigates how the recent experiences of the British Army in the Highlands indirectly 
affected Murray when engaging in warfare, pacification, militarisation, and governance 
in Quebec. Exploring Murray’s pacification of Quebec through the lens of the 
benevolence paradigm, it questions why Murray adapted pacification strategies from the 
Highlands for use in Quebec and the extent to which the steps taken by Murray influenced 
the direction of British imperial policy in Quebec. Chapter four explores Jeffrey 
Amherst’s command in North America from 1758 until 1763, specifically focusing on 
his attempts to pacify and govern Native Americans in the post-conquest period, and how 
he waged war on that population group when these attempts failed. Studying Amherst’s 
interactions with Native Americans illustrates how the superiority paradigm influenced 
his adoption of a subjugatory strategy in the interior that received criticism both from 
ministers in London and imperial agents in the colonies. The final chapter, a case study 
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of Thomas Gage, focuses on the continuing process of militarisation in North America in 
the aftermath of the French and Indian War. Focusing again on the paradigm of loyalty 
which guided Gage’s interactions with colonial settlers and Native Americans, this 
chapter suggests that earlier experiences of the army in Scotland continued to influence 
British imperialism in North America over two decades later. Identifying several 
paradigm shifts resulting from militarisation in both imperial fringes, this chapter 
demonstrates how these affected British imperial attitudes in the years prior to the 








Chapter One: The British Army in Scotland 
Figure 1. Map showing the progress of the British and Jacobite armies during the Forty-Five.  
See table below for a description of the events depicted.1 
  
                                                 
1 The information used to plot this map was taken from: Christopher Duffy, The ’45: Bonnie Prince 
Charlie and the Untold Story of the Jacobite Rising (London: Phoenix, 2007).  
47 
 
Number Event Date 
 
1 Charles Edward Stuart lands in Scotland at Eriskay 23 July 1745 
2 Jacobite Standard raised at Glenfinnan 19 August 1745 
3 Lt. Gen. Sir John Cope joins British Army in 
Stirling prior to setting out against the Jacobites 
19 August 1745 
 
4 Cope’s troops reach Garvarmore before turning 
back amidst rumours of a large Jacobite Army 
ahead 
27 August 1745 
5 Cope’s troops arrive in Inverness 29 August 1745 
6 Cope attempts to beat the Jacobites to Edinburgh 
via water 
11 September 1745 
7 Jacobites capture Edinburgh 17 September 1745 
8 Cope’s army lands in Dunbar 17 September 1745 
9 Battle of Prestonpans, Jacobite victory 21 September 1745 
10 Jacobites capture Carlisle after a siege 9-15 November 1745 
11 Field Marshal George Wade gathers a British 
Army at Newcastle but fails to challenge the 
Jacobites at Carlisle 
31 October-22 
November 1745 
12 Jacobites advance to Manchester having travelled 
through Preston and Wigan 
29 November 1745 
13 Jacobites arrive in Derby, a Council of War makes 
the decision to retreat to Scotland 
4-6 December 1745 
14 Wade’s troops reach Pontefract having travelled 
down the opposite side of the Pennines 
6 December 1745 
15 Skirmish at Clifton Moor 18 December 1745 
16 Lord Loudoun’s Independent Companies are 
repulsed at Inverurie 
23 December 1745 
17 British Army retakes Carlisle from a Jacobite 
garrison 
30 December 1745 
18 Jacobite Army camps in Glasgow having avoided 
the three pursuing arms of the British Army 
26 December 1745-3 
January 1746 
19 Battle of Falkirk, Jacobite victory 17 January 1746 
20 Jacobites fail to capture Stirling Castle during a 
siege 
18 January-1 February 
1746 
21 Jacobites capture Inverness 21 February 1746 
22 The Duke of Cumberland arrives in Aberdeen with 
the British Army 
27 February 1746 
23 Jacobites fail to capture Fort William during a 
siege 
20 March-3 April 1746 
24 Lord Loudoun retreats to Skye with approximately 
half his troops 
28 March 1746 
25 British Army reaches Banff 9 April 1746 
26 British Army reaches Nairn, Jacobite night march 
to attack British camp fails 
15 April 1746 






The Jacobite rising of 1745-46 took place during the War of the Austrian 
Succession, which saw the majority of the British Army stationed in Europe. This, 
alongside the threat of a French invasion capitalising on the internal diversion, eventually 
abandoned in late December 1745, prevented the army’s full strength from being 
deployed against the Jacobites until early 1746.2 The Jacobites took advantage of the 
British Army’s weakness and advanced rapidly, reaching Derby by early December (Fig. 
1). However, they failed to consolidate their position as they progressed or to press the 
advantage gained by victories at Prestonpans and Falkirk and by February 1746 had 
retreated to the Highlands. The rising was quelled with the British Army’s decisive 
victory at the Battle of Culloden in April 1746 and, although approximately 1,500 
Jacobites regrouped at Ruthven Barracks after the battle, Charles Edward Stuart ordered 
them to disband and began his escape from Scotland.  
In the aftermath of the Forty-Five, Captain General William Augustus, Duke of 
Cumberland, embarked on a punitive campaign to prevent a renewal of hostilities in the 
Scottish Highlands and in the longer-term assimilate the Highlanders. Whilst the Forty-
Five itself has been thoroughly studied,3 this chapter focuses on the army’s role in 
implementing post-war British policies. Extending the work of Geoffrey Plank,4 it 
considers the cultural paradigms driving British policy manifest in militarisation strategy. 
Pacification of the Highlands set an important precedent for the British Army with 
regards to the acculturation of peoples on the imperial fringe. Heretofore, the army was 
a reluctant agent of cultural imperialism, but in thwarting the Forty-Five it played a 
leading role in reconfiguring identities in the Highlands. As agents of cultural 
imperialism, British Army officers imposed a new set of values upon subjugated peoples, 
inculcating loyalty, and in the process revealing the paradigms driving militarisation: 
civility equated with submission to the British state, and loyalty with assimilation. 
Pacification of the Highlands provided the cultural benchmarks for the British Army’s 
militarisation strategies in North America, which are explored in subsequent chapters.  
                                                 
2 Duffy,’45, 373-79. 
3 It is not within the scope of this dissertation to examine Jacobitism in depth. Two of the most accessible 
general syntheses are Bruce P. Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain: 1689-1746 (London: Eyre 
Methuen, 1980); Daniel Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1994).  
4 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery.  
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II. The Jacobite Rebellion and the British State, 1745-46 
Violent, internal uprisings against the state, whether depicted as revolutions, 
revolts, or rebellions, were commonplace in the early modern world. The Jacobite 
rebellion evinces several common, overarching features of popular rebellions identified 
by Jack Goldstone in his framework of state breakdown: intra-elite rivalry, popular 
unrest, and dissociation from the religion of the state.5 Jacobite support came from 
throughout Britain although Highlanders did constitute the majority and there were 
myriad reasons that prompted men from all levels of society to take up arms for the 
Jacobite cause. Some joined willingly through family or clan loyalty whilst others were 
coerced into service. A recent study argued that Jacobite impressment was higher and 
more significant than the historiography has typically suggested.6 Intra-elite rivalry 
stemmed from population growth, which caused a general increase in the number of elites 
vying to improve their position and left the British state unable to provide for all. 
Numerous families had suffered a loss of status and influence due to their continued 
support of King James VII and II during the Revolution of 1688-89, whilst the Anglo-
Scottish Union of 1707 had reduced opportunities for patronage and political office for 
Scottish elites. Many of those who took up the Jacobite cause recognised the 
opportunities of place and patronage that awaited them if they assisted a successful 
restoration. Popular unrest was fuelled by opposition to the Hanoverian monarch and the 
Whigs, who had dominated the British government since the succession of George I. 
Anti-union sentiment remained widespread in Scotland as some of the promised 
economic benefits had failed to materialise by the 1740s and Jacobite leaders used the 
issue as a rallying call to attract support throughout the country. In addition, economic 
hardship motivated many in the lower classes to support Charles Edward Stuart in the 
hope of improving their individual circumstances. Religion played an important role in 
recruiting Catholics and Episcopalians to the cause as many shared the Stuarts’ belief in 
the divine right of kings and Episcopalians opposed the establishment of Presbyterianism 
as the governing church of Scotland in the revolution settlement. In sum, Jacobitism 
proved a popular movement, both culturally and militarily, for a wide range of discontents 
                                                 
5 Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1991), 1-62.  
6 Darren Scott Layne, ‘Spines of the Thistle: The Popular Constituency of the Jacobite Rising in 1745-6’ 
(PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2016), 71–75. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/8868.  
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throughout Britain.7 Although the primary aim of the Jacobite rebellion, the restoration 
of the Stuart monarchy, was unique, its underlying causes adhere to Goldstone’s general 
framework of state breakdown.  
The Jacobites viewed themselves as a legitimate military force engaged in a just 
war to restore the rightful sovereign to the British throne. In contrast, from the perspective 
of the British state, the Forty-Five was not a just war and the Jacobites were rebels guilty 
of treason. This was notably different from the Fifteen, which had begun in Braemar and 
enjoyed much popular support in the Lowlands and throughout England and was viewed 
as more akin to a civil war than a Highland rebellion.8 As such, British Army officers 
argued that the Jacobites were not entitled to the protections afforded to legitimate enemy 
forces through the rules of warfare. The rules of war were codified in the seventeenth 
century by Hugo Grotius and moderated in Samuel von Pufendorf’s 1672 Of The Law of 
Nature and Nations and Emmerich de Vattel’s 1758 The Laws of Nations. They imposed 
constraints upon nations in an attempt to ensure war was only waged by a legitimate 
authority for a just cause and to limit the actual conduct of war.9 The rules marked a step 
away from the fire and sword campaigns that targeted all within an enemy country; 
forbidding any violence against civilians so long as they did not actively assist the enemy 
by taking up arms. Further, any ravaging of an enemy’s country was only permitted 
through military necessity or as a punishment for outrages of the rules of war. The rules 
also offered protection to surrendering soldiers: stipulating that quarter was to be given 
to those who laid down their arms during a battle and that a capitulating garrison ought 
never to be refused their lives.10 The rules of war emphasised that the main consideration 
when waging war ought to be moderation and that any unnecessary damage or hostility 
undertaken against the enemy was condemnable as contrary to the law of nature. 
Although in practice these rules were often flouted, they provided a blueprint for how 
civilised, European nations ought to behave when in conflict with one another. 
                                                 
7 See: Ian Gilmour, Riot, Risings and Revolution: Governance and Violence in Eighteenth-Century 
England, 2nd ed. (London: Pimlico, 1993), 67; Layne, ‘Spines of the Thistle’, 34-79.  
8 See Szechi, 1715, 51-76.  
9 M. Howard, ‘Constraints on Warfare’, in The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western 
World, ed. M. Howard, G. J. Andreopoulos, and M. R. Shulman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1994), 1-11; Eliga H. Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making 
of a New World Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 16–24.  
10 Campbell, Rights of War and Peace, bk. 3, 290-418; Vattel, Laws of Nations, bk. 4, 301-20; Samuel 
von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations: Translated into English by Basil Kennett, 4th ed. 
(London: Internet Archive from Boston Public Library, 1729), bk. 8, 833-53.  
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However, when conflict involved rebels who had unjustly taken up arms the rules 
were less clear on what protection, if any, they were entitled to. Rebellion was viewed as 
high treason and early iterations of the rules, including Grotius’, argued that no 
punishment was too severe for those who engaged in it.11 Although attitudes were 
softening towards clemency in the eighteenth century, Grotius’ interpretation 
underpinned the British response to the Forty-Five. Furthermore, despite Vattel’s 
formalisation of a policy of moderation and clemency towards rebels in The Laws of 
Nations, few eighteenth-century army officers were prepared to treat rebels as legitimate 
opponents covered by the rules of war.12 The status and rights of rebels remained 
contested and British Army officers continued to use the classification of a conflict as a 
rebellion to justify military excesses and violence throughout the empire. The rights of 
nations classified as savages were similarly contested throughout the eighteenth century. 
Grotius made no specific mention of savages and, although Vattel urged moderation, 
emphasising that “whenever severity is not absolutely necessary, clemency becomes a 
duty”, he believed it was acceptable for warfare against such groups to be conducted on 
the terms of the savage, rather than the civilised, nation.13 Groups who were classified by 
the British as savages, including Scottish Highlanders and Native Americans, were often 
accused of unrestrained brutality and of being incapable of adhering to the rules of 
warfare. As such, the rules legitimised the use of violent tactics against these groups, and 
army officers justified their targeting of entire communities by referencing the rules of 
war and arguing they were simply following the example of the savages themselves.  
The outbreak of the Forty-Five and the Jacobites’ rapid advance south during its 
early stages exposed the failure of the British state’s response to the Fifteen. Less than 
fifty men were executed for participating in the Fifteen, none in Scotland, as there was 
little appetite amongst the elite to seek punishment for those who had been involved. In 
Scotland, where support for Jacobitism remained high, severity was thought 
inappropriate and the state instead sought loyalty through clemency and reintegration. 
Elites convicted of participation in the Fifteen had their estates forfeited to the Crown, 
but there was no attempt to implement improvement upon them as would follow the 
                                                 
11 Campbell, Rights of War and Peace, 50.  
12 Stephen Conway, ‘To Subdue America: British Army Officers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary 
War’, WMQ 43, no. 3 (1986): 396–97. https://doi.org/10.2307/1922482; Vattel, Laws of Nations, bk. 3, 
421-28.  
13 Vattel, Laws of Nations, bk. 3, 348.  
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Forty-Five. Many quickly found their way back into the hands of those families who had 
forfeited them, and the fact that several would be forfeited again in the aftermath of the 
Forty-Five highlights the failure of the state’s pacification strategy.14 Immediate attempts 
were made to improve military infrastructure in the Highlands, with the construction of 
barracks at Ruthven, Glenelg, Inversnaid, and Kilwhimen. These garrisons were manned 
by local Highlanders who had remained loyal during the Fifteen but proved ineffective 
at deterring crime or implementing the 1716 Disarming Act, which forbade Highlanders 
from owning weapons.15 The shock of another attempted rising in 1719, and a petition 
from Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, alleging that the Highlands remained in a state of 
incivility, with thievery and depredation rampant, caused the British to take further 
action.16 Fort Augustus was built to replace Kilwhimen and Fort George in Inverness was 
constructed as the army’s northern base of operations, whilst a new Disarming Act was 
passed in 1725. Under the direction of General George Wade, commander of the troops 
in Scotland, Independent Highland Companies were raised to act as a police force in the 
region and the army embarked upon a road-building programme. Although the 
Independent Companies successfully confiscated hundreds of weapons, many 
Highlanders possessed two or three sets of arms, so the steps failed to curb their ability 
to rebel or engage in criminal activity. By 1745, Wade had overseen the construction of 
approximately three hundred miles of military roads and several bridges, but many 
Highland regions remained inaccessible.17 Further, the formalisation of the Independent 
Companies into the 43rd Highland Regiment of Foot, or the Black Watch, led to their 
removal from the Highlands and deployment in Europe during the War of the Austrian 
Succession. When the Forty-Five broke out, British troops were confined to the five 
active garrisons in the Highlands and it was the Jacobites who were able to exploit 
Wade’s newly constructed roads to assist their advance. The perceived failure of the 
pacification strategy adopted in response to the Fifteen would influence the steps taken 
after the Forty-Five.   
                                                 
14 Margaret Sankey, Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion: Preventing and Punishing Insurrection in 
Early Hanoverian Britain, rev. ed. (London: Routledge, 2017), 99-129; Lenman, Jacobite Risings, 159-
79. 
15 Peter Simpson, The Independent Highland Companies, 1603-1760 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2001), 
100–101.  
16 Memorial of Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, Undated, GD224/918/15, NRS.  




The development of a fiscal-military state left Britain financially better able to 
wage war whilst the enlightenment influenced the values and ideals of the army and 
encouraged the spread of knowledge within it, particularly amongst the officer class. 
These structural and theoretical developments underpinned Britain’s eighteenth-century 
military adaptations, although the changes themselves emerged because of the direct 
experiences of the army campaigning throughout the world. The Forty-Five provided an 
opportunity for the British Army to confront the challenges inherent in keeping an army 
supplied in a geographical fringe and test new methods of warfare and operational tactics. 
The lessons learnt during this campaign then influenced how the army approached similar 
challenges in another geographical fringe during the French and Indian War.  
A functioning logistics system was vital to keep the army supplied whilst on 
campaign but during the Forty-Five the British Army struggled to keep all its soldiers 
supplied with provisions. The most remote locations were always the most difficult to 
supply as road and water access was often restricted. As such, the Independent 
Companies, scattered throughout the Highlands, were particularly affected by the army’s 
inability to ensure that centralised provisions reached the soldiers. In August 1745 Major 
William Mackenzie complained that there was “not a single spare firelock in this Garrison 
[Inverness]” and requested assistance from John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, to 
supply his men so they could take to the field.18 Likewise, although supplies could be 
obtained locally there was no mechanism in place to allow the distribution of centralised 
supplies or money to troops in the Highlands. Duncan Forbes of Culloden observed that 
provisioning the Independent Companies had been a “great hardship” throughout the 
campaign, although the troops had subsisted by private credit.19 Soldiers on the march in 
the Highlands were expected to subsist on the country around them. Whilst provisions 
could be demanded from local inhabitants, the fire and sword tactics employed by the 
British Army to try and bring the rebellion to an end also affected soldiers as food became 
increasingly scarce in the Highlands. This continued to cause problems during the 
pacification after the Battle of Culloden, and Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell had to end an 
intelligence-gathering trip in Glen Dessary because “there is scarce a cow left in this 
                                                 
18 William Mackenzie to Earl of Loudoun, Inverness, 13 August 1745, LO (SCO) 12053, HL. 
19 Duncan Forbes to Duke of Newcastle, Inverness, 13 May 1746, LO (SCO) 11512, HL.  
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country to subsist us.”20 Little was done to overcome the logistical problems in the 
Highlands during the rising. However, officers like Loudoun who witnessed the issues 
first hand gained a clear understanding of the importance of a good logistics system for 
implementing militarisation strategy, to allow the army to effectively carry out its 
function and secure victory. This led Loudoun to focus on the development of such a 
system in North America when he took command of the troops there.   
In the eighteenth century, regular warfare encompassed carefully planned 
marches, sieges, and battles against enemy forces, all centrally organised and carried out 
by trained and disciplined soldiers in professional armies. In contrast, irregular warfare 
was undertaken by small groups, sometimes employed by a state and sometimes acting 
independently, who used their knowledge of the environment to conduct surprise assaults 
whilst the enemy was on the march and to raid enemy fortresses and camps. Those 
carrying out irregular warfare sought to harry and weaken the enemy rather than win a 
decisive battle and irregular soldiers, often outnumbered during raids, tended to rely upon 
surprise: attacking quickly and then melting into the countryside before their enemy could 
regroup and stage a counter-attack.21 Scottish Highlanders and Native Americans both 
had long traditions of irregular warfare, with Highland clans adopting such methods 
against other clans as well as government forces and with Native Americans utilising 
such tactics against both natives and settlers. Eighteenth-century European warfare 
increasingly consisted of a combination of regular and irregular tactics and European 
powers often employed frontiersmen who were not trained in traditional combat as 
irregulars. 
During the Forty-Five the British Army waged a campaign of irregular warfare 
concurrent to its regular campaign. After supporting Sir John Cope in the defeat at 
Prestonpans in September 1745, the Earl of Loudoun was ordered to Inverness with his 
64th Regiment. He was to work in conjunction with Duncan Forbes of Culloden, who 
had been granted a number of blank commissions to recruit loyal Highlanders under 
                                                 
20 John Campbell to Earl of Albemarle, 10 August 1746 in The Albemarle Papers: Being the 
Correspondence of William Anne, Second Earl of Albemarle, Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, 1746-
1748 with an Appendix of Letters from Andrew Fletcher, Lord Justice-Clerk to the Duke of Newcastle, 
1746-1748, ed. C. S. Terry, vol. 1 (Aberdeen: New Spalding Club, 1902), 92.  
21 See: Russell, ‘Redcoats in the Wilderness’, 629-52; John K Mahon, ‘Anglo-American Methods of 
Indian Warfare, 1676-1794’, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 45, no. 2 (1958): 254–75. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1902929; Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-
1815 (London: University College London Press, 1998), 17-36; John Grenier, The First Way of War: 
American War Making on the Frontier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 87-114.  
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Loudoun’s command, to conduct a campaign of irregular warfare.22 It was expected that 
keeping a body of troops in this region would act as a deterrent to those thinking of joining 
the Jacobites and would ensure a supplementary force was available that could be sent to 
strengthen the main body of the army if required. Loudoun worked closely with Forbes 
and numerous clan chiefs during this period of recruitment, quickly gaining a reputation 
as a good, honest general which he would retain throughout his time in Scotland. He was 
willing to negotiate with certain Highland elites, recognising that he required their help 
to recruit effectively in that region. The mathematician Colin MacLaurin, writing in late 
1745, noted that Loudoun and Forbes had successfully managed to persuade a number of 
clans to remain quiet whilst simultaneously raising several hundred men for the 
Independent Companies.23 This important work was credited with hampering Jacobite 
recruitment. It also gives a sense of Loudoun’s character. Most officers refused to 
negotiate with Highlanders due to the perception that they were closet Jacobites and 
therefore untrustworthy. Loudoun, however, took a more open view of the Highlanders 
and was willing to work with those who professed loyalty to the Crown.  
Irregular troops in the Highlands were tasked with securing routes of 
communication, garrisoning military posts, disrupting Jacobite supply lines, harassing 
parties of Jacobites remaining in the region, and destroying the settlements of those who 
had marched south. As early as October 1745 Loudoun was ordered to drive away the 
sheep and cattle of any clans who had joined the Jacobites, with John Dalrymple, second 
Earl of Stair, arguing that attacking the homes and families of Jacobites would likely 
persuade them to abandon the cause and return home.24 Such tactics were deliberately 
designed to dampen Jacobite morale and encourage desertion. In early 1746 the Duke of 
Cumberland ordered Loudoun to “do all that lays in your Power to annoy the Rebels in 
their Retreat whilst H.R.H. pursues ’em on to Perth from this side.”25 The irregulars 
continued to be employed in the aftermath of the rising as the army sought to prevent the 
Jacobites regrouping. 
                                                 
22 Stair, Memorial Concerning the Rebellion in Scotland, 5 September 1745, LO (SCO) 7641, HL. 
23 Colin MacLaurin to Unknown, Morpeth, 14 November 1745, Add MS 35889, ff.41-2, BL; MacLaurin 
to Unknown, Edinburgh, 14 December 1745, Add MS 35889, ff.66-7, BL.  
24 Earl of Stair to Loudoun, London, 5 October 1745, LO (SCO) 7636, HL. See also: Report of 
Argyleshire Men, Dunkeld, 20 February 1746, GD1/90/3, NRS; Duke of Cumberland to Loudoun, 
Aberdeen, 20 March 1746, LO (SCO) 9504, HL. 
25 Cumberland to Loudoun (in the Hand of Joseph Yorke), Stirling, 3 February 1746, Add MS 35889, 
f.81, BL.  
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The tradition of irregular warfare amongst Highlanders led to the prevailing view 
within the British Army that they were, by nature, better equipped to handle the 
challenging Highland climate and explains why it was primarily Highlanders who were 
recruited in that role. Irregular troops had to be fit as they were expected to climb 
mountains and navigate the difficult Highland terrain whilst remaining constantly alert 
for possible ambushes, and local knowledge was an advantage for ambushing the enemy. 
Irregulars were expected to remain active, scouring the countryside for Jacobites 
throughout the winter months even after the rising had been extinguished. This was 
notably different from the regular army which was generally sent into quarters over 
winter.26 Margaret Campbell, Countess of Loudoun, expressed concern for her son 
spending so much time in the Highlands and particularly for proposing to spend a second 
winter with his men where they would be encamped in the hills without tents. Margaret 
noted Loudoun would be exposed to such “hardships as the most barbarous of 
Highlanders are only able to support.”27 Despite the poor conditions, Loudoun gained 
much experience of irregular warfare during his time in the Highlands as a result of 
spending winters in the field with his men, exposing himself to the same conditions they 
faced. This would influence him a decade later in North America when he considered 
what tactics to use during the French and Indian War.  
Although only Loudoun, his 64th Regiment, and the Independent Highland 
Companies carried out irregular warfare during the Forty-Five, accounts of that aspect of 
the campaign spread throughout the army, increasing the general understanding of 
irregular warfare amongst the officer class. A number of British Army officers subscribed 
to newspapers which carried first-hand accounts of the skirmishes between irregulars and 
Jacobites and military literature increasingly came to discuss irregular warfare during the 
1740s and 1750s.28 The regular army also underwent its own adaptation to campaigning 
in the Highlands over the course of the rising. As Victoria Henshaw highlighted, the army 
began the campaign adhering to the wide marching formation specified in Bland’s 
Treatise of Military Discipline. However, this was not suitable for the mountainous and 
                                                 
26 Albemarle to Newcastle, Fort Augustus, 1 August 1746 in Terry, Albemarle Papers, 1:14-15. 
Albemarle informed Newcastle that the weather was already growing bad and he hoped to put his own 
troops into winter quarters soon, leaving Loudoun and the irregular troops to scour the countryside 
around Fort Augustus.  
27 Countess of Loudoun to Loudoun, 14 May 1746, Sorn Castle, LO (SCO) 11259, HL. 
28 Russell, ‘Redcoats in the Wilderness’, 47; Ira D. Gruber, Books and the British Army, 3-63.  
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often boggy Highland terrain, and when Cumberland adapted the formation to a narrow 
one as preferred by the Jacobites manoeuvrability immediately improved, allowing the 
army to engage with the Jacobites twice on the march prior to the Battle of Culloden.29 
This highlighted that such adaptations were possible during a single campaign and that 
making changes to formation, strategy, etc. to better suit the specific environment the 
army was campaigning in could make a clear contribution to victory. It provided an 
important precedent for further military adaptations in other fringes of the British Empire.  
British Cultural Paradigms in the Forty-Five 
The loyalty paradigm influenced how the British defined the Jacobites during the 
Forty-Five. Labelling the Jacobites as rebels emphasised their disloyalty to the Crown 
and provided justification for the level of violence employed against them. Geoffrey 
Plank explained that by defining the Jacobites as criminals and rebels, the British 
suggested that they held personal responsibility for acting treasonously against the state.30 
As such, upon learning of the prospect of an imminent rising, the British government 
offered a reward for Charles Edward Stuart’s arrest and Jacobites were liable to 
prosecution if taken prisoner throughout the campaign. Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, the 
Earl of Chesterfield, articulated the British state’s view of the Jacobites’ treason, 
explaining that “They are not enemies but criminals; we cannot be at war with ‘em”.31 
Chesterfield suggested that the Jacobites were not entitled to the treatment afforded to 
enemy forces as set down in the rules of warfare. Cumberland, who took command of the 
British troops in late November 1745, made it clear that any negotiation with Jacobites 
was unacceptable. At the Jacobite surrender of Carlisle, his aide-de-camp Joseph Yorke 
observed that Cumberland refused to make an “exchange of hostages with Rebels”, 
claiming he had “no power to treat with them” and demanding their surrender to face the 
legal consequences of their actions.32 Cumberland’s actions were widely praised, 
                                                 
29 Victoria Henshaw, ‘A Reassessment of the British Army in Scotland, from the Union to the ’45’, 
Northern Scotland 2, no. 1 (May 2011): 12–13. https://doi.org/10.3366/nor.2011.0002.  
30 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 22. Regarding the definition of treason and the process of prosecuting 
those accused of it, see Blackstone, Commentaries, bk. 4, 75-93.  
31 Earl of Chesterfield to Newcastle, 11 March 1746 in Private Correspondence of Chesterfield and 
Newcastle, 1744-46, ed. Richard Lodge, (London: Royal Historical Society, 1930), 122-23.  
32 Joseph Yorke to Earl of Hardwicke, Carlisle, 30 December 1745 in The Life and Correspondence of 
Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, ed. Philip Yorke, vol. 1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913), 492; Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 40-44. Officers 
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resulting in the arrest and trial of hundreds of men. Officers claimed they were following 
treason law, capturing Jacobites and presenting them to justices of the peace to be 
prosecuted as criminals. However, the army began to undertake more punitive measures 
as the rebellion continued whilst continuing to refuse to treat the Jacobites as a legitimate 
enemy force. In February 1746, Cumberland issued instructions that soldiers should kill 
any Jacobite who did not immediately surrender to them.33 During the Battle of Culloden, 
soldiers killed hundreds of wounded or surrendering Jacobites with impunity, only 
offering the French soldiers in the employ of the Jacobites the opportunity to surrender.34 
Army officers ordered the killing of Jacobites on the battlefield as a method of sentencing 
them to death for treason without having to resort to a trial, although such actions went 
against due process of law.35 Officers rationalised their actions through the paradigm of 
loyalty. The rebellion was not a just war and the Jacobites were guilty of high treason, 
for which the sentence was death. Officers were simply carrying out that sentence on the 
battlefield rather than awaiting such a verdict in a courtroom. 
The British Army and ministry viewed the Forty-Five as a Highland rebellion, 
even though significant numbers from the North East, and smaller numbers of 
Lowlanders and Englishmen, joined the Jacobites and despite many Highlanders 
remaining loyal to the Crown. As such, it was the civility paradigm that played the most 
important role in informing the British response to the Forty-Five. The civility paradigm 
led the British imperial elite to view themselves as civilised in contrast to the barbarous 
Highlanders and to believe that subjugation was necessary to force the Highlanders to 
submit to the British state, which in turn was the only way that population could 
potentially progress to civility. The desire to subjugate savages to civilise them was not 
unique to the Forty-Five, having been implemented in Ireland and even in the Highlands 
previously, and an understanding of the Highlands as a wild, barbarous region and the 
Highlanders as a savage race was well-established prior to the rising.36 The civility 
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paradigm was, however, manifest during the Forty-Five as Highlanders were repeatedly 
labelled savages and it was implied they were inherently rebellious and that none could 
truly be trusted. In addition, discussion and development of ideas and values of progress 
during the Enlightenment encouraged the idea that brutality was a justified necessity 
when a civilised nation was attempting to bring a savage nation to peace to prevent the 
savage nation from standing in the way of progress.37  
During the Forty-Five, the civility paradigm asserted that all Highlanders were 
savage, assigning a characteristic to the entire population group that suggested they were 
inherently backwards and collectively required corrective policies. Plank demonstrated 
that this caused confusion regarding how to treat both Jacobites and non-combatants 
during and after the rising and encouraged the British Army to carry out a campaign of 
violence against the population at large rather than targeting known or suspected 
Jacobites.38 The civility paradigm suggested that, when faced with a barbaric population, 
civil and military spheres could legitimately be blurred and civilians would no longer be 
guaranteed the protections they could generally expect during conflict. Further, the Forty-
Five was widely interpreted as an alien invasion that represented, particularly once the 
Jacobites reached Derby, a real threat to British liberties and to the British Empire.39 This 
encouraged the association of Highlanders and Jacobitism and strengthened the belief 
that all Highlanders were equally guilty for the actions of those who joined the rising and 
ought to be punished as such.  
 Plank detailed the campaign of ‘military execution’ undertaken by the British 
Army during the Forty-Five. Military execution involved the widescale destruction of 
houses and resources and the general scorching of the countryside in areas where civilians 
had refused to comply with the orders of the army or were suspected of doing so. 
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Although such a tactic was relatively common in European warfare it had little legal 
standing as the rules of war technically protected civilians from military excess.40 The 
civility paradigm, however, provided army officers with justification for targeting all 
Highlanders during the Forty-Five. Soldiers were ordered to destroy the houses and crops 
of men they believed were fighting with the Jacobites in the hope it would force them to 
abandon the cause, although no measures were taken to ensure that those targeted were 
participating in the rising. Provisions were appropriated from all Highlanders to feed 
troops on the march or else were destroyed to prevent them finding their way into the 
hands of the Jacobites. Bridges and roads were likewise destroyed to disrupt Jacobite 
communications, leaving the Highlands isolated.41  
Joseph Yorke, aide-de-camp to the Duke of Cumberland and son of Lord 
Chancellor, the Earl of Hardwicke, exhibited the paradigm of civility throughout the 
Forty-Five. Referring to the debate about whether severity or leniency ought to be 
practised once the rebellion had been quelled, Yorke discussed the Highlanders generally, 
rather than the Jacobites, and praised Cumberland for refusing to consider any notion of 
leniency.42 That Yorke professed a desire to punish Highlanders for the rebellion is not 
surprising. His patron, Cumberland, had issued a proclamation the previous month 
decreeing that any who had taken part in the rising ought to surrender themselves and 
their arms to their local magistrate or Presbyterian minister and “submit themselves 
entirely to the King’s Mercy”. Any civilians with information about the rising or 
knowledge of the whereabouts of Jacobite arms were likewise ordered to inform the 
magistrates, and Cumberland threatened a policy of “military execution” against any who 
did not comply.43 In addition, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke would preside over the trial of 
the Jacobite peers in the aftermath of the rising, where “some thought his severity in 
decreeing death sentences comparable to the ‘butchery’ of Cumberland on the 
battlefield.”44 Yorke, therefore, shared the same understanding of the civility paradigm 
as Cumberland and Hardwicke, believing subjugation necessary to gain the submission 
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of Highlanders to the Crown. The actions of the army during the Forty-Five further 
highlight that Yorke was typical within the British Army, as the vast majority of officers 
expressed no qualms about undertaking an indiscriminate fire and sword campaign.  
Such attitudes and understandings were also pervasive in the ministry. In March 
1746 Secretary of State for the Southern Department, the Duke of Newcastle, argued that 
it was necessary for the “power of the Highlands” to be “absolutely reduced” to prevent 
France from playing “the Pretender upon us whenever she pleases”, implying the whole 
Highland region was a threat to Britain’s security.45 Chesterfield, recently appointed Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland, expressed the view that all Highlanders were closet Jacobites. 
Whilst he determined not to introduce pre-emptive measures against Irish Catholics 
during the Forty-Five, fearing it may encourage them to join the rebellion, he advocated 
severity towards Highlanders as they were already in open rebellion: 
 …while that favourall distinction remains of loyall and disloyal, the 
rebellion will never be extinguish’d. Recall your Scotch heroes, starve 
the whole country indiscriminately by your ships, put a price upon the 
heads of the chiefs, and let the Duke put all to fire and sword.46 
Again, the attitudes of Newcastle and Chesterfield towards the Highlanders were 
informed by the civility paradigm and were widely shared amongst British government 
officials, who supported the actions of the army in the Highlands during the rebellion. 
The prevalence of such attitudes within the army and ministry encouraged the adoption 
of a fire and sword campaign during the rising, which would continue during the 
pacification.   
III. Pacification  
In the aftermath of the British victory at Culloden in April 1746, the actions of 
the army in the Highlands became increasingly punitive and indiscriminate. Jacobites and 
those suspected of Jacobitism were sometimes killed rather than arrested. The day after 
the battle, British officer James Wolfe noted that “as few Highlanders were made 
prisoners as possible”,47 whilst the following month Captain Caroline Scott hanged three 
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unarmed men who were suspected of Jacobitism in Lochaber rather than referring them 
to a justice of the peace.48 Women were subject to verbal abuse and physical and sexual 
assault, whilst children were targeted with threats or violence on occasion. Such tactics 
were occasionally employed to gather intelligence about the movements of Charles 
Edward Stuart but often they were simply a method of punishing Highlanders for the 
rebellion.49 Wanton destruction of homes and crops was common, with Cumberland 
noting that he had sent troops to Badenoch to “burn [and] destroy that Country” as not all 
had surrendered their arms.50 Vast areas of the Highlands were laid to waste with little 
care taken to save the houses of those who had not been concerned in the rebellion. When 
the Duke of Montrose complained that his tenants had their farms burnt despite remaining 
loyal throughout the rising, Cumberland blamed Montrose’s factor, who had failed to 
prevent all the tenants from joining the Jacobites.51 The actions of the British Army had 
a lasting impact in the Highlands, leading many to suffer famine during 1746 and 1747.52 
The association of Highlanders with savagery led to the belief that punitive 
measures against the population were the only way to prevent a renewal of hostilities 
immediately, or in the future. In April 1746 Cumberland expressed his belief that: “The 
Jacobite rebellious Principle is so rooted in this Nation [the Highlands], that this 
Generation must be pretty well worn out before This Country will be quiet”, illustrating 
that he felt the army’s actions were vital for British security. Over the following months, 
Cumberland advocated the deportation of several Highland clans, including “the entire 
Clan of the Camerons, [and] almost all the Tribes of the McDonalds”, to the West Indies 
as the only way to prevent future rebellions.53 His aide-de-camp Joseph Yorke expressed 
a similar preference for permanent measures, writing that “we are in the Heart of the vile 
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Race now, [and] I wish were to extirpate.”54 Although such measures were never 
implemented, they highlight the clear desire within the British Army to punish the savage 
Jacobites and explain why the initial pacification was so bloody. Most officers were fully 
engaged with Cumberland’s vision for the pacification. Major General Campbell quickly 
complied with the commander’s orders to drive off the cattle of all who had been involved 
in the rising and articulated his belief that the land of rebels ought to be burnt and 
destroyed, whilst Caroline Scott quickly gained a distasteful reputation for the 
vindictiveness and violence with which he pursued the pacification.55 In addition, 
Cumberland had the support of the ministry and, more importantly, the King for his 
actions as Newcastle informed him that he had the “King’s entire approbation” of his 
Highland strategy.56 
Cumberland’s belief in the need for severity to pacify the Highlands was not 
universally shared, however, and Loudoun’s willingness to negotiate with Highland elites 
during the rising suggests he was not as focused on the punishment of Highlanders as his 
commander. Despite Cumberland’s orders to disarm all Highlanders after Culloden, 
Loudoun negotiated with some elites, allowing them to be answerable for the conduct 
and loyalty of their men so that numerous Highlanders continued to possess weapons.57 
Loudoun also entered into discussion with those who had been actively involved in the 
rebellion, securing a pardon for Simon Fraser, Master of Lovat. Writing to the Earl of 
Albemarle, Cumberland’s replacement as commander of the army in Scotland, Loudoun 
argued that Fraser had shown “great remorse [and] repentance for his past behaviour” 
and had surrendered voluntarily. Asking for guidance as to how he was to treat Jacobite 
officers who surrendered, Loudoun suggested that if low ranking officers were treated 
with clemency Albemarle “would have the whole [surrender] immediately.”58 Loudoun’s 
willingness to negotiate illustrates his desire to facilitate the immediate rehabilitation of 
Highlanders into British imperial society. His experiences working closely with Highland 
soldiers in the Independent Companies clearly influenced his own cultural paradigms, 
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leading him to perceive vast differences amongst Highlanders regarding their civility and 
loyalty to the Crown.  
Loudoun also adopted a limited stance with regards to pacifying the country, 
specifically ordering his men “not to destroy or distress the Country” except as a last 
resort if Highlanders refused to comply with orders.59 Even when ordered to burn houses 
and kill men in Lochaber by his superior Humphrey Bland, Loudoun chose a more 
conciliatory approach, seizing several men but killing none. It is likely that this approach 
induced over one hundred Camerons to surrender personally to Loudoun the following 
day.60 Whilst he was willing to use violent tactics when he believed they were required, 
Loudoun consistently favoured a more moderate approach in the Highlands. His 
“Mildness, Civility and Moderation”61 was recognised and praised during the 
pacification, encouraging compliance with his requests for disarming and submission and 
his reputation led some Jacobites to appeal directly to him for assistance when 
surrendering. For example, James Winrame pled his case for a pardon to Loudoun in 
November 1746, stating that he was emboldened to approach him after: “hearing of your 
Lordps: great Goodness and Humanity to Severals in my Situation by giving them 
protections.”62 
Loudoun was not alone in advocating moderation in the Highlands. Letters in the 
Scots Magazine and Caledonian Mercury throughout 1746 highlight that there was 
significant public support for adopting a policy of leniency in an attempt to win the 
loyalty of Highlanders to the Crown.63 Highland elites including Duncan Forbes of 
Culloden and the Duke of Argyll both advocated the use of peaceful measures to disarm 
the Highlands in the aftermath of Culloden, and Forbes’ constant attempts to persuade 
Cumberland of the benefit of lenient treatment towards Jacobites led Cumberland to 
brand him “arrant Highland mad.”64 As Highlanders themselves, Argyll and Forbes were 
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not guided by the civility paradigm that suggested the subjugation of all Highlanders was 
necessary to affect their civilisation. They believed that wanton destruction of land would 
not help ensure peace but rather would lead to the economic ruin of both loyal and 
disloyal Highlanders, potentially increasing resentment throughout the region.65 As both 
would suffer financially from an indiscriminate campaign of destruction it is likely that 
their desire for moderation arose, at least in part, from self-interest. However, whilst there 
were some who were in favour of negotiation and moderation, coupled with violence 
where appropriate and necessary, as the best method of restoring a lasting peace to the 
Highlands, the prevailing attitude throughout the pacification was that of severity. 
The experiences of the British Army pacifying the Scottish Highlands emphasises 
the importance the British imperial elite placed on submission within the British Empire. 
Whether they advocated leniency or severity, all British Army officers shared a 
determination to gain a total submission from all Highlanders. The paradigm of loyalty 
caused the British imperial elite to demand the allegiance to the Crown of all within the 
empire. Although clanship was in decline by the time of the Forty-Five, the British 
imperial elite remained convinced of its potency and believed that the main reason for 
the rising was the absolute power and tyranny clan chiefs held over their clansmen.66 
They believed that local loyalties at the family or clan level had to be subverted to an 
overriding loyalty to the Crown. The actions of army officers in the initial pacification of 
the Highlands were driven by this desire to assert British authority, ensure a formal 
recognition of King George II, and emphasise the power and reach of the Crown, even in 
a geographical fringe. As the pacification of the Highlands moved past its punitive phase, 
this goal remained fundamental to British interests and long-term policies were developed 
to meet it so that the peace could be consolidated, and the Highlanders would eventually 
be assimilated within the British Empire as Britons.  
Militarisation of the Highlands 
The militarisation of the Highlands in the decades after the Forty-Five was a 
deliberate process undertaken by the British Army, under the direction of the government, 
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driven by the paradigms of loyalty and civility. Fifteen thousand troops were posted to 
Scotland by September 1746, most in the Highlands, and a year later approximately ten 
thousand remained. This represented a substantial change from the 1720s and 1730s when 
only small companies of independent, Highland troops patrolled the region.67 Forts and 
garrisons that had existed prior to the Forty-Five were improved and expanded, enabling 
them to quarter more troops, whilst new forts were constructed in strategic locations such 
as Fort George, near Inverness. Proposals were made for a chain of garrisons and barracks 
to link together throughout the Highlands, allowing a strong military presence throughout 
the entire region.68 As Jeremy Black highlighted, this was unusual in a domestic setting 
as fort building was normally reserved for overseas locations.69 The Forty-Five 
highlighted that Wade’s earlier road-building efforts had not extended far enough. 
Extensive road building programmes were advocated as a method of pacifying the 
population and militarising the region.70 Construction began immediately after Culloden 
and, by 1767, Major Caufield’s roadbuilding parties had constructed approximately nine 
hundred miles of roads throughout the Highlands, making the most remote areas of the 
Highlands more accessible to soldiers and providing commercial links between the 
Highlands and the Lowlands and England.71 The army was also expected to act as a police 
force in the Highlands, ensuring compliance with the legislative measures enacted to 
prevent a repeat uprising. These measures included the Act of Proscription, 1746, which 
renewed and re-emphasised the Disarming Act of 1716: banning Highlanders from 
carrying arms and introducing stricter penalties for those caught violating the act. It also 
included a Dress Act which prohibited the wearing of Highland dress such as the plaid. 
Officers’ reports from the region throughout the 1750s noted the active role taken by 
soldiers arresting men for both offences.72 The Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act was 
also passed in 1746, abolishing the traditional rights of the clan chiefs so that they could 
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no longer legally call their men to arms or act as a judge in cases of civil or criminal law 
involving their men.73 
The maintenance of a strong military force and the substantial investment in 
military infrastructure in the Highlands highlights both the continued threat of Jacobitism 
post-Culloden and the perceived ‘otherness’ of the region and its people. The possibility 
of another Jacobite rising remained a realistic prospect whilst the War of the Austrian 
Succession continued should France sponsor a Highland rebellion or invasion as a 
distraction from the continental war. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle in April 1748 made 
this less likely, although the British government remained determined to limit 
Highlanders’ military capabilities. Whilst punitive measures had been considered 
effective in the short term, the British Army and state believed that deep, structural 
changes within Highland society were required for long-term peace in the region. 
The measures proposed aimed to effect the assimilation of Highlanders into the 
British Empire and guarantee a continuing submission and adherence to the Crown from 
them as loyal Britons. Understandings of civility continued to guide the British imperial 
elite as the civilisation of the Highlanders was generally considered a prerequisite for 
their assimilation. The emergence of stadial theory in Scotland in the writings of Adam 
Smith at the same time Britons were considering what measures they ought to take to 
civilise the Highlands can clearly be seen to have influenced the steps taken. Stadial 
theory suggested that Highlanders had the potential to progress from their current state 
as pastoralists, through agriculture, to a civilised state of commercialism.74 As such, there 
were several commonalities in commentators’ plans for civilising the Highlands which 
drew on emerging enlightenment philosophies. Agriculture was repeatedly identified as 
the foundation of wealth for a society and the first step towards industry, whilst 
improvement was lauded as a national objective in which the emphasis ought to be on 
commerce.75 Other proposals argued that government control of property was vitally 
important to hold power over the inhabitants. Lord Justice Clerk Andrew Fletcher 
identified this as paramount for civilising the Highlands, stating that: 
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To the best Judgement I can form, of that, Barbarous, Lawless countrey, 
the shortest and easiest way of civilizeing it, and reduceing it to the 
Obedience of the Law, is to Vest the absolute Property in the Crown of 
as much of it as possible: which, of course, gives his Majesty the 
absolute Disposal of all the Inhabitants.76 
The plans also placed emphasis on eroding the “barbarous customs” of the people and 
removing their dependence on their clan chiefs, again highlighting that despite the 
weakening of clanship over the previous decades the British continued to believe it a 
barrier to peace.77 Finally, a clear link was inferred between Jacobitism and religion, with 
nonjuring Episcopal meeting houses accused of being “nurseries and schools Of 
Jacobitism and disaffection.”78 All of these proposals influenced the parliamentary debate 
regarding the steps to be taken in the Highlands in the months and years following 
Culloden.  
Immediately after the rebellion, forty-one Highland estates belonging to members 
of the landed gentry who had openly supported the Jacobites were forfeited to the Crown. 
Whilst the majority of these were sold to pay debts or raise revenue, the annexation of 
thirteen of them in 1752 “for the better Civilizing and Improving the Highlands of 
Scotland and Preventing Disorders there for the Future” developed from Fletcher’s 
proposals emphasising control of property.79 The estates were to act as models for 
improvement, industry, and commerce throughout the Highlands and profits from the 
rentals were to be used to affect more general improvements in the region. The Society 
in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge, SSPCK, had been actively attempting 
to educate and convert Highlanders for decades. From the 1750s it worked closely with 
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the Commission for the Annexed Estates, establishing charity schools and placing 
Presbyterian ministers in Highland parishes. Schools aimed to remove the ‘popish’ 
influence of Highland parents by converting children and teaching them English.80 
Cumberland’s belief that disaffection and Jacobitism were firmly entrenched in the older 
population was widely shared, so focus was placed on ensuring that younger generations 
grew up as loyal, Protestant subjects.81 Other steps taken to gain the loyalty of Highland 
children to the Crown, rather than the clan, included removing them from the Highlands 
to be raised by Lowland, Protestant families and the apprenticeship scheme coordinated 
by the commissioners for the annexed estates, which provided education in crafts, 
including spinning and weaving, for children from the poorest Highland families.82 The 
purpose of the scheme was twofold. First, by providing them with an education it was 
hoped the children would grow up loyal to the Crown and, secondly, by requiring 
apprentices to return to their home parish to practice their craft once their education was 
complete it was hoped that industry and commerce would spread throughout the 
Highlands.  
At the same time as measures were being implemented from above, Highland men 
from all levels of society continued to become increasingly engaged with improvement 
ideology themselves. Numerous Highland elites undertook significant work on their 
estates whilst some tenant farmers even implemented improvements due to changes to 
the rental system which provided them with longer leases.83 Improvers believed that 
traditional clanship was incompatible with improvement as clanship was viewed as a 
military, rather than an agricultural, system. Such an understanding had been developing 
amongst Highland landowners for decades, contributing to the decline in clanship prior 
to the Forty-Five.84 The move from clanship to commerce continued in the decades after 
the rising, accelerating due to the systematic steps taken by the government.  
The measures implemented by the British in the Highlands had mixed results. The 
Commission for the Annexed Estates made little progress in its attempts to facilitate 
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widespread improvement throughout the region. Henry Home, Lord Kames, one of the 
commissioners, admitted that much of the money spent had been “no better than water 
spilt on the ground.”85 The civilising mission was much more successful and within three 
years of the commission’s establishment reports were indicating that its intervention had 
contributed to a decrease in theft and rapine in the Highlands.86 This downward trend 
continued so that when the annexed estates were restored in 1784, the act of restoration 
proclaimed that no inhabitants of Britain were more loyal or dutiful than the 
Highlanders.87 Whilst Highlanders had not yet become a commercial society, the British 
imperial elite believed the annexation had served its purpose and helped to assimilate 
them more closely within Britain. The measures represented a clear evolution in the 
approach of the British to pacifying the Highlands away from subjugation towards 
regulation and commercialisation. This mirrored a more general evolution of the army at 
this juncture as its purpose became less fixed simply as a fighting force and it increasingly 
played an important role in promoting and attempting to implement a civilising mission 
in the places it was active.88  In North America, the British Army relied upon direct and 
indirect experiences in the Highlands when implementing militarisation, pacifying hostile 
peoples, and governing distant geographical fringes of the empire. 
Changing Attitudes towards Highlanders 
At the same time as militarisation strategy was thought to be affecting changes in 
Highland society, the recruitment of Highland soldiers into the British Army on a vast 
scale to fight as defenders of empire in imperial theatres of war contributed to a general 
softening of attitudes towards that population. As noted, Highland recruitment was not a 
new phenomenon in the post-Culloden period. The Black Watch Regiment had patrolled 
the Highlands since 1739 and during the Forty-Five Loudoun raised the 64th Regiment 
in the Highlands.89 Highland recruitment into regiments serving abroad had been 
identified in the wake of the Forty-Five as a way of removing men from the region to 
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lessen the threat of renewed rebellion. However, large-scale Highland recruitment only 
began with the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War in 1756 as Secretary of State William 
Pitt suggested Highlanders as an alternative source of manpower for the colonial 
theatre.90 Andrew Mackillop illustrated that although the British government did not 
think of military recruitment as a method of pacifying the Highlands it quickly became 
the most successful government policy for rehabilitating Highlanders and assimilating 
them within the empire.91 This was particularly true for Highland elites who were able to 
effect recruitment at a local level despite it being a central government policy. The 
government’s ignorance about the weakening of clanship led to its reliance on clan chiefs 
to encourage enlistment, who exploited the government’s lack of understanding to obtain 
patronage through the recruitment process.92 Recruitment allowed Highland elites to 
participate as members of the wider British imperial elite, rehabilitating themselves in the 
eyes of the state. This was also true for Highland soldiers, and even ex-Jacobites, who 
had previously been classified as rebels and savages but increasingly came to be viewed 
as useful soldiers of empire. As Highland soldiers gained a reputation as talented and 
loyal, attitudes towards Highlanders generally began to soften accordingly.  
By the time the British Army was undertaking further recruitment in the 
Highlands upon the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War, consideration of how 
civilised the Highlanders were played a much less important role in guiding the army’s 
interactions with that population than it had previously. Partly, this was because efforts 
to civilise Highlanders were thought to be working, which caused them to be described 
as savages less often, although such language did not disappear entirely even into the 
nineteenth century. Shifts in attitudes were assisted by the publication of the ‘Ossian’ 
poems in the 1760s which refocused attention on the Highlands culturally rather than 
politically at a time when the positive image of the ‘noble savage’ was emerging to 
challenge the negative impression of the ‘barbarous savage’.93 The militarisation of the 
Highlands made the region increasingly accessible and enabled further development of 
commerce which, in turn, led to increased interactions between Highlanders and Britons 
                                                 
90 Dziennik, Fatal Land, 27-57.  
91 Mackillop, More Fruitful than the Soil, 75; Dziennik, Fatal Land, 27-57.  
92 Mackillop, More Fruitful than the Soil, 41-76. The Duke of Argyll played a central role in Highland 
recruitment. See Argyll to Loudoun, London, 12 March 1757, LO (AM) 3028, HL.  
93 Robert Clyde, From Rebel to Hero: The Image of the Highlander 1745-1830 (East Lothian: Tuckwell 
Press, 1995), 84; Dziennik, Fatal Land, 183-219.  
72 
 
and an erosion of the perception that the Highlanders and their customs were alien. In 
addition, there was no continued military threat from the Highlands after the Forty-Five 
and Highlanders were increasingly integrated into the war effort and imperial venture 
through their recruitment into the British Army to serve in the colonial theatre.  
Most importantly, the loyalty paradigm came to play an increasingly important 
role in guiding interactions between the British imperial elite and all imperial populations. 
Uncivilised Highlanders had clearly not fully assimilated into the British state and 
become Britons. However, they were displaying continuing submission and adherence to 
the British state, which suggested that loyalty could be achieved without assimilation. 
Thus, Britishness was not a necessity for imperial populations who could be loyal 
subjects of the empire without being Britons. As the militarisation process shaped such 
understandings in the Highlands, a concurrent militarisation process in North America 
(explored in the following chapters) cemented this paradigm shift in the wake of the 
French and Indian War and the territorial expansion of the British Empire. Highlanders 
came to be viewed as imperial subjects with the same rights and responsibilities as others 
throughout the empire. Their continuing barbarity meant they were not thought to share 
the developing British identity highlighted by Linda Colley.94 They would remain on the 
periphery of both the British state and empire until after the wars of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. It would be with the reshaping of empire in the aftermath 
of the loss of the thirteen colonies that Highlanders would begin to truly be included 
within the British identity and play a role as Britons shaping the empire rather than one 
simply as subjects of that empire.  
IV. Conclusions 
Waging war against the Jacobites provided the British Army with experience 
fighting an ‘other’ population group in a geographical fringe of the empire. Difficulties 
supplying the army in remote regions of the Highlands, alongside a recognition that poor 
access and communication links had prevented a speedy resolution of the conflict, 
emphasised the importance of a good logistics system to victory, particularly in regions 
far from the imperial centre. In addition, the Forty-Five provided the army with an 
opportunity to utilise irregular soldiers to hamper Jacobite recruitment efforts and harry 
retreating forces. The direct experience of those involved in the Forty-Five contributed 
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to increased knowledge and understanding throughout the army regarding military 
adaptations to specific conditions of warfare, which would influence army officers a 
decade later in North America. 
In the eyes of British authorities, the association of Scottish Highlanders with the 
Forty-Five raised questions about the loyalty and identity of population groups within the 
British Empire. The cultural paradigms of loyalty and civility guided the British Army 
and state in their response to the Forty-Five. Classifying the Jacobites as rebels and 
traitors who were acting disloyally served to deny them legitimacy as a military force and 
acted as a method of justification for the army’s failure to adhere to the rules of warfare 
when fighting them. Concurrently, the civility paradigm led to the view that all 
Highlanders were savages who were inherently rebellious and, therefore, were all equally 
guilty for the actions of the Jacobites and ought to be treated and punished as such. This 
led to a blurring of the military and civil spheres and both Jacobites and non-combatants 
suffered as the British Army implemented indiscriminate, punitive measures as they 
sought to end the conflict and prevent a renewal of hostilities in the future, although some 
officers did temper their response with moderation. 
Imperial security remained the primary British aim and ensuring Highland 
allegiance and adherence to the Crown was thought to be the best method of achieving 
this. Whilst punitive measures and a requirement for all to submit to the Crown were 
thought sufficient for short-term security, militarisation as an implicit threat against 
rebellion and structural changes within Highland society to assimilate Highlanders within 
the British state and empire, thereby inculcating loyalty, were considered necessary steps 
in the long-term. Civilising the population was considered a prerequisite for their 
assimilation and emerging enlightenment values and ideals influenced the 
implementation of measures designed to progress the Highlanders from barbarity to 
civility through improvement and industry.  
By the 1770s steps taken to civilise Highlanders were thought to have had some 
success as they accelerated a shift towards commercialism that had begun decades earlier. 
Highlanders had also begun to rehabilitate themselves within British society through their 
participation in the imperial venture resulting from their recruitment into the British 
Army. Such recruitment, alongside the perception that civilising measures were working 
and the lack of a continued military threat from the Highlands, helped to reduce the 
‘otherness’ of the Highlanders in the eyes of the British imperial elite, although this had 
not been entirely overcome. The Seven Years’ War led to the territorial expansion of the 
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British Empire and introduced new, non-Protestant, non-British populations into the 
imperial fold. This, alongside the concurrent militarisation processes implemented in the 
Highlands and in North America, caused a shift in understandings of loyalty within the 
empire as Britishness was no longer thought a necessity for imperial populations. As a 
result, Highlanders were viewed as loyal imperial subjects, but they remained on the 


















































Figure 2. Title: John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudoun, 1705-1782. In Regimental Highland Dress. 
Artist: John Faber. Engraving after portrait by Allan Ramsay, 1747. Date created: 1755.  





I. Introduction  
A decade after the outbreak of the Forty-Five, the British Army was again 
involved in a military conflict with significant imperial implications. Originating as a 
dispute over trade and settlement rights in the Ohio Country, the French and Indian War 
quickly developed into a general conflict between Britain and France and their respective 
Native American allies throughout North America and then into the global Seven Years’ 
War from May 1756 when Britain officially declared war on France. Many British Army 
officers and soldiers who fought during the Forty-Five were involved in the conflict in 
North America as Britain sent an unprecedented number of soldiers across the Atlantic, 
complementing the shift in foreign policy towards blue water, imperial aims.1 Edward 
Braddock, the first commander-in-chief, was sent to the Ohio Country in 1755 with two 
regular regiments to remove the French from that region but was killed in the battle at the 
Monongahela River, a military disaster that jeopardised British influence in the region. 
Braddock was initially replaced by Massachusetts Governor William Shirley before Lord 
Loudoun was given the command in 1756.2 Loudoun was tasked with gaining the 
cooperation of colonial assemblies, provincial soldiers, and civilians in the war effort and 
obtaining strategic victories against the French. He was recalled on 30 December 1757 
after presiding over the worst campaigning year for the British Army throughout the 
entirety of the war: abandoning an expedition against Louisbourg and suffering 
significant defeats at Fort William Henry and the German Flatts.  
The previous chapter highlighted the British Army’s experiences of militarisation 
in Scotland during and after the Forty-Five and explored how the cultural paradigms of 
civility and loyalty governed the British response to that conflict and later perceptions of 
Highlanders. Loudoun played an important role in the Forty-Five, commanding a 
campaign of irregular warfare in the Highlands and playing an active role in the 
pacification of the region, where he favoured a strategy of moderation and negotiation 
with Highland elites to secure peace and ensure long-term loyalty from the population. 
This chapter considers Loudoun’s experiences of warfare and militarisation in North 
America during his time as commander-in-chief, highlighting how his formative 
experiences in Scotland influenced his actions in another fringe of the British Empire. It 
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challenges the common portrayal of Loudoun, prevalent both in older biographies and 
recent historiography, as obstinate, hot-headed, and bullying.3 Although quick to anger 
at perceived colonial insubordination, this chapter argues Loudoun preferred negotiation 
inspired by the failed Albany Plan of Union of 1754. It first considers Loudoun’s prior 
experiences, before exploring the North American context: how British imperial attitudes 
and militarisation exacerbated British-colonial relations. Loudoun’s attempts to 
overcome the challenges of waging war in North America illustrate how the Forty-Five 
influenced British imperialism and how military practices employed in Scotland were 
adapted to suit North American conditions. The process of militarisation in North 
America, in its infancy during Loudoun’s command, was driven by considerations of 
imperial security in much the same way as the militarisation of the Highlands had been, 
with the cultural paradigm of loyalty to the fore. Loudoun expected Britons in North 
America to exhibit adherence to the imperial state through enthusiastic engagement with 
the war effort. The difficulties he encountered with colonial North American settlers led 
him to question their loyalty, and hence their Britishness, at this early stage in the 
militarisation process, which continued for the duration of the French and Indian War. 
II. Lord Loudoun and the French and Indian War 
Born at Loudoun Castle, Ayrshire, in 1705, John Campbell, fourth Earl of 
Loudoun, was a British Army officer and Scottish representative peer. A noble with ties 
to two prominent Whig families, Clan Campbell and, through his mother, the Dalrymples 
of Stair, Loudoun quickly gained place and patronage both politically and militarily. 
After inheriting the earldom in 1731 he was elected a peer in 1734, which led to his 
appointment as governor of Stirling Castle in 1741. Militarily he rose through the ranks 
from his entry as a cornet in 1727 to his appointment as aide-de-camp to King George II 
in 1743 and as adjutant-general to Sir John Cope at the beginning of the Forty-Five, by 
which time he held the rank of lieutenant-colonel. The family reputation as staunch 
loyalists ensured that his Scottish identity did not impede his military progression, 
although he repeatedly reaffirmed his loyalty throughout his career. Loudoun’s command 
of the 64th Regiment during the Jacobite Uprising led to his association with the Highland 
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soldiers in the British Army, exemplified in a 1747 portrait by the renowned Scottish 
loyalist, Allan Ramsay. The Lowlander Loudoun sports full regimental Highland dress 
in celebration of the loyal Highlanders of the 64th whilst reaffirming the Dress Act of 
1746, by which only British soldiers could wear the kilt. John Faber’s 1755 engraving of 
the Ramsay portrait (Fig. 2), commemorating Loudoun’s appointment as commander-in-
chief, was a visual reminder of Loudoun’s identification with an area still provoking 
questions of loyalty. In his own career, it is likely he was driven to excise any suspicion 
arising from his Scottish origins despite his exploits for the British Army during the 
Forty-Five.  
Loudoun had developed a close relationship with the Duke of Cumberland during 
the Forty-Five. Cumberland and his political allies Henry Fox, Secretary of State for the 
Southern Department, and the Earl of Halifax, president of the Board of Trade, secured 
Loudoun the North American command in January 1756. The British government hoped 
Loudoun would provide leadership to facilitate colonial cooperation in the prosecution 
of the war and reverse Britain’s disastrous early defeats. Conflict had ignited in North 
America in 1754 when competition between Virginia, Pennsylvania, and France over 
land in the Ohio Country led Virginia to send a party of militia under George Washington 
to defend their claims (Fig. 3).4 Washington’s defeat at Fort Necessity caused the 
Newcastle ministry to send British regulars under Braddock, marking a shift in Britain’s 
North American military strategy that signified the failure of the policy of colonial self-
defence.5 Prior to 1754, British regulars had had little involvement in conflicts in North 
America, which were generally conducted by provincial soldiers under the command of 
colonial governors. Braddock’s commission, which gave him authority over all the troops 
and expeditions in North America, was a determined attempt by the ministry to centralise 
control of the conflict in the hands of an imperial agent.   
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Figure 3. Map showing the progress of the British Army’s campaigns in 1754 and 1755. See table 
below for a description of the events depicted.6 Base map used: http://pvhs.info/page/8/ 
 
 
Number Event Date 
1 George Washington sets off from Williamsburg 
with approximately 200 Virginia militiamen 
 
2 April 1754 
2 Battle of Jumonville Glen, Virginian victory 28 May 1754 
3 Battle of Fort Necessity, French victory. 
Washington surrenders the fort 
 
3 July 1754 
4 Col. Robert Monckton sets out from Boston 22 May 1755 
5 Edward Braddock sets out from Fort Cumberland 29 May 1755 
6 Monckton arrives at Fort Lawrence 2 June 1755 
7 Fort Beauséjour surrenders to the British 16 June 1755 
8 Battle of the Monongahela, French victory 9 July 1755 
9 Shirley decides against continuing his expedition 
against Fort Niagara, orders Fort Oswego repaired 
 
September 1755 
10 Battle of Lake George, British victory 8 September 1755 
11 Johnson decides not to proceed against Crown 
Point. Orders the construction of Fort William 
Henry 
 
29 September 1755 
 
 
                                                 
6 The information used to plot this map was taken from Anderson, Crucible of War. 
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The 1755 campaign, and Braddock’s defeat (Fig. 3), highlighted the problems 
Loudoun would have to overcome to successfully prosecute the war. The difficulties 
Braddock encountered securing the necessary wagons for his expedition suggested 
colonial reluctance to participate in a war effort controlled by London, whilst colonial 
disunity was manifest in his inability to negotiate the establishment of a common war 
fund. A lack of Native American allies illustrated Braddock’s arrogance and inexperience 
but, more systematically, demonstrated the failure of British attempts to conduct Indian 
diplomacy through the Covenant Chain with the Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy, 
on whom they relied to exert influence over client tribes, including the Shawnee and 
Delaware.7 The Iroquois' declining influence in the Ohio Country and tribal grievances 
centred on colonial land-grabbing (notably the Walking Purchase of 1737 and the Treaty 
of Lancaster of 1744) left Britain with few supporters,8 the Delaware half-king 
Tanaghrisson a notable exception. Moreover, the Iroquois initially stuck to their policy 
of neutrality. In the wake of the Battle of the Monongahela, the regulars retreated to 
Philadelphia and frontier security collapsed amidst frequent Indian raiding, with many 
inhabitants becoming refugees. Tanaghrisson and his followers abandoned the region and 
most neutral Ohio Indians allied themselves with the French.9  
Failure to attain any of the campaign’s objectives, except the capture of Fort 
Beauséjour, which isolated the French garrison at Louisbourg, left Cumberland and Fox 
determined to assert stronger imperial control over the war effort. Indian diplomacy was 
centralised with the creation of two new departments of Indian Affairs: Sir William 
Johnson and Edmond Atkin were appointed superintendents for the North and South, 
respectively, and subordinated to the commander-in-chief.10 Loudoun, as both 
commander-in-chief and governor and captain general of Virginia, was granted two more 
regular regiments and given permission to raise an additional four thousand regulars in 
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the colonies as Britain significantly increased its military commitment. Although the 
governorship was largely a ceremonial role, Loudoun’s commission gave him military 
authority over the other colonial governors, who were required to assist him. Neither he 
nor they could demand the compliance of colonial assemblies; all were obliged to 
negotiate for “requisitions”, governor’s requests for appropriations to fund recruitment 
and supplies. Despite the limitations on his power, he enjoyed a greater military authority 
than either Braddock or Shirley had previously as the ministry sought to install him as its 
representative for military affairs in the colonies: granting him almost complete control 
over warrants, provisions, appointments, and discipline.11 Loudoun served early notice 
of his determination to assert imperial authority in a circular from London to the 
governors: “What assistance I may depend upon from your Province, in Men or Money? 
What number of Waggons, Carriage Horses, [Bateaux] [And] what Forage?”12 Upon his 
arrival in July 1756, he reiterated governors’ responsibilities,13 probably unaware how 
far governors themselves had to negotiate “requisitions” and the assemblies’ cooperation 
to supply British forces.14 Loudoun’s benchmark, however, was not the experiences of 
fellow governors, but his military experiences in Scotland.  
Despite his early assertion of royal authority and a historiographical reputation as 
an imperial bully,15 Loudoun, in fact, replicated the role of imperial negotiator first 
performed in Scotland during the Forty-Five. Only by negotiating with Highland elites 
was he able to recruit soldiers in that region, invoking the paradigm of loyalty in 
interactions with the Highland population. He approached warfare in North America with 
a similar willingness to negotiate with colonial elites, namely the Indian superintendents 
and colonial assemblies, whose support and cooperation he recognised as essential. 
Nonetheless, his interactions were based on the attitudes that informed his imperial 
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outlook: his cultural paradigm of loyalty equated with colonists clearly displaying due 
adherence and subordination to the Crown.  
Whilst early studies of the French and Indian War tended to dismiss Loudoun’s 
command as an abject military failure, recent scholarship, following Stanley Pargellis, 
challenged that view, arguing Loudoun’s reform of military logistics administration laid 
the groundwork for subsequent British successes.16 Administrative delays prevented his 
arrival in time to avert the loss of Oswego in 1756 and he was bereft of patrons when, in 
1757, William Pitt became Secretary of State, replacing Fox. Pitt replaced Captain-
General Cumberland with John Ligonier, first Earl Ligonier, for signing the Convention 
of Kloster-Zeven and directly intervened in Loudoun’s campaign plans, ordering him to 
attack Louisbourg rather than Quebec. Loudoun’s decision not to proceed against 
Louisbourg that year, a result of poor weather as much as any deficiencies in his 
command, gave Pitt reason to recall him that December. Loudoun was a political victim 
of Pitt’s purging of Cumberland’s protégées and allies though he almost survived when 
Pitt struggled to find a suitable replacement.17 Although he spent less than two years in 
North America, investigating Loudoun’s time there illustrates how the cultural paradigm 
of loyalty guided the commander at an integral point in the war effort as Britain officially 
declared war on France and began implementing militarisation strategy. Further, 
Loudoun’s close involvement in militarisation in two imperial fringes highlights the 
common understandings that drove his military adaptations and encounters and the extent 
to which these influenced the army more generally in North America.  
III. Military Adaptations  
At the commencement of every war, the modes of fighting the last are 
immediately outdated. Strategy and tactics are inevitably updated in the light of 
experience, but, equally, old modes linger on. The Forty-Five witnessed a major British 
commitment to irregular warfare, which would prove valuable when exploring options 
for North America, whilst the failure of the army to overcome logistical problems during 
that campaign taught military officers beneficial administrative lessons. The French and 
Indian War would provide officers with an opportunity to implement the lessons learnt 
from the previous campaign whilst concurrently adapting to the new challenges they 
                                                 
16 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun; Anderson, Crucible of War, 179-84; Brumwell, Redcoats, 23.  
17 Middleton, Bells of Victory, 51.  
84 
 
faced. As Stephen Brumwell illustrated, the British Army did not impose European 
methods of warfare on the French and Indian War because of the unique logistical, 
topographical, and climatic challenges of the North American theatre,18 together with the 
problem of maintaining communication with the distant imperial centre in London; the 
scale of such challenges dwarfed anything that the geography of Europe, or Scotland, had 
thrown up.19 Irregular warfare, which had played a limited role during the Forty-Five, 
was integral to campaigning in North America where pitched battles were uncommon. 
Close coordination between the army and navy aided amphibious operations in Canada, 
whilst an unrestrained frontier war continued between Native Americans and interior 
settlers for the duration of the conflict.20 The British Army waged war in conjunction 
with the colonies, relying on colonial recruitment into both the regular and provincial 
regiments, and the colonies to supply and quarter the troops. The cooperation of colonial 
assemblies was essential to the war effort. Colonial politics may have seemed an 
inconvenient barrier, testing the patience of British commanders; they need not 
understand the internal power struggles, but they could not ignore them when required to 
negotiate the assemblies’ assistance. The Forty-Five may not have seemed ideal 
preparation in political terms: for Loudoun it provided experience in the politics of 
negotiation, albeit from the perspective of subjugating hostile groups. His formative 
military experiences in Scotland, however, seemed more readily suited to adaptation in 
North America.  
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Figure 4. Title: A Map of that part of America which was the Principal Seat of War in 1756. Date 
Created: c. 1757. ©Library of Congress Geography and Map Division. 
https://lccn.loc.gov/82693309. 
The principal areas of action during the 1756 and 1757 campaigns have been highlighted on the 
map including Forts Oswego, William Henry, Ticonderoga, and Crown Point as well as Britain’s 
military headquarters of Albany.  
 
Logistics 
The logistical adaptations pursued by Loudoun were clearly inspired by his 
experiences during the Forty-Five. Neither Braddock nor Shirley had sought to tackle the 
army’s deficiencies but the Forty-Five had impressed upon Loudoun the importance of 
safeguarding transportation and supply prior to and during campaigns. His first task was 
a survey of military infrastructure and administration, his first reports exposing the need 
for substantive repairs to many barracks and forts and the tangled state of contracts and 
payments. “The Expenses here, are immense,” he complained, “the Prices of every thing 
in the Country are dear, by the management of our Predecessors”.21 He accused Shirley 
of hiding large payments for unknown expenses and illegally filling vacancies in the 
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service.22 The backlash that accompanied his reports of Shirley’s indiscriminate spending 
was a warning to keep his own expenses as low as possible. He strove to create a more 
centralised system that would both save the army money and better support the troops. 
He economised on the purchase of provisions, dealing directly with provincial merchants 
where possible, rather than going through contractors who inflated prices and added 
commission.23 He also created a new storehouse system to ease distribution (with two 
main stores in New York and one at Halifax, supported by smaller stores throughout the 
interior). Supply levels and the condition of provisions were monitored by a commissary. 
This ensured plentiful local supplies for the troops stationed in the interior.24 
As had been the case in Scotland, it was the distribution of centralised supplies 
that hampered military operations in North America. In advance of the campaign against 
Ticonderoga (Fig. 4) in the summer of 1757, Loudoun advised Major General Webb that 
his most arduous task would be “supplying your People with provisions.”25 His repeated 
references to maintaining transport supplies over vast distances, particularly in the winter, 
illustrate that this was a continuing concern. Braddock had built a military supply road 
for the 1755 campaign from Fort Cumberland to the interior and Loudoun took this a 
stage further, enabling communication between interior forts and with military 
headquarters at Albany. Soldiers widened and improved existing roads and built 
waystations along routes, whilst Loudoun invested in the construction of bateaux and 
scows and improved portages along routes by rivers and lakes wherever possible.26 
Loudoun’s investment in infrastructure would make it easier for the British to supply the 
army throughout North America for the remainder of the war.  
Loudoun was also determined to overcome the British Army’s dependence on 
colonists for supplying the wagons necessary for transporting troops and provisions, 
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which had caused delays during Braddock’s 1755 expedition. Braddock and his 
subordinates tended to view the colonists as an obstruction to the progress of the 
expedition, rather than as allies they ought to cooperate with. This attitude, coupled with 
the legitimate concern that wagons would not be returned or compensated for, led many 
colonists to refuse to cooperate with the army and to refuse their wagons for the service. 
It was only when Benjamin Franklin intervened in the situation, offering compensation 
to wagon suppliers and threatening that those who did not would be suspected of 
disloyalty, that sufficient wagons were produced.27 Delays in settling these accounts after 
the campaign made all colonists, particularly Pennsylvanians, more averse to hiring their 
wagons to the army.28  
The paradigm of loyalty rationalised Loudoun’s reaction. He was frustrated by 
the colonists’ failure to cooperate, believing they were duty-bound to do so as subjects of 
the British Crown. Regardless of law and custom, recalcitrance he equated with disloyalty 
to the war effort, informing Cumberland that “they have assumed to themselves, what 
they call Rights and Priviledges, Totally unknown in the Mother Country and are made 
use of, for no purpose, but to screen them, from giving any Aid, of any sort”.29 In August 
1756, he confessed to the Duke of Cumberland that he was “convinced, that till we have 
every thing necessary, for carrying on the War here, within ourselves, Independent of Aid 
from this Country, we shall go on very slowly.”30 In September, Loudoun was obliged to 
impress civilian wagons, and even then many of the wagoners simply deserted en route 
to the army.31 To circumvent colonial goodwill and impressment, Loudoun created a 
British Army wagon train consisting of fifty wagons with horses, a wagon house and 
stables, and an establishment of drivers.32 These wagons were utilised for the general 
support of the troops in North America rather than for specific campaigns, where 
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impressment quickly became the only method of gaining the required numbers.33 By the 
autumn of 1757, Loudoun had standardised transportation between Albany and Fort 
Edward using a mixture of bateaux, ox teams, wagons, and scows, significantly reducing 
the expense of supplying the army in that region.34 
The changes Loudoun implemented made it easier to supply army operations in 
the interior. John Forbes gained much experience of supplying the interior as Loudoun’s 
adjutant-general. He used it to good effect during his 1758 expedition where he spent 
time investigating the most efficient route to Fort Duquesne and ordered his troops to 
erect blockhouses every forty miles to secure the route and ensure the safe delivery of 
supplies.35 Forbes’ success in 1758 was largely due to his careful preparation and focus 
on logistics. Even so, provisioning troops in the interior was an arduous and long, 
difficult, and expensive process at the mercy of the weather, enemy incursion, and 
deterioration. Officers repeatedly complained about difficulties they had in impressing 
wagons from civilians yet to be recompensed for previous usage. In Pennsylvania, the 
failure of the British to impress suitable numbers of wagons in 1759 in part restricted the 
army to purely defensive measures in the Ohio region.36 The cost of maintaining an army 
spread throughout the interior continued to test and trouble British commanders, notably 
Thomas Gage, charged with the responsibility of militarising the region and pacifying the 
Native Americans.37 Logistics presented pressing, sometimes insurmountable problems 
for the British Army in North America.  
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Irregular Warfare  
Whilst it is now generally accepted that the British had prior experience of 
irregular warfare in Europe before application in North America, Braddock’s defeat 
exposed the extent of the army’s unpreparedness in his matter.38 Few, if any, of the 
officers in the 44th and 48th Regiments sent to North America with Braddock had direct 
experience of irregular warfare against the Jacobites. Whilst some soldiers in these 
regiments had fought at Prestonpans and Falkirk, none had experience of Loudoun’s 
irregular campaign.39 However, despite a lack of direct experience during the Forty-Five, 
Loudoun’s irregular campaign had been widely reported and the inclusion of irregular 
tactics in military textbooks had helped to disseminate knowledge amongst the officer 
class. Matthew Ward argued that British failures in the Ohio Country were less the 
product of commanders’ naivety of irregular tactics than a failure to quickly train and 
equip soldiers to conduct irregular warfare.40 Braddock understood the necessity of 
employing specific soldiers as scouts and pickets to thwart ambush, though his 
unwillingness to comply with diplomatic conventions left him with insufficient Native 
Americans; and he lacked time to train regulars effectively to take their place.41 Ignorance 
of irregular warfare does not explain Braddock’s defeat; rather arrogance and 
inexperience, coupled with the superiority of the enemy.  
Loudoun arrived in North America with a clear understanding of irregular 
warfare. During the Forty-Five, Loudoun’s mixture of regulars (the 64th Regiment) and 
irregulars (the Independent Highland Companies) were thought the best suited of all 
British troops to oppose the Jacobites’ interior raids because the majority were 
Highlanders, familiar with the harsh local climate and difficult terrain. It was immediately 
clear that Loudoun’s Scottish experience had impressed upon him the benefits of utilising 
local knowledge for irregular warfare when he requested that Native Americans allied 
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with the British and rangers be used for scouting missions rather than British regulars.42 
Native Americans and rangers better understood the local terrain than the regulars 
arriving with Loudoun, and Loudoun utilised both for reconnaissance on numerous 
occasions.43  
Irregular soldiers could also harass the enemy upon the march and disrupt their 
supply lines, as Loudoun’s Highland troops had hampered the Jacobite retreat 
northwards. After the fall of Oswego (Fig. 4) in August 1756, Loudoun’s irregular troops 
defended the British retreat, preventing the advancing enemy attempting a frontal assault 
on Major-General Webb at the German Flatts. Again, Loudoun expressed his belief that 
Indians and rangers were best suited to such an undertaking due to their superior 
understanding of the countryside.44 During the summer of 1757, when the British were 
restricted to a defensive campaign, Loudoun favoured irregular warfare, rather than 
engaging the French fully. In part, this was to avoid further losses after the debacle of 
Fort William Henry, but Loudoun’s irregulars aimed to harass the French troops on their 
march through the interior and isolate them from their supply train and thereby delay or 
prevent an expected assault on Albany (which never transpired).45 “The keeping a Great 
Body of the Lightest and Nimblest of your People in the Rear, to harass them [the enemy] 
as much as possible…you will distress them more than by Fighting their main Body.”46 
Loudoun adapted the Highland approach in response to the challenges of 
campaigning in North America. Recognising that his irregulars in Scotland had 
successfully remained active throughout the winter (thereby mitigating the problems 
inactivity caused for troop morale and discipline) he likewise hoped to use North 
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American irregulars for surprise attacks, despite the harsh American winters.47 He 
proposed an expeditionary force of regulars and rangers against Crown Point and 
Ticonderoga in the winter of 1757, and to join his men in their wilderness campaign, as 
he had done in Scotland.48 Irregulars already performed winter-times intelligence-
gathering and he expected the rangers, some equipped with snowshoes, to clear a path for 
the regulars to attack the French forts. Such an expedition was more ambitious than those 
his irregulars had undertaken during the Scottish winters although the general principles 
were the same. The expedition was aborted when the French learned of the plans.49 
Loudoun firmly believed irregular warfare was vital for campaigning in North 
America and presided over a marked increase in the number of irregular troops affiliated 
with the British Army, from approximately three hundred upon his arrival to 
approximately one thousand by early 1758.50 But he also advocated a move away from 
employing those with specialist, local knowledge towards training regulars in light 
infantry techniques so that they might eventually replace the rangers.51 This was not 
because local knowledge was less important in North America than in Scotland but rather 
a response to the difficulty the British had attracting and retaining Native American allies 
and the expense and indiscipline of the rangers.52 Despite the diplomatic efforts of the 
Indian superintendents, the British failed to harness significant Native American support 
for their cause during Loudoun’s command. This caused Loudoun to rely heavily on the 
rangers who, as specialist units, were trained, armed, and clothed differently from the 
regular and provincial soldiers, were paid a premium wage and, although they were 
subject to British military discipline, were often admonished by British Army officers for 
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their indiscipline and insubordination.53 Loudoun turned to the regulars in an attempt to 
create a reliable, disciplined corps of troops trained in irregular techniques at a lower 
expense to the Crown, giving Thomas Gage permission to raise a regiment of five 
hundred light infantry in late 1757. He expressed his thoughts in a letter to William Pitt 
of February 1758, in which he noted the necessity of rangers for the war effort and stated 
that Gage’s regiment would not only constitute a great saving to the Crown, but would 
also allow him to reduce his dependence upon the rangers whilst concurrently allowing 
him a “Corp of Rangers that would be disciplined, and have Officers at their head on 
whom I could depend, which except a very few is not the Case at present.”54 
Loudoun also attempted to spread basic wilderness techniques throughout the 
regular army. Officers were encouraged to train their soldiers to shoot whilst kneeling or 
lying down, to fire individually at specific targets, and to take cover from ambush in 
woodland.55 Like in Scotland, the army adapted strategy and tactics to surmount the 
challenges they faced. Loudoun remained committed to adaptation in North America, 
sending volunteers from the officer corps of the regulars out on patrols with Rogers’ 
Rangers.56 However, there were never enough men who benefited from Rogers’ teachings 
to transform the entire British Army. Whilst some officers enthusiastically adopted the 
new drills for their men, the practice was not widespread, and most regulars gained little 
or no training in irregular warfare. Indeed, far from being able to replace them, the British 
Army had to raise more rangers for the service in the coming years, with Whitehall’s 
support.57 Although not entirely successful, Loudoun’s attempts to spread irregular 
warfare techniques throughout the army illustrate his belief that such methods were 
essential for waging war on an imperial fringe and were exemplified by the manner in 
which he adapted military practices learned in Scotland. Officers including John Forbes, 
Thomas Gage, and George Howe continued to encourage an understanding of irregular 
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tactics in the army at large and the use of irregular troops for specific purposes during the 
war after Loudoun’s recall. This reflected a more general evolution of thought within the 
“seasoned American Army” described by Brumwell, where irregular tactics became a 
standard aspect of British operations. 
IV. Militarisation in North America 
The decision made by the British ministry to send regulars to fight in the French 
and Indian War alongside colonists, all under a British commander-in-chief, marked the 
beginning of a deliberate process of militarisation in North America that would continue 
even after the war ended. Militarisation ensured the necessary systems were in place for 
waging war in North America, pacifying hostile population groups, and securing 
territory. The process of militarisation was in its early stages during Loudoun’s 
command, expanding as the war evolved from a conflict in the American interior into a 
global war involving European powers, and as Britain’s war aims expanded from the 
expulsion of France from the Ohio Country to its expulsion from the continent. In contrast 
to Scotland, where militarisation was a method of subjugation and assimilation, in North 
America it was initially conceived as a way to enable Britain and the colonies to wage 
war cooperatively. In the colonies, the British had to undertake local recruitment for the 
regular and provincial armies, attempt to gain Native American allies, locate quarters for 
the regulars, and manage large quantities of supplies and provisions. In addition, Britain 
took an increased interest in reforming colonial government and in the colonists 
themselves, some of whom they accused of profiteering and trading with the enemy. 
Militarisation meant that war impinged more directly upon the colonists than previously 
and increased civil-military tension, although tension was neither universal nor constant.  
Recruitment 
A key aspect of militarisation in North America during Loudoun’s command was 
the recruitment of colonists for service in both the regular and provincial regiments and 
recruitment of Native American irregulars. During the Forty-Five, Loudoun had relied 
upon Highland elites loyal to the government to encourage enlistment to the Independent 
Companies and to persuade wavering clans to remain neutral rather than joining the 
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Jacobites.58 Loudoun had closely negotiated their cooperation in return for status and, in 
the case of those given command of Independent Companies, place. He had done this 
because he recognised that an understanding of, and influence over, the local situation 
and power structures were important for maximising recruitment. Loudoun had asserted 
his authority in the Highlands, demanding loyalty, but even when dealing with Jacobites 
this was carefully moderated to achieve tangible results. In the colonies he recognised 
that, to a much greater extent than in the Highlands, local politics was a barrier to 
recruitment.59 
Loudoun relied upon the Indian superintendents to supply Native American allies 
and to persuade other nations to remain neutral. Although he retained overall command 
over the superintendents and was often forthcoming with his opinion on Indian affairs, 
he left diplomatic efforts in their hands, not attempting to influence negotiations. Even 
before his arrival in North America Loudoun had written to Johnson to express his hope 
that the Northern Superintendent would use his “utmost endeavours, to procure as large 
a body as can be got, to act in Conjunction with His Majesty’s Forces, against the 
Common Enemy.”60 He went on to state that he was bringing presents with him for the 
Indians and would consult with Johnson regarding how they ought to be distributed, 
accepting the Native Americans as distinct nations who had to be persuaded to join the 
British war effort. This represented a clear parallel with his earlier experiences in the 
Highlands: whilst Highlanders were British subjects, Loudoun viewed them as an ‘other’ 
whose allegiance similarly had to be won. Loudoun relied upon the local expertise of the 
superintendents and the relationships they had already established with various nations 
for the recruitment of native allies. As in the Highlands, Loudoun took a keen interest in 
the progress made by the superintendents and, although distance denied them proximity 
in working together, he corresponded frequently on diplomatic matters, especially 
Johnson’s meetings with the Iroquois in early 1757.61 
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Loudoun recognised the contribution Native Americans could make to the British 
war effort, praising the campaign of irregular warfare carried out by Cherokee warriors 
in the Virginian backcountry during the 1757 campaign, which had helped to significantly 
reduce the number of enemy raids against backcountry settlements.62 He referenced 
accounts he had received of the “Services which were done by the Cherokees”63 when 
ordering Atkin, the Southern Superintendent, to raise similar numbers for the 1758 
expedition against Fort Duquesne, with the freedom to facilitate this as he thought best. 
Loudoun further strove to prevent colonial governors and assemblies from interfering in 
Indian affairs and making their own treaties and arrangements with Native Americans. 
He believed that the superintendents were best placed to undertake such negotiation and 
that colonial meddling hampered their efforts. He made this clear in a letter to Henry Fox 
of August 1756 in which he complained that New Jersey had declared war on the 
Shawnee and Delaware at the same time as Johnson was negotiating a peace with them.64 
On numerous occasions, Loudoun ordered colonies to desist private negotiations with 
Native Americans and to leave Indian diplomacy in the hands of the superintendents.  
Loudoun aimed to play a more direct role in the recruitment of colonists into both 
the regulars and provincials, although he recognised he would still need to work closely 
with colonial elites. During the Forty-Five, the entire Highland population had been 
accused of savagery and disloyalty and those who failed to submit and demonstrate 
adherence to the British state through cooperation with Loudoun faced subjugation. As 
such, Loudoun had little trouble gaining the cooperation of Highland elites anxious to 
prove their loyalty to the Crown. The loyalty paradigm led him to classify the colonists 
as Britons participating in and benefiting from the imperial venture, just like Britons at 
home. In placing the needs of the imperial state as paramount, in this case, successful 
prosecution of the war effort, the loyalty paradigm demanded the allegiance of the 
colonists to the Crown. Loudoun assumed the colonies would be willing to act 
cooperatively for the common prosecution of a war that he, therefore, viewed as being 
just as important for them as it was for the mother-country, and he expected them to 
exhibit their adherence to the state through compliance with his requests for assistance. 
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He anticipated encountering few problems working closely with colonial governors, 
hoping that they could persuade the colonial assemblies to agree to his requests for troops. 
Failure to act as expected would suggest disloyalty, which could be overcome by 
negotiating adherence or by forcing submission. The situation in North America was 
much more complex than it had been in Scotland and royal governors had to negotiate 
“requisitions” with assemblies, who held direct power over them through control of their 
salaries.65 Further, the fostering of a different interpretation of their rights and 
responsibilities as Britons led many colonial legislatures to view demands for assistance 
from the commander-in-chief as a threat to their individual liberty. 
Immediately upon his arrival, Loudoun was introduced to the difficulties he 
would face negotiating with the assemblies regarding the raising of men for the war effort. 
The loss of Oswego in August 1756 left Britain’s interior and the military headquarters 
at Albany exposed (Fig.4). Loudoun requested all provinces raise emergency troops to 
counter a possible French advance, though the main burden was placed on the New 
England colonies where the immediate danger lay.66 All assemblies delayed answering 
Loudoun’s request or refused to comply with it “considering the year is so far advanced” 
and they were “exhausted both of Men and Money”.67 Whilst Massachusetts agreed to 
draft the troops requested from the militia, the assembly ordered them to be kept in 
reserve until definite intelligence of a French advance was received, which would prevent 
them providing timely aid.68 New York, the most exposed province, was alone in 
answering Loudoun’s request and it was the governor, not the assembly, who authorised 
the sending of one thousand militiamen to Loudoun, who kept them in service for just ten 
days until the danger had passed.69 Similar difficulties beset Loudoun when he requested 
the colonies send troops to counter a rumoured French advance that October. The slow 
response of the colonies mobilising their troops frustrated Loudoun and he admonished 
the assemblies, arguing that had the rumours proven true the colonial delay would have 
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prevented the troops from providing the necessary relief to the interior.70 His anger 
stemmed from the recognition there was little he could do in such a situation to furnish 
the troops, vital though they were for the protection of the interior. Despite his frustration, 
Loudoun attempted to cultivate goodwill amongst the assemblies by ordering enlistment 
halted immediately upon realising that the delays would prevent the troops offering any 
benefit to the service. He recognised that many provinces were already struggling 
financially due to the war effort and ordered the stoppage, as well as the discharge of 
troops already raised, in an attempt to save the assemblies money.71 Loudoun’s early 
encounters made it clear that negotiating with elites in North America would be much 
more difficult than it had been in Scotland and illustrated to him that colonial assemblies 
were willing to ignore or refuse his requests for assistance, thereby failing to show due 
adherence and submission to the Crown. 
 Loudoun’s early encounters left him convinced that he could only gain colonial 
support if he sidestepped the assemblies. He proposed negotiating directly with colonial 
governors and commissioners empowered to act on behalf of the assemblies at two 
general meetings for the northern and southern provinces. Military practice in Scotland 
provided a benchmark for Loudoun’s actions in North America as he sought to simplify 
the recruitment process by removing the additional, complicating layer of power and 
negotiation that had not existed in Scotland. He would negotiate with the governors and 
commissioners, allowing them to enjoy agency and power in the recruitment process as 
he had in the Highlands, but he saw no role for the colonial assemblies whose members 
were not acting in the way he expected them to as loyal Britons. Loudoun took inspiration 
from the spirit of mutual defence expressed in the failed Albany Plan, requesting the New 
England provinces raise a total of four thousand troops but allowing the commissioners 
to decide on what proportion each colony ought to raise.72 He hoped that this would help 
to eliminate inter-colonial jealousy and that negotiating directly with commissioners 
would encourage the colonies to comply with his requests quicker, allowing an early start 
to the campaigning season. Further, his request for four thousand New England troops, 
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considerably less than had been raised the previous year, was Loudoun’s recognition of 
the expense the colonies were put to by the war and an attempt to cultivate goodwill. As 
he had in Scotland, he attempted to demonstrate that he was willing to do all in his power 
to make the situation easier for those he encountered, but only if they acted with due 
subservience to the Crown, complying with his requests.  
Loudoun proved willing to adjust his expectations and understanding of 
recruitment to the unique circumstances of North America, and he attempted to balance 
what he believed were necessary assertions of authority with consideration of colonial 
needs and difficulties to achieve results.  However, his attempts to use a quota system to 
furnish recruits did not overcome all the difficulties he had previously faced as the 
commissioners failed to agree on quotas, eventually requiring Loudoun to propose these 
himself.73 Further, as the commissioners did not have the authoritative powers Loudoun 
had hoped they would, all colonial assemblies had to be consulted before recruitment 
could begin, causing general delays and leading to a refusal from the New Jersey 
assembly to raise the troops requested of them.74 The weakness of Loudoun’s position as 
an imperial agent was illustrated in May 1757 when he received Secretary of State Pitt’s 
instructions ordering the colonies to raise the same number of troops as the previous year 
after he had already negotiated the raising of a reduced number. Loudoun was unable to 
ignore his instructions but, unwilling to cause any further tension with the assemblies 
when recruitment in many colonies was finally underway, he adapted the instructions, 
requesting the colonies hold their militias in readiness to assist the service if required.75 
Although the majority complied, few took concrete steps to ensure their militia would be 
able to provide timely and adequate support and New Jersey again refused to comply, 
even passing a militia act which removed management of the militia from the hands of 
the governor so that he could not raise it without their approval.76 Adapting his position 
and expectations in response to local conditions and power structures enabled Loudoun 
to largely meet his recruitment goals. However, he was left frustrated by the delays to 
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campaigning resulting from colonial slothfulness and angered by the actions of the New 
Jersey assembly, which he believed deliberately impeded the service and challenged the 
royal prerogative. 
In attempting to facilitate colonial recruitment, Loudoun had to negotiate with 
various colonial elites to try and cultivate a good understanding with them whilst 
simultaneously asserting his authority as an agent of empire to meet his goals for the 
campaign. He was quick to praise those who complied with his requests and he also 
actively attempted to reduce the financial burden on the colonies during the campaign: 
cancelling requests for the raising of provincials after the surrender of Fort William Henry 
(Fig. 4) due to the arrival of regulars and attempting to ensure that all colonies took 
responsibility for their proportionate share of the war effort.77 However, he was also quick 
to register his displeasure with those assemblies that delayed providing assistance or 
refused to comply with his demands, informing governors and assemblies alike of his 
disappointment in an attempt to assert imperial authority and encourage them to 
reconsider their position. Even when expressing his displeasure, however, Loudoun was 
measured rather than hot-headed. He again couched his disappointment with reference to 
the Albany Plan, suggesting that such actions were a desertion of the “common cause of 
the defence and Security”78 of the colonies, rather than framing it in terms of imperial 
disloyalty. 
Loudoun’s experiences in North America influenced his opinions on imperial 
governance, which he did frame in terms of disloyalty. He complained to the ministry 
about the inaction of the assemblies and argued in favour of imperial reform. In a letter 
to Cumberland written in late 1756, Loudoun suggested that the problems resulted from 
the assemblies controlling the salaries of the governors: 
…till you find a Fund, independent of the Province, to Pay the 
Governors, and new model the Government, you can do nothing with 
the Provinces. I know it has been said in London, this is not the time; if 
You delay it till a Peace, You will not have a force to Exert any British 
Acts of Parliament here, for tho’ they will not venture to go so far with 
me, I am assured by the Officers, that it is not uncommon, for the People 
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of this Country to say, they would be glad to see any Man, that dare 
exert a British Act of Parliament here.79 
This highlights that Loudoun increasingly viewed the colonists in a military, rather than 
civil, light as the requirements of the war effort blurred distinctions. Interpreting the 
actions of colonial assemblies as insubordinate, disloyal, and contrary to both the service 
and the empire, Loudoun ‘othered’ the colonists in his letter to Cumberland, perceiving 
them as significantly different from Britons at home and marking them as a potential 
threat to British imperial security. Such an understanding was not permanent and was 
strictly a reflection of the military predicament, but it demonstrates how quickly the 
militarisation process began to influence British Army attitudes towards the colonists. 
Further, whilst he proved willing to work within the frameworks currently existing in 
North America, his experiences led him to strongly recommend a reform of the 
relationship between the colonies and the mother-country. In Scotland, the British Army 
had advocated, and implemented, closer regulation over the population as a method of 
ensuring imperial security and encouraging assimilation and Loudoun believed that such 
steps should also be taken in North America, expressing similar sentiments to the Earl of 
Halifax and William Pitt as to Cumberland.80 Loudoun hoped that returning power to 
Crown-appointed representatives would enforce direct control over imperial affairs, 
encouraging submission and adherence to the state and thereby reaffirming the 
Britishness of the colonies. The need for significant imperial reform had been highlighted 
by the Earl of Halifax and the Board of Trade in the 1740s and it was a conclusion that 
numerous British Army officers would agree with upon serving in that fringe of the 
British Empire.  
Military Service  
Military service was an important aspect of militarisation in both Scotland and 
North America. However, whilst in the former it eventually acted as a tool of integration 
for Highlanders into the imperial fold, in the latter military service during the French and 
Indian War, even with the regulars, did not necessarily correspond to support of the 
British state during the imperial crisis or the Revolutionary War. In Scotland military 
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service underwent two key phases: the first during the Forty-Five when Highlanders were 
recruited as regulars by Loudoun into his 64th Regiment and into militia companies that 
fought alongside them, and the second upon the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War when 
large numbers of Highlanders were recruited into the British Army to serve as regulars 
in the North American theatre of the war.81 During the first phase, and to a lesser extent 
in the early stages of the second, there was widespread hostility towards Highland 
soldiers within the military and government because Highlanders were viewed as 
untrustworthy savages; even those who remained loyal to the Crown were suspected of 
Jacobitism. Loudoun was a notable exception, willing to recruit Highlanders for military 
service. He did not view all Highlanders as inherently rebellious and, working closely 
with this ‘other’ population group caused him to view them as less alien than most of the 
British imperial elite did at that juncture. Unlike those who characterised them as 
incompetent and untrustworthy, Loudoun came to appreciate the local knowledge that he 
believed left Highlanders naturally suited to the irregular warfare they carried out. His 
experiences with Highland soldiers provided Loudoun with experience about how 
internal population groups could best be utilised by the British Army that influenced not 
only how he approached irregular warfare but also the general utilisation of colonial 
troops in North America. 
Upon his arrival in North America, Loudoun inherited a provincial army from his 
predecessor William Shirley, rather than raising it himself as he had done in Scotland. 
Shirley had facilitated the raising of the provincials on the agreement that they would act 
independently of the regular troops on an expedition against Crown Point (Fig. 4) 
commanded by provincial officers.82 He had agreed to this believing it the only way to 
gain sufficient numbers of provincial troops as relationships between regular and 
provincial soldiers were often tense, particularly when the two groups were forced to 
work in close proximity with one another during joint campaigns.83 Provincials were 
particularly frustrated by British regulations that left provincial officers of any rank with 
less authority than regular officers of the lowest rank, as well as by the 1754 regulation 
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that subjected them to the discipline of the regulars whilst on joint campaigns. Regular 
officers and soldiers tended to view the provincials’ abilities disparagingly and objected 
to their perceived lack of discipline.84 Loudoun was furious at Shirley for putting the fate 
of the year’s main expedition entirely in the hands of inexperienced and ill-disciplined 
provincials. It did not fit with Loudoun’s previous experience in Scotland where regular 
troops had undertaken the bulk of campaigning and the Highlanders raised under 
Loudoun had engaged in irregular warfare, which he thought best suited their skills and 
experience.  
Loudoun had no choice but to agree that the provincials could remain subject to 
the terms of their enlistment as the provincials threatened to abandon the expedition en 
masse if they were forced to work alongside regulars, but insisted they accept his 
authority as commander-in-chief, the first time the provincials were to acknowledge this 
during the war.85 Fred Anderson highlighted the contractual view New Englanders took 
of military service. During the dispute, the provincials argued that they had signed up for 
service upon certain terms and that, if those terms were broken (as Loudoun proposed by 
forcing them to serve alongside the regulars) they would be within their rights to return 
to their homes, and escape punishment for desertion.86 The situation angered Loudoun as 
he believed his commission gave him authority to “Command all the Troops raised or to 
be raised in North America”87 and was frustrated that he had to compromise for this to 
be accepted. Further, he believed his appointment as the King’s military representative 
in the colonies gave him the power to alter the terms of service for all soldiers to answer 
campaigning needs.88 However, he recognised the necessity of the provincials and chose 
to negotiate to prevent the issue impeding the service. He had not had to compromise his 
authority in a similar way in Scotland and this early experience again highlighted that the 
situation in North America would be much more difficult for Loudoun to navigate. 
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Loudoun’s Scottish experiences continued to provide a benchmark for his actions 
in North America regarding the military services of the provincials, despite the challenges 
he encountered. During the Forty-Five he had acted in fairness towards all his Highland 
troops and had not treated those in the Independent Companies as inferior. Prior to his 
embarkation for North America, he had similarly attempted to act in a fair manner 
towards provincial troops by bringing the issue of disparity in rank between regulars and 
provincials to the attention of the ministry. Loudoun argued that such disparity should be 
eliminated to remove colonial grievances, highlighting that he recognised the importance 
of provincial troops and wanted to ensure that they would act as willing contributors to 
the war effort. His actions prompted a regulation giving provincial officers rank with the 
eldest regular captains when serving alongside them, meaning that far fewer provincial 
officers stood to be outranked by their more junior, regular counterparts on joint 
expeditions.89 Although he accepted the situation Shirley had agreed upon for 1756, 
Loudoun drew upon his prior experience for the 1757 campaign; expressing his desire to 
recruit provincials of a good standard, preferably with prior military experience, and to 
employ them to carry out specific tasks. Loudoun believed regulars were best suited for 
general campaigning whilst provincials could best be utilised by playing a supporting 
role and manning the interior, as the Highland troops had during the Forty-Five. He 
thought employing the provincial troops to garrison forts in the backcountry, in 
conjunction with regulars where necessary and appropriate, was most beneficial for the 
service as they would provide protection upon colonial boundaries from French assaults 
and Native American raiding parties whilst freeing up a larger proportion of regulars to 
engage in direct offensive manoeuvres against the French.90 This model influenced his 
planning in 1757 when he ordered a regular force to attack Louisbourg whilst provincials 
and a smaller number of regulars defended the interior forts.  
Whilst earlier experience influenced how Loudoun approached and managed 
provincial military service in North America, he also adapted to local circumstances. In 
response to the general abhorrence of regular discipline amongst the provincial soldiers, 
he took steps to prevent any provincial soldier from being executed by a regular officer 
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in 1757. He hoped that the threat of regular discipline would be more effective for 
governing the behaviour of the provincials and preventing desertion than imposing the 
harshest punishments upon them. In a number of cases, provincials were sentenced to 
death by a mixed court martial, but their sentence was later reduced or they were 
pardoned.91 Loudoun hoped leniency would have “a better effect upon the Troops than 
the severity of Punishment.”92 His priority was the successful prosecution of the war and 
he was willing to forgo the usual punishments for military transgressions if moderate 
measures were likely to produce better results in provincial behaviour.  
Loudoun demonstrated on numerous occasions that he was willing to adapt 
military service for provincials if the steps he took would improve their performance and 
allow campaigns to be conducted more effectively, so long as the steps did not represent 
a threat to royal authority. He recognised the objections of the provincials and viewed 
them in a much more balanced way than many other British Army officers who served 
alongside or after him. His willingness to recognise the importance of provincials and 
seek adaptations best suited to their strengths was unusual within the British Army 
hierarchy where the contribution and ability of such troops were often dismissed without 
qualification.93 However, he was typical of British Army officers in North America in 
that, despite his accommodations for the provincials, he privately complained about their 
behaviour, talent, and discipline to subordinates as well as ministry officials in London. 
Loudoun claimed the army’s progress had been delayed “by the Quibbles of the 
Provincials”94 and expressed frustration that the provincials at Fort William Henry “could 
not be prevailed on to so far finish the Fort”95 upon the lapsing of their enlistment period. 
Such actions, he warned, threatened to throw the fort “into the Enemys hands”.96 This 
illustrates that Loudoun believed the provincials, like the assemblies, were willing to 
sacrifice British imperial security for their own ends. Whilst service in Scotland alongside 
the Highland troops had eroded some of the ‘otherness’ of that population in Loudoun’s 
eyes, service in North America, where he had not campaigned in the field with provincials 
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as he had in Scotland, had an opposite effect. It caused him, and other British military 
officers, to view and treat the provincials as notably different from the regulars and, as 
such, from Britons generally. Such a view would be strengthened during and after the 
war as colonists’ perceived disloyalty led them to increasingly be classified as an ‘other’ 
rather than as Britons by British Army officers.97  
Quartering  
The impact of militarisation in North America was further felt on colonial elites 
and civilians due to the army’s attempts to secure quarters for the regulars. Quartering 
was a country-wide problem, as British troops required accommodation whilst on the 
march and throughout the winter months when campaigning halted. It increased 
interactions between the army and the populace, whom they were generally quartered 
amongst, which tended to temporarily increase tension between the two groups whilst the 
troops were there, as well as causing repeated disputes between British Army officers and 
colonial assemblies and other elites regarding the provision of suitable quarters and 
necessities. Quartering invoked issues of space and privacy, forcing colonists to consider 
questions of difference between public and private houses, civil and martial spaces, and 
regular and provincial soldiers. At its highest level, it was essentially a dispute over power 
between British Army officers and colonial assemblies centring around whether 
quartering ought to be addressed by acts of the colonial assemblies or by the royal 
prerogative.98  
The Mutiny Act distinguished public and private spaces in England, ordering 
troops be billeted only in public houses and giving the army responsibility for the cost of 
troop necessities. In Scotland and Ireland, however, where there was a lack of suitable 
public houses, quartering was allowed in private houses and the costs of necessities were 
borne by the providers of quarters. During the Forty-Five, soldiers had generally either 
been quartered in pre-existing forts and garrisons or required to camp whilst on the march. 
British Army officers had requisitioned some private houses for the use of troops, 
particularly in the Lowlands, under the Mutiny Act but disputes ended with the 
rebellion’s failure. Furthermore, the army did not have to deal with civil authorities in 
Scotland who held significant power themselves and whose cooperation was necessary 
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for the quartering of troops as they did in North America. This made the settling of 
quartering a much simpler exercise in that imperial fringe. The sections of the Mutiny 
Act relating to quartering were not extended to North America and no separate act was 
passed to settle the issue until 1765, leaving the situation undefined. Loudoun’s only 
guidance upon taking the command was a Privy Council ruling of 1756, which disputed 
the right of the Pennsylvania Assembly to pass a Quartering Act, claiming the colonies 
did not have the right to legislate on such matters, and his instructions, which ordered 
him to use the example from Britain when seeking quarters for his men in North 
America.99  
Recognising parallels in the situation in Scotland and North America, particularly 
regarding the unsuitability of the small, cramped public houses for holding large numbers 
of soldiers, Loudoun chose to interpret his instructions as widely as possible. He argued 
the King had rights to “Quarters with proper Conveniences for [his] Troops at all 
Times”,100 so he could demand the quarters he required, whether this consisted of 
barracks, public houses, or private houses if the first two were not available or suitable 
and he could take them by force if they were not provided willingly.101 Again, the 
paradigm of loyalty guided him as he determined the colonists ought to act as loyal 
Britons; respecting the royal prerogative and, therefore, his authority as commander-in-
chief. Further, he recognised that he had little room to negotiate on the issue of quartering 
because his troops could not survive the winter without adequate shelter and conceding 
points in one colony would spark further demands, raise costs, and likely precipitate his 
recall. He was also hampered by the lack of action taken in London to either find a 
solution or legitimise his authority on the matter. Despite assurances from William Pitt 
that he would resolve the problems with the Mutiny Bill, neither he nor the ministry 
addressed the issue of quartering in North America during Loudoun’s command or, 
indeed, during the entirety of the French and Indian War.102 
When Loudoun demanded quarters, in private houses if necessary, colonial 
assemblies were forced to consider whether civil and martial spaces should be separated 
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or joined. They quickly disagreed with Loudoun’s interpretation, highlighting that the 
sections of the Mutiny Act related to quartering specifically applied to Britain and arguing 
that individual circumstances ought to be applied to suit local conditions rather than 
general provisions being extended across America.103 The failure of the ministry to craft 
legislation to support Loudoun’s position encouraged colonial challenges, and numerous 
assemblies and municipal authorities, including New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Massachusetts, refused requests for the provision of quarters during 1756 and 1757.  
Loudoun attempted to settle the point emphatically the first time it was raised, 
threatening to seize quarters by force following a refusal by the mayor of the city of New 
York.104 The threat of force on this occasion worked, and the mayor and council agreed 
to provide the quarters. Loudoun believed that, as an imperial agent, he was authorised 
to make such demands of colonial authorities, viewing them as essential for the successful 
prosecution of the war and, therefore, the maintenance of British imperial security. He 
was left frustrated by New York’s initial refusal and, combined with the delays and 
difficulties he had faced regarding recruiting, interpreted it as an act of disloyalty towards 
the Crown and an obstruction to the service. However, the experience also led him to 
believe the colonies would submit to his authority if he utilised the threat of force as and 
when necessary, informing Henry Fox that “the People in this Country, tho’ they are very 
obstinate, will generally submit when they see you determined.”105 His prior experiences 
in Scotland also influenced how Loudoun handled the disagreement over quartering in 
New York, leading to his adoption of moderate tactics after his initial assertion of 
authority. Once the authorities had agreed to quarter the troops he immediately made a 
conciliatory gesture towards them by not insisting that they provide beer for the troops as 
a necessity.106 He insisted it was his right to demand it from them but chose not to in 
recognition of the financial impact of the war upon the colonies and in an attempt to 
cultivate goodwill with colonial authorities without compromising his authority.  
Loudoun also faced disputes over quartering in Pennsylvania in 1756 and South 
Carolina and Massachusetts in 1757 and had to rely upon the threat of force to bolster his 
authority and achieve the desired results. However, problems related to quartering were 
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neither as many nor as drawn out as has been suggested, and the problems did not 
disappear after Loudoun’s recall. Indeed, if anything the dispute between Britain and the 
colonies regarding quartering became even more pronounced in the aftermath of the war 
when Thomas Gage commanded a standing army in North America.107 Problems 
regarding quartering contributed to Loudoun’s frustration with colonial authorities 
generally, confirming his opinion that the colonial assemblies had too much power and 
deliberately and consistently acted out of self-interest and in direct opposition to royal 
authority. Whilst he adapted to the systems of power and authority operating in North 
America during his command as much as he could without compromising the authority 
and supremacy of the mother-country, his experiences left him convinced that adaptation 
of the imperial-colonial relationship was required for the more effective governance of 
North America.   
Loudoun did not regularly interact with colonial civilians, whereas his soldiers 
and officers quartered in colonial communities increased civil-military tension.108 The 
quartering of troops in the Highlands during and after the Forty-Five had similarly 
increased interactions and tension, but this had not been as disruptive as it would prove 
to be in America, where larger bodies of troops were involved. Civilian objections to the 
stationing of redcoats amongst them had numerous roots. There was a general fear of the 
prospect of a standing army throughout the British Empire. This had been exacerbated in 
England in the seventeenth century over concern that the monarch might utilise the army 
to control the populace and ignore Parliament.109 Whilst American aversion to a standing 
army would become increasingly important in the post-war period, far more important 
during the war were prejudicial views about the social composition of the British Army 
and its propensity for disorderly conduct. Contemporary opinion argued that British 
regulars were the poorest and least skilled in society and that they were often criminals 
avoiding prison or vagrants who had no other option than enlistment.110 Such beliefs were 
fostered by officers, such as James Wolfe, who regularly complained about the poor 
quality of men they were forced to recruit.111 Civilians feared for their safety if criminals 
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and undesirables were quartered in close proximity to themselves and their families. Such 
fears were often exacerbated because soldiers in winter quarters were inactive and prone 
to disobedience, drunkenness, and disorder.112 Accusations against soldiers of theft, 
destruction of property, and violence were common in areas where troops were quartered 
for prolonged periods.  
However, quartering could also bring benefits to a region when soldiers remained 
under strict discipline. In the Highlands, the army served as a focus for commercialisation 
as troops required provisions and supplies and the soldiers used their wages to purchase 
local goods. This was also the case for some areas in North America as the customer base 
of merchants and traders expanded due to the war. Albany did very well as a result of the 
stationing of the army in the town and the trade embargo imposed upon the colonies by 
Loudoun had little effect there due to the increase in trade from the army.113 Other frontier 
towns including Lancaster, Carlisle, and Winchester also benefitted from the war as a 
result of increased opportunities for commerce but this was not the case universally, and 
many colonies that quartered troops still suffered economically as a result of both the war 
generally and Loudoun’s embargo specifically. Overall, civil-military tension increased 
during Loudoun’s time in command in North America, given the influx of regulars, and 
continued afterward.  
Loudoun’s frustration over the issue of quartering was largely directed towards 
the colonial assemblies but the attitude of the colonists regarding both that issue and the 
war effort more generally also angered him. His view of the colonists was shaped by his 
focus on his military task and he complained they caused delays and added expense to 
the service. He found “not only, a general backwardness in every Colony, but even, 
almost in every individual on this Continent, to aid in carrying on the Public Service.”114 
To Loudoun, all in North America lacked a proper sense of their duty to the Crown as 
loyal Britons and the fact they appeared willing to act in opposition to Britain’s war effort 
if it was in their interest to do so suggested imperial disloyalty.  
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Loudoun’s prior military experience in Scotland and lessons learnt in that imperial 
fringe influenced how he approached warfare in North America and left him determined 
to overcome the obstacles to campaigning in another imperial fringe. The steps he took 
to create standardised transport and logistics systems were inspired by his formative 
experiences and adapted to suit the unique challenges and vast scale of warfare in North 
America. The systems he implemented played an instrumental role in the ultimate British 
victory, influencing military officers even after his recall. Loudoun similarly applied the 
knowledge he had gained of irregular warfare in Scotland when organising scouting 
parties that took advantage of local knowledge and planning campaigns with irregulars 
in North America. As with logistics, he adapted his earlier experiences in response to 
North American conditions, attempting to spread knowledge of irregular warfare 
throughout the entire army and to raise specific light infantry units to remove the army’s 
reliance on unreliable Native American allies and expensive and ill-disciplined rangers. 
The militarisation of North America was also influenced by Loudoun’s prior 
Scottish experiences. He proved himself willing to negotiate as a first response to conflict 
with those he encountered including colonial authorities and provincial soldiers, who had 
different understandings of the imperial relationship than he did as a Crown-appointed 
army officer and peer. As in the Highlands, however, he also demanded that the royal 
prerogative be respected and was quick to register his displeasure when individuals or 
authorities acted in a way he felt subverted it. Loudoun’s North American experiences 
and interactions illustrate a more nuanced character than the historiography suggests. 
Whilst he did come into conflict with colonial assemblies and provincial soldiers it would 
be wrong to conclude that these conflicts were a result of his bullying manner. Where 
possible Loudoun negotiated with those he encountered and the hard line he took 
regarding quartering was his only option due to a lack of support from London. 
Furthermore, Loudoun was not the only commander-in-chief to come into conflict with 
various groups in North America and after his recall disagreement between military and 
colonial authorities remained common.  
Militarisation did tend to increase tension between the civil and military spheres 
in North America as the two became blurred because of the impingement of war upon the 
populace. The British Army was concerned with how best to wage war far from the 
central power structures of London. As a result, the colonists increasingly came to be 
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seen by Loudoun, his successors, and his subordinates in a military rather than civil light 
and frustration grew at their complaints and perceived insubordination as the British felt 
they did not contribute enough to the war effort and even impeded the service on 
occasion. Their failure to adhere to the British state suggested that they were not loyal 
Britons and they were instead classified as an ‘other’ by Loudoun and other British Army 
officers. This interpretation was not static and was, at this point, confined to military 
affairs but it provides an early indication of changing attitudes within the army towards 
the colonists which were consolidated during and after the war. Further, although 
Loudoun showed a willingness to work within the existing system of governance in North 
America and negotiate with those who held power in that country, he was frustrated by 
their failure to recognise what he believed to be the rightful authority of the mother-
country and believed the system required adaptation. His suggestions for closer 
regulation and a redistribution of power from assemblies to Crown-appointed officials 
highlight that, even whilst the war was ongoing, questions were being asked as to whether 
the “empire of negotiation”115 remained fit for purpose or whether steps, such as those 
being taken in the Highlands at that time, ought to be adopted to enable closer regulation 
and assimilation in another imperial fringe.   
  
                                                 






Chapter Three: James Murray 








The shift in British ministerial focus during the French and Indian War from 
asserting control over the Ohio Country towards the conquest of French North America 
continued in the aftermath of Loudoun’s recall with the successful 1758 expedition 
against Louisbourg and the assault on Quebec the following year. Command of the 
Quebec campaign was given to James Wolfe, veteran of the Forty-Five, and Wolfe chose 
Robert Monckton and James Murray as two of his three brigadiers general whilst William 
Pitt secured the appointment of George Townshend as the third. The campaign to conquer 
Quebec demonstrated the continuing influence of the Forty-Five on the British Army as 
the civility paradigm once again encouraged officers to undertake a violent campaign. 
After the British victory at the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, which left James Murray 
at the head of a British occupation of Quebec, the army’s first objective was securing its 
tenuous hold on the region as the wider conflict with France continued. In Scotland, the 
British were able to attain short-term security through the subjugation of the local 
population, but in Canada, punitive pacification was impossible because of the continuing 
military threats from the French-Canadian inhabitants and the French military. Therefore, 
steps were taken to induce the local population to cooperate with the British Army. 
Officers were guided by the benevolence paradigm as they sought to establish dominance 
through cooperative submission.  
The September 1760 surrender of Montréal made Canada the newest fringe of the 
British Empire, although it was generally expected the region would be handed back to 
France when peace came, either to secure the return of any potential British losses or to 
acquire more profitable conquests. For now, the French-Canadian population became 
subjects of the British Crown despite clear differences of nationality, language, and 
religion, a status they would keep after the 1763 Treaty of Paris confirmed that Canada 
would remain British.1 The eventual decision to keep Canada rather than the French sugar 
colony of Guadeloupe was made for strategic reasons to secure Britain’s empire in North 
America. Thereafter, British attempts to govern Canada and assimilate the French-
                                                 
1 Immediately after the 1760 conquest debates began to emerge regarding whether Britain ought to 
restore Canada to France at the eventual peace. See Anonymous, ‘The Interest of Great Britain 
Considered with Regard to Her Colonies and the Acquisition of Canada and Guadeloupe’, Evans 
Collection. The ministry was also split regarding what conquests Britain ought to retain, although the 
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University Press, 1969), 296-340.  
115 
 
Canadians more closely within the British Empire through militarisation and 
commercialisation were governed by the paradigm of loyalty that had likewise governed 
the militarisation of the Highlands after the Forty-Five. But questions of long-term 
security, religious differences, and the need to accommodate various population groups 
made the situation in Canada much more complex and left James Murray, first as military 
and then as civil governor of the region, struggling to balance often contradictory aims 
whilst asserting British imperial authority.  
The previous chapter highlighted how Loudoun’s formative experiences led him 
to view the colonists in a military, rather than civil, light and to question their imperial 
loyalty with regards to the war effort. This chapter explores Murray’s attitudes and 
actions in Quebec from 1759 until his recall in 1766, focusing on his relations with the 
French-Canadian population in their transition from enemies to subjects. It first considers 
how Murray’s identity and family reputation shaped his imperial outlook, before 
examining the conquest, pacification, and governance of Canada. Investigating the 
themes of subjugation, accommodation, and cooperative submission enables 
comparisons with British approaches during the Forty-Five. Militarisation in North 
America continued under Murray and the process led him to question the assumption that 
assimilation was necessary to guarantee the imperial loyalty of ‘other’ populations, whilst 
concurrently causing him to question the loyalty of the colonial merchants who settled in 
Canada after the conquest. As governor of Canada, Murray was granted much autonomy 
over the direction of policy and the choices he made provided a precedent both for his 
replacement Guy Carleton and for the Quebec Act of 1774.  
II. James Murray and the Burden of Jacobitism 
If Lord Loudoun felt it necessary to outwardly demonstrate his loyalty to the 
British state because he was a Lowland Scot, James Murray had even more reason to do 
so. Born in Ballencrieff, in the Lothians, in 1722, Murray was a son of the fourth Lord 
Elibank and younger brother to Alexander, a main conspirator in the Jacobite Elibank 
plot of 1752. Upon discovery, Alexander spent two decades in exile with Prince Charles’ 
inner circle. Murray’s elder brother Patrick, who became fifth Lord Elibank in 1736, was 
also strongly suspected of Jacobitism, although he was careful to ensure there was no 
evidence linking him to the Stuarts. Prior to the Elibank plot, the Stuart sympathies of the 
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two brothers were already so well known that Horace Walpole described them in 1751 as 
being: 
Both such active Jacobites that if the Pretender had succeeded, they 
could have produced many witnesses to testify their zeal for him; both 
so cautious, that no witnesses of actual treason could be produced by 
the government against them: the very sort of Jacobitism that has kept 
the cause alive, and kept it from succeeding.2 
James Murray himself was never accused of Jacobitism and there is no evidence to 
suggest he supported the Stuarts at any point in his life. His initial military experience 
was in the Scots brigade of the Dutch Army from 1736, and in 1740 he purchased a 
commission in the British Army. In the War of the Austrian Succession, he served in 
Europe and was not present during the Forty-Five.3 However, the rumours of Jacobitism 
cast a shadow over Murray’s entire career.  
Murray believed his family’s Jacobitism hindered his progress in the army. On 
numerous occasions, less experienced officers were promoted above him, including 
Robert Monckton, Thomas Gage, and Ralph Burton, who served with him in North 
America. Murray was the junior brigadier in the Quebec campaign to Robert Monckton 
and George Townshend. By 1762 he seemed to accept he had reached the apex of his 
career unless the British government could finally see past his family’s disgrace. Seeking 
the support of Secretary at War Charles Townshend in his search for preferment, he 
offered that: 
By the chances of war [and] very extraordinary ones they have been, I 
have hitherto surmounted the difficulties thrown in my way by the 
Political Behaviour of two of my Brothers, but perhaps these Chances 
have already push’d me higher than the true maxims of a well govern’d 
state will admit…tho’ it would be too much to give Lord Elibanks 
Brother an old Regiment, I humbly presume it will be right to support 
the authority of the Governor of Quebec by some distinction…4 
                                                 
2 Horace Walpole, Memoirs of King George II, January 1751 - March 1754, vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale 
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3 G. P. Browne, ‘Murray, James’, DCB, vol 4, 2003, see DCB online.  
4 James Murray to Charles Townshend, Quebec, 1 September 1762, WO 34, vol 2, Microfilm Reel B-
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The letter to Townshend implicitly questioned the advancement of Scottish officers, at a 
time when Scotophobia was rampant in London by dint of the Earl of Bute’s influence 
over the young George III.5 An agent of empire he might have been, but Murray remained 
fully aware of the limits to his and other Scots’ imperial progression.  
Murray’s appointment as first military and then civil governor of Canada made 
him enemies of Scotophobes in London and Canada. John Wilkes was Murray’s most 
persistent detractor, harbouring his own unfulfilled ambitions to become governor of 
Quebec.6 Wilkes’ attacks in the North Briton claimed that the colonies had been left “prey 
to the rapacity of four hungry Scottish governors” (Murray in Quebec, his nephew George 
Johnstone in West Florida, James Grant in East Florida, and Robert Melville in Granada) 
even though the undeserving Murray had almost lost Quebec in 1760.7 Murray, Wilkes 
presumed, was part of Bute’s inner circle and one of the “King’s Friends”. The ambitious 
colonial merchants who settled in Quebec in the aftermath of the conquest disliked 
Murray’s overtures to the French-Canadians and petitioned for his recall. They used 
common Scotophobic stereotypes equating Scottishness with Jacobitism to their 
advantage, portraying Murray as a tyrannical governor. These attacks likely contributed 
to Murray’s belief that he had reached the apex of his career and encouraged him to 
continue allying himself with the French-Canadians in recognition of the opposition he 
faced from other quarters.  
Murray was not averse to portraying himself as British, rather than Scottish, to 
counter the machinations of his opponents. His marriage into the Collier family provided 
him with a powerful ally, and he recognised that much of his advancement by 1752 had 
been due to the political influence and financial assistance of his father-in-law.8 He also 
developed relationships with those in power and by 1760 he could count the Duke of 
Newcastle and Jeffrey Amherst as patrons, thanking both for his appointment as military 
                                                 
5 See: Colley, Britons, 105-32; Tim Worth, ‘Transatlantic Scotophobia: Nation, Empire and Anti-Scottish 
Sentiment in England and America, 1760-1783’ (PhD Thesis, University of Southampton, 2016), 
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governor.9 Although Murray did not respond directly to Wilkes’ attacks on his family 
and identity, he repeatedly emphasised his loyalty to the King and complained of his 
detractors in the ministry. In a letter to his friend and confidant Ralph Burton, Murray 
opined: 
…for my part I believe our young King is very capable of Governing 
himself, and I am such a friend to our incomparable Constitution that I 
shall be sorry ever to see Him reduced to the necessity of Governing by 
Faction…These are Mr Burton! the Sentiments of an honest Briton who 
Blushes for the man who makes distinctions betwixt the North, and 
South of the Tweed, and who in Place, or out of place, elivated, or 
depressed, will ever think the same, and act accordingly.10 
Murray’s comments came in the wake of the resignation of the Earl of Bute in April 1763 
following the Wilkite campaign. His references to the “incomparable Constitution” of 
Britain and the evolution of the idea of a “Patriot King” ruling independently above 
faction highlight a clear identification with the imperialist ideology of King George III 
himself who gloried “in the Name of Briton” and aimed to unify the people of Britain, 
Ireland, and the colonies under a paternalistic monarch.11 Murray’s emphasis on being an 
“honest Briton” disassociated himself from the images perpetuated by Scotophobia and 
was an investment in the patriotic ideology of inclusive Britishness above the 
factionalism.  
Did his own experiences lead him to oppose the oppression of the French-
Canadian population? In his correspondence, Murray took pains to explain exactly how 
his policies would help ensure long-term imperial security and general prosperity. The 
mildness of the pacification was a result of Murray’s personal choice rather than military 
or ministerial directive. The commander-in-chief only asserted control over recruitment, 
quartering, and discipline, whilst the Pitt-Newcastle, and later Bute, ministry was focused 
on the continuing war effort and gave Murray no instructions. Whether he was more 
predisposed towards mild measures and toleration due to his own experiences or not, 
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Murray exhibited the paradigm of benevolence when balancing subjugation and 
cooperation, believing it to be in the best interest of the Crown. Likewise, as his 
understanding of imperial loyalty evolved due to his experiences implementing 
militarisation in Canada, his refusal to call an assembly during the period of civil 
government was again motivated by his belief that doing so would undermine imperial 
security. Murray pursued this course despite the sustained petitioning against him by the 
mercantile population that would eventually lead to his return to London and to his 
conduct being investigated, although ultimately sanctioned. Figure 5 depicts Murray at 
the height of his power and influence in Canada, dressed in the uniform of a Major-
General with Quebec City in the background, symbolising his military role in the 
conquest. It was likely painted after his return to London to celebrate his personal 
contribution to the conquest of Canada and the exoneration of his conduct as governor. 
III. Conquest and Pacification, Canada 1759-63 
Subjugation 
James Murray’s first years in Canada were concerned with the conquest and the 
pacification of the French-Canadian population. There were significant differences 
between the conflict in Canada and the earlier campaign in Scotland, not least that in 
Canada the British faced an external, rather than internal, enemy. However, there were 
parallels: regular and irregular warfare was present in both. The British Army in Canada 
faced regulars (the troupes de terre and the troupes de la Marine) and irregulars (the 
French-Canadian militia and Native Americans), while also struggling to differentiate 
non-combatants and combatants amongst the civilian population. Matthew Ward 
suggested the siege of Quebec represented an early example of ‘total warfare’ in North 
America, citing the French mobilisation of civilians through male participation in the 
militia and women and children in transporting supplies and intelligence-gathering. The 
British Army under James Wolfe actively targeted French-Canadian civilians as well as 
soldiers, destroying homes, food-stores, and crops.12 The Forty-Five had not witnessed 
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the mass mobilisation of civilians on the scale of Quebec, but the campaign of destruction 
to subjugate French-Canadians was reminiscent of that undertaken against Highlanders.  
Undertaking a sustained bombardment of the city in 1759, the British Army 
destroyed hundreds of houses and large quantities of stores, demoralising the population. 
Parties were sent to scour the country, with orders to set fire to all buildings except 
churches, to seize or destroy crops, cattle, and other provisions, and to kill all men they 
found and take the women prisoner. James Murray took charge of the expedition north 
of the city, ordering his troops to burn houses to provoke French forces into an 
engagement.13 Whilst there is no record of the numbers killed, Matthew Ward highlighted 
that all settlements and approximately two thousand farms were destroyed in a one 
hundred mile strip above and below Quebec.14 As Armstrong Starkey argued, whilst the 
limits of violence during a campaign were theoretically set by sovereigns and 
governments, in reality it was the officers on the ground who decided whether to adhere 
to the rules of warfare and how to treat civilians.15 Wolfe had direct experience of the 
effectiveness of the fire and sword tactics employed in the Highlands, which had 
neutralised the threat of the local population, and his army mirrored these aspects of that 
campaign in Quebec.  
As in Scotland, the army justified a campaign that targeted civilians by accusing 
that population of savagery. The British tended to associate French-Canadians with 
Native Americans, because the militia frequently worked in conjunction with Indian 
scouts and allies, and accused both groups of atrocities. The British used the paradigm of 
civility to characterise the savage barbarism of these groups in contrast to their own 
supposedly more civilised warfare. Wolfe, for example, frequently bracketed “Indians 
and Canadians” in correspondence and his private journal, depicting both together as “the 
Savages”.16 In July 1759 he issued orders forbidding the “unhumane Practice of Scalping 
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Except when the Enemy are Indians [and] all Canadians Dress’d Like Indians.”17 Wolfe’s 
order effectively gave his troops impunity to scalp any French-Canadian they 
encountered, again blurring the two populations and asserting that previous and 
continuing barbarities undertaken by both justified the army’s actions. Whilst French-
Canadians were not explicitly labelled as savages in the same way as Highlanders and 
Native Americans, the army’s association of them with Native Americans caused them 
to be treated as such whilst the conflict was ongoing.  
In both Scotland and Quebec, the difficulty the British Army faced defining their 
enemy, and their association of the population with savagery, rationalised the targeting 
of the civilian population. Due to the French Army’s reliance upon the French-Canadian 
militia, and the mobilisation of the entirety of Quebec society in the war effort, the divide 
between the military and civil spheres in Quebec was already ill-defined. This made it 
easier for Wolfe and the British Army to justify a campaign that purposefully aimed to 
subjugate the entire population. When the fleet first arrived in the River St. Lawrence, 
Wolfe issued a proclamation to the civilians, assuring them that they would not be harmed 
if they remained at home and took no part in the campaign. He warned that: 
The Resolution the Canadians ought to take is by no means doubtfull. 
The utmost Exertion of their Valour will be intirely useless and will 
only serve to deprive them of the Advantages that they might Enjoy by 
their Neutrality. The Cruelties of the French against the Subjects of 
Great Britain in America would excuse the most severe Reprisals. But 
English Men are too Generous to follow such Barbarous Examples; 
they offer to the Canadians the sweets of Peace amidst the Horrors of 
War: it is left to themselves to determine their Fate by their Conduct.18 
When French-Canadians continued to serve the French war effort, Wolfe claimed that the 
civilians had now denied themselves any protection they might have been entitled to.19 
Understanding that the rules of warfare clearly demarcated combatants and non-
combatants, Wolfe argued that he had been forced to lay waste to the country and target 
French-Canadians due to the active role they had taken in the war. He did this to justify 
his campaign of military execution to the British government and public, despite having 
planned such a campaign from the outset, informing Commander-in-Chief Jeffrey 
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Amherst that if he found it likely Quebec would not fall into British hands, he proposed 
to “set the Town on fire with shells, to destroy the Harvest, Houses, [and] Cattle, both 
above [and] below…to leave famine and desolation behind me.”20 Wolfe’s campaign 
targeted civilian morale as much as France’s military capabilities, with Quebec 
inhabitants noting that the British had “altered the direction of their Bombs” to target the 
civilians in the suburbs.21 Wolfe targeted civilian morale to increase pressure on the 
French Army to leave the confines of the city walls and engage in battle. The British 
Army also sought to punish the entire population for the actions of those who had taken 
on a military role in the conflict, even if they had been coerced into that role by the French 
Army. As it appeared increasingly unlikely that they would be successful in provoking 
the French to a decisive engagement, the actions of the commander and his troops against 
the civilian population also marked their frustration at their situation.  
Although the campaign of destruction against Quebec ended after the British 
victory at the Battle of the Plains of Abraham on 13 September 1759 and the surrender 
of the city five days later, the British Army under James Murray continued the 
subjugation of the population during the winter and throughout 1760 as they attempted 
to secure their tenuous hold on the region whilst the conflict with France in North 
America continued. During the 1759 campaign, Murray had made it clear he believed 
Wolfe’s actions to be both lawful and necessary and he continued to use the threat and 
sometimes the reality of violence to secure the British conquest after Quebec’s 
surrender.22 In November 1759, Murray published a manifesto ordering the disarming of 
the inhabitants, and if they failed to do so “they must expect all the severity which it is in 
the power of a victorious but justly irritated army to exercise. The blame will fall on 
themselves. Such a line of conduct will be dictated by human nature, and it will be fully 
justified by the laws of nations.”23 As in Scotland, the army insisted upon total submission 
from a hostile population group to ensure imperial security. The weakness of the British 
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hold on Quebec as they faced a winter with insufficient provisions and just seven 
thousand troops to maintain control over the city, the surrounding area, and the 
inhabitants meant this was particularly important. Murray was aware that the conquest of 
Quebec had not been absolute, and he used the threat of violence to induce compliance 
from the population. Explicit reference to the rules of warfare illustrates that the 
population continued to be viewed as an enemy so long as the French Army threatened 
within Canada. Again, rationalisation of the army’s abandonment of the rules of warfare 
was attributed to the actions of the inhabitants.  
 




Whilst the British violence of the 1759 campaign had been indiscriminate, Murray 
was careful to target communities refusing to submit to British authority or which broke 
their oaths of submission. In February 1760, he discovered that a detachment of the 
French Army had been concealed at Point Levy (Fig. 6) and sent out parties to destroy 
houses, publicly excusing the action as retribution for the inhabitants’ failure to inform 
the British of the French military presence.24 Murray sought to exemplify the punishment 
of failing to submit to British authority. His threats of violence, accompanied with 
occasional instances of destruction, had the desired effect in 1760 as most French-
Canadians did not actively assist the French. When the inhabitants of Sorel (Fig. 6) joined 
the French in August, Murray informed Pitt that he had been put “under the cruel 
Necessity of burning the greatest part of these poor unhappy peoples houses. I pray God 
                                                 
24 Proclamation of 26 February 1760 in Nish, French Canadians, 45. 
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this Example may suffice, for my nature revolts, when this becomes a necessary part of 
my duty.”25 With “cruel Necessity”, Murray consciously alluded to state power 
reluctantly deployed, here against hostile civilians: an aberration. In doing so he implied 
a preference for leniency rather than the indiscriminate killing Cromwell’s troops visited 
on the inhabitants of Drogheda in 1649, whilst simultaneously accentuating his own 
imperial loyalty through his willingness to employ brutality when required. But it was 
Murray’s preference for leniency and for winning the loyalty of the population that 
shaped the direction of British policy during and after the military occupation of Canada.  
The articles of capitulation agreed to by the British were lenient: the French 
garrison was granted full honours of war, French regulars were transported to France 
rather than being made prisoners of war, militiamen were allowed to remain with their 
families, and civilians were granted protection in their homes and freedom to continue 
practising their religion.26 However, militiamen and civilians were required to disarm and 
swear an oath of fidelity, submitting to British authority. Manifestos were published 
informing civilians of the terms of the surrender and militiamen were only allowed to 
return to their farms and gather their harvest after obeying them.27 Disarming parties were 
sent into the countryside to take fidelity oaths and gather arms. Whilst these steps were 
similar to those taken in the Highlands after the Forty-Five, the disarming of the French-
Canadians was more problematic for that population: shortages of provisions following 
Wolfe’s depredations left many dependent on hunting through the winter months; without 
their weapons they might starve. But, as in Scotland, disarming the civilian population 
was a precondition of British military security and for securing civilian interests. The fear 
of a pro-French insurrection took a while to recede,28 in much the same way that fear of 
French intervention drove British pacification in the Highlands.  
 
 
                                                 
25 Murray to Pitt, Near Montreal, 24 August 1760 in Correspondence of William Pitt When Secretary of 
State with Colonial Governors and Military and Naval Commissioners in America, ed. G. S. Kimball, 
vol. 2 (New York: MacMillan, 1906), 321-24.  
26 The Articles of Capitulation for the Town of Quebec, Conquest of Canada and Louisbourg Collection, 
MG18N28, ff.32-38, LAC; The Articles of Capitulation Concluded at Montréal, Conquest of Canada and 
Louisbourg Collection, MG18N28, ff.133-156, LAC.  
27 Robert Monckton to Pitt, Quebec, 8 October 1759, CO5/51, f.103, TNA. Regarding the oaths of 
allegiance see Form of the Oath Administered to Canadians, Montresor Family Papers, G28, Microfilm 
Reel 695, DLAR. 
28 Amherst to Murray, New York, 2 April 1762, WO 34, vol 3, Microfilm Reel B-2638, LAC. 
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Figure 7. Title: Plan of the Settled part of the Province of Quebec, reduced from the large survey 
to serve as an index plan to the large sheets. General James Murray’s Map of the St. Lawrence. 
Date: 1761-1763. © Library and Archives Canada, Online MIKAN no. 4134077.  
The legend highlights the number of families and men able to bear arms in every town or parish 


















































Figure 8. Title: Plan of Canada or the Province of Quebec from the uppermost settlements to the 
Island of Coudre as surveyed by order of his excellency governor Murray in the year 1760, 61, 
and 62. Item 77.  Date Created: 1761-1763. © Library and Archives Canada, Online MIKAN no. 
4134077. 
Item 77 highlights the town of Quebec and its surrounding area. The legend in the top left corner 
provides references for points of interest including the governor’s house, powder magazines, the 
cathedral, and various bastions. The legend in the top right corner provides references for points 
of interest relating to the 1759 campaign.  
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Figure 9. Title: Index of the Roy Military Survey of Scotland. Date: 1747-1755. © British Library 
Board from Maps K.Top.48.25-1.a-f.  
The Roy Military Survey was the first systematic mapping of the Scottish mainland. It was begun 
in the wake of the Forty-Five, as both a method of pacification and to provide a detailed map of 
the region to aid the British response should conflict break out again in the future. When the 
mapping of the Highlands was completed in 1752 the decision was taken to extend the survey to 
the Lowlands. Each of the thirty-eight rectangles on the index map represents a separate page of 
the map providing detail of the land, roads, buildings, landmarks, and watercourses in specific 




Figure 10. Title: Roy Military Survey of Scotland, Rectangle 26. Date: 1747-1755. © British 
Library Board from Maps K.Top.48.25-1.a-f. The image above highlights the detail around 
Inverness and Culloden Moor, taken from rectangle 26. The map provides a wealth of information 
regarding settlement and land use in the mid-eighteenth century. 
 
 
As in Scotland previously, the British undertook a large-scale mapping project of 
the St. Lawrence Valley region as part of the militarisation of Canada. This provided a 
detailed picture of the country they had conquered and offered further means of 
subjugation. Both Murray and his superior Jeffrey Amherst recognised the need for a 
detailed map of the region, to ensure effective British control of the country should it be 
retained or to provide them with the military information they would require to reconquer 
it, should the need arise, were it returned to France. Murray took the lead with the 
mapping project, ordering surveys of various parts of Canada, under the command of Lt. 
Spry. Murray also took the decision to include a census that detailed the number of men 
able to bear arms in each parish, providing useful intelligence for the army.29 The survey 
itself was completed by autumn 1761, with the engineers having mapped the St. 
Lawrence River from Les Cèdres above Montréal to Île-aux-Coudres below Quebec and 
had included additional detail of parts of the Richelieu and Chaudière rivers which flowed 
out of New England (Fig. 7).30 The mapping of the region was vital for the subjugation 
                                                 
29 J. S. Murray, Terra Nostra: The Stories behind Canada’s Maps, 1550-1950, from the Collection of 
Library and Archives Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 41.  
30 Murray to Thomas Gage, Quebec, 1761, Gage Papers, vol 8; Murray, Terra Nostra, 41, 45. In response 
to complaints about his management and abilities, Murray demoted Lt. Spry but was forced to reinstate 
him after Spry denounced him to the Board of Ordnance. It is likely Murray’s awareness of his enemies 
in London induced him to reinstate Spry whilst denying Spry’s accusations, rather than to take the matter 
further. William Spry to Board of Ordnance, Quebec, 12 November 1761, Amherst Papers; Spry to 
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of the population as the map not only provided the British Army with a detailed 
understanding of the landscape but it also had a much more symbolic and powerful 
resonance as an act of pacification. The physical presence of soldiers upon farms over a 
year after the conquest provided a clear reminder of the British Army’s total control over 
the region.31 The Murray Map (Figs. 7, 8) was similar to a number of eighteenth-century 
maps, the most recent example being the Roy Map of Scotland (Figs. 9, 10), which had 
been drawn between 1747 and 1755 in direct response to the Forty-Five. Both mapped 
regions over which the British wished to assert dominion. Murray’s Scottish roots, 
coupled with the fact that the Roy Map was completed whilst he was serving in the army, 
ensured he was aware of both the earlier precedent and the importance of cartography to 
pacification.  
A further method of subjugation employed by the British Army under James 
Murray was the implicit threat that the British could remove anyone they found 
disruptive, or even the entire population, transporting them to France or deporting them 
to other British colonies in North America. Whilst the articles of capitulation theoretically 
provided the civilian population security that they would be allowed to remain in their 
homes, the deportation of the Acadians in 1755, over forty years after British control of 
Nova Scotia had been determined by the Treaty of Utrecht, for refusing to swear oaths of 
allegiance to the British Crown, was a fearsome precedent. The Acadians had repeatedly 
refused to swear an oath of allegiance to the British that would require them to take up 
arms against the French. Geoffrey Plank highlighted that after Cumberland’s plan to 
transport Highland clans to the West Indies was made public, the possibility of 
transporting the Acadian population of Nova Scotia became increasingly popular.32 
Whilst Britain and France were at peace there was no justification for the British to 
remove the population but upon the outbreak of the French and Indian War, and amidst 
a belief that Acadians were supporting the French in that region, approximately seven 
thousand Acadians were removed from Nova Scotia and scattered throughout other 
                                                 
Murray, Quebec, 14 November 1761, Amherst Papers; Spry to Board of Ordnance, Quebec, 23 
November 1761, Amherst Papers. 
31 Murray, Terra Nostra, 22. 
32 For Cumberland’s plans for Highland clans see Chapter One. Regarding the Acadian deportation see: 
Geoffrey Plank, An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 112–17; J. M. Faragher, A Great and Noble 
Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from Their American Homeland (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 245–364.   
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British North American colonies in the hope that they would be more easily assimilated 
into colonial society.  
Both the British Army and the French-Canadian population were aware of the 
mass deportation of the Acadians. The French had used the episode to warn French-
Canadians that they would meet a similar fate should Canada be lost, encouraging them 
to join the militia. Murray actively sought to allay such fears after the British victory at 
Quebec, and again after the arrival of British supply vessels in early May 1760 caused 
the French Army under François de Gaston, Chevalier de Lévis, that had beaten Murray’s 
troops at the Battle of Sainte-Foy the previous month, to abandon their siege of the city 
and retreat to Montréal. Murray repeatedly reassured civilians that they had nothing to 
fear from the military occupation if they cooperated with the army, issuing a proclamation 
stating that the King: 
…wishes to preserve for the inhabitants, the religion they cherish and 
the priests, who exercise it, to maintain the communities and private 
individuals in all their property, laws and customs, provided that, 
satisfied with sentiments so generous, they submit willingly and 
promptly to his orders.33 
The proclamation was designed to encourage civilians to take the oath of fidelity and to 
show that the mass deportation of French-Canadians was never considered as an option 
as it had been elsewhere. Indeed, the ministry was determined not to furnish France with 
thousands of men for the continuing war. However, although Britain had no intention of 
repeating the Acadian deportation, the implicit threat of removal remained throughout 
the military occupation.34 The British could effectively remove any uncooperative 
individual or non-submissive groups simply by accusing them of breaking the terms of 
their oaths.  
Submissive Cooperation 
Although subjugation continued in the aftermath of the surrender of Quebec as 
the British Army embarked upon the militarisation of the region, the occupation has been 
                                                 
33 Proclamation at Quebec, 22 May 1760 in Nish, French Canadians, 45-46.  
34 Such a removal would have been harder to effect in practice, as the example of the Jesuits highlights. 
Despite regularly wishing for the removal of that group, neither Murray nor the government took active 
steps to secure their removal. See: Report by James Murray on the Province of Quebec, 5 June 1762, Add 




assessed as moderate, with emphasis placed on the high standard of troop discipline and 
the freedoms and security granted to civilians. James Murray’s humanity and clemency 
during this period have been credited with softening French-Canadian attitudes towards 
British rule.35 Murray received little direction from the ministry or from Jeffrey Amherst 
during the winter of 1759 and his actions then, and after the surrender of Montréal in 
September 1760, were guided by the paradigm of benevolence. The benevolence 
paradigm sought to establish the dominance of the conqueror through a process of 
cooperative submission: exhibiting the justness and mildness of the conqueror to remove 
entrenched perceptions of their cruelty from the minds of the conquered, thereby affecting 
acceptance and submission. Murray explained that the French-Canadians had been taught 
to look upon the British as “Barbarians, whose only view was their destruction”, 
suggesting that the civilians would have submitted earlier in the campaign had such a 
view not been so prevalent.36 The British would have to overcome this perception by 
demonstrating the justness of their rule if they were to reconcile French-Canadians to the 
conquest. During the winter of 1759, Murray encouraged the population to cooperate with 
the British Army through employment, provisioning, and by ensuring the army acted in 
a moderate and fair manner. He did so to ensure the survival of the British garrison and 
to encourage civilians to remain neutral during the 1760 campaign, exemplifying the 
benevolence paradigm. His concern for the King’s new subjects was therefore pragmatic 
in the first instance, arising from the imperialistic ideology of the army as he sought to 
establish dominance to ensure imperial security.37  
The seven thousand British troops were greatly outnumbered by French-
Canadians and needed civilian assistance to survive the winter in the destroyed city.38 
Without enough troops to fortify Quebec before the winter set in, Murray had to employ 
civilians and he provided them with provisions in return for their service, despite this 
exacerbating the shortages in the army. Murray justified his actions to the Treasury as 
                                                 
35 Burt, Old Province of Quebec, 13; Neatby, Quebec, 19; Fernand Ouellet and Translated by A. Kern, 
‘The British Army of Occupation in the St. Lawrence Valley, 1760-64: The Conflict Between Civil and 
Military Society’, in Armies of Occupation, ed. R. A. Prete and H. Ion (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 1984), 17-54.  
36 Murray to Amherst, Quebec, November 1759, Murray Papers. 
37 Cameron Nish, ‘The 1760s’, in Colonists & Canadiens, 1760-1867, ed. J. M. S. Careless (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1971), 5; Anderson, Crucible of War, 366-68.  
38 By the beginning of March 1760, the number of British soldiers fit for duty in Quebec City was just 
4,800. Ward, Battle for Quebec, 219. See also Kerr, ‘Creation of Empire’, 233-36.  
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“no other Consideration could engage them to act for us, with any kind of Heart or Spirit, 
besides a little Generosity was highly requisite to ingratiate ourselves with a People only 
Conquered in Part.”39 Murray recognised that the population had not been fully 
subjugated and believed that leniency would better serve the purpose of preventing 
civilian opposition the following year. This also emphasises the lack of provisions 
available in Quebec. Whilst the richer civilians were able to relocate to Montréal, the 
remainder were left in great need of assistance and Murray was able to exploit this to gain 
their cooperation. Their dependency on the British for provisions helped reconcile them 
to British rule, as the army bought these same provisions at a fair price from those 
civilians who had a surplus.40 Murray hoped that the army’s generosity, coupled with the 
threat of violence for any caught colluding with the French Army, would prevent civilians 
in and around Quebec from assisting the French. He continued to act moderately in 1760, 
promising security and freedom to all who remained in their homes, swore oaths of 
allegiance, and disarmed. The French Army believed that this was responsible for the 
desertion of over seven thousand French-Canadians from the militia in 1760, stating that 
the British might thank their “humanity more than [their] arms for so great an 
Acquisition.”41 After the final conquest of Canada neither Murray nor Gage nor Burton 
in Montréal and Trois- Rivières had to resort to wanton destruction to force the 
submission of the population.  
Murray sought the submissive cooperation of the Quebec inhabitants throughout 
the military occupation. He developed a close relationship with Canon Briand, grand 
vicar of Quebec, which allowed the church to retain some influence in the province 
despite it no longer playing a role in the administration. This provided early reciprocal 
benefit for the British as Briand ordered prayers be said in mass for King George III 
before the peace had been concluded, encouraging civilian acceptance of British 
authority.42 More generally, Murray recognised the importance of religion to the French-
Canadians, arguing that they were “extremely Tenacious” of it and that “nothing can 
                                                 
39 Murray to Samuel Martin, Quebec, 28 August 1761, Murray Papers.  
40 Ward, Battle for Quebec, 206.  
41 John Montresor to James Gabriel Montresor, Quebec, 16 December 1760, Montresor Family Papers, 
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contribute so much to make them Staunch Subjects to their Majesty as the new 
Governments given them every reason to imagine no alteration is to be attempted in that 
Point.”43 During the military government, he sought to assure the population that the 
British would not compromise their freedom of religion, believing that doing so would 
help to quickly reconcile them to British rule. He allowed some French-Canadians to 
serve in the administration and, although the civil courts were replaced with military ones, 
based his court and the laws of the province on those that had previously existed.44 
Murray also attempted to ensure high standards of troop discipline, issuing proclamations 
banning alcohol to reduce theft and drunkenness and encouraging civilians to report any 
violence they encountered from troops.45  
The steps Murray took were guided by the benevolence paradigm as he sought to 
secure Britain’s empire in North America by weakening France’s future ability to wage 
war in that theatre. It was generally believed that Canada would be returned to France 
after the war. This encouraged the French-Canadians to accept British authority as a 
temporary measure and, whilst approximately 1,600 people left (mostly civil 
administrators, military officers, and the upper-class merchants who would not benefit 
from the British occupation), the majority either willingly or reluctantly submitted.46 The 
emigration of the French-Canadian elite was a significant contrast to the British Army’s 
earlier experiences in the Highlands where mass relocation of the elite had not taken place 
and specific measures were implemented to remove the power of that group and their 
perceived influence over the Highlanders. In Canada, the voluntary relocation of the elite 
facilitated the British takeover as there was no need to neutralise that group’s power or 
compete with their influence over the population. It also left the remainder of the 
population feeling abandoned by their mother-country. Concerned that if Britain treated 
civilians punitively and Canada was returned to France then their experiences would 
cause them to oppose the British even more strongly during any future war, Murray 
planned to:  
Do everything in my power to convince [the French-Canadians] how 
happy they would be under the influence of British laws [and] therefore 
                                                 
43 Report by James Murray on the Province of Quebec, 5 June 1762, Add MS 35913, ff.136-47, BL.  
44 Neatby, Quebec, 21.  
45 Proclamation of 15 November 1759 in Nish, French Canadians, 43-44; Anderson, Journal of the 
Siege, loc. 123-35.  
46 Calloway, Scratch of a Pen, 114.  
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nothing shall be wanting in me to exert that Justice [and] Humanity 
which I hope will ever continue to Characterise the British 
Government. I shall by this means extinguish the prejudices the 
Canadians in general were taught to conceive against us and I shall 
endeavour to cultivate close connections with some of them as hereafter 
may be of use to Us in case of another war, [and] that this country is 
restore to France.47 
Murray was determined to limit any advantage France might gain from Britain’s 
occupation of Canada. In addition, his emphasis on extinguishing the prejudices of the 
French-Canadians demonstrates their cultural difference that Murray felt it necessary to 
acknowledge and overcome to affect their submissive cooperation during the military 
occupation.  
The fact that the French-Canadians were a conquered population rather than 
rebels explains why the benevolence paradigm led James Murray and the British Army 
to seek their cooperation. It took much longer for the British to engage in cooperation in 
the Highlands, apart from the efforts of select officers. The necessity driving cooperation 
in Canada did not exist to the same extent in the Highlands as the ongoing threat from 
France was much less pressing. Further, frustration and a desire for punishment had been 
vital factors directing the pacification in Scotland as the British sought to punish 
Highlanders for engaging in another Jacobite uprising. Whilst both frustration and 
punishment had been factors in the violence of the 1759 campaign, there was not the 
same sustained desire for punishment in Canada. French-Canadians were not viewed as 
rebels and they were no longer associated with savagery after their military association 
with Native Americans had ended; this diminished the desire for punishment that had 
been so important in the Highlands and contributed to making early cooperation and 
leniency possible and desirable in Canada. As early as November 1759, Murray explained 
the benefits of a policy of leniency to Amherst: “Until I have the Honour to receive your 
orders, I shall follow the natural dispositions of my heart, which dictates Clemency; this 
Conduct can do no hurt, because the Effects of it may be undone in one week; It may 
have permanent advantage.”48 Murray was convinced that benevolence was the quickest 
method of winning the allegiance of the French-Canadians, and vital for imperial 
security. The ministry, hoping to persuade as many civilians as possible to remain in 
Canada after the conquest, agreed with his strategy. Secretary of State Lord Egremont 
                                                 
47 Murray to Pitt, Quebec, 22 October 1760, Murray Papers.  
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informed Jeffrey Amherst that it was essential that the French-Canadians remain rather 
than move to colonies still under the control of the French where they would be of great 
service to the French war effort.49 Egremont praised the mildness of the pacification to 
that point, suggesting it was the best way to persuade civilians to remain, and he urged 
Amherst to ensure it continued.  
The benevolence paradigm not only influenced the measures implemented by 
Murray in Quebec, but also his attitude towards the populations he was responsible for 
during the occupation. He and the British Army had to concern themselves not only with 
French-Canadians but also with the Native Americans who resided in or around Canada. 
This population was not of as much concern to the British Army as they did not represent 
the same threat as the French-Canadians or the Native Americans who resided in the Ohio 
Country due to their being far fewer in number. The difference in the perceived level of 
threat is illustrated by Murray’s insistence that the French-Canadians remain disarmed in 
1761 but his belief that it would be useful to supply the Native Americans with limited 
quantities of arms and ammunition.50 Murray recognised that weapons were essential for 
Native Americans and that such a trade would provide much-needed commodities. After 
the conquest, Native Americans in Canada who submitted to British authority were 
treated in the same manner as French-Canadians and the army promised them security 
and safety so long as they remained peaceful.51 Aside from overseeing trade disputes and 
ensuring any murders were compensated for, the British Army did not have much contact 
with Native Americans in Canada prior to the Treaty of Paris. However, the outbreak of 
Pontiac’s War led Murray to reconsider the potential threat of that population and in July 
1763 he informed Amherst that although he believed that the “Indians in Canada will 
remain quiet”, further risings were likely unless the British prevented Catholic 
missionaries from visiting native settlements.52 Murray did not believe that the Native 
Americans in Canada were a direct threat to Britain despite the rising, but he did believe 
steps should be taken to convert them. It was the continuing perception of Native 
Americans as savages that led to such opinions that were reminiscent of the Highlands 
after the Forty-Five.  
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In contrast, the association of French-Canadians with savagery ended entirely 
after the conquest. That population was viewed by Murray and the British Army as much 
more civilised than both Native Americans and Scottish Highlanders, although not as 
civilised as Protestant Britons. Murray claimed they were “perhaps the most ignorant 
people under the Sun” due to having no communication with any nations apart from the 
Native Americans.53 The British Army, under the direction of Jeffrey Amherst, classified 
the population as having become “the King’s Subjects” immediately after the surrender 
at Montréal.54 Such a classification was guided by the paradigms of benevolence and 
loyalty: establishing dominance through the submission of the French-Canadians by 
granting them the same rights as others within the British Empire. Both Murray and 
Amherst argued that the French-Canadians ought not to lose out on trade opportunities 
due to the occupation. In response to an attempt by some British merchants recently 
settled in Canada to claim French-Canadian pelts from Montréal, Amherst informed 
Murray that: “A Monopoly of that Branch of Trade, which [the merchants] seem to Aspire 
at, is not their due, for, all His Majesty’s Subjects in General have an Equal right with 
them, to a share in that Commerce, [and] the Canadians are now His Majesty’s 
Subjects.”55 Amherst sought to act in a fair manner towards the French-Canadians to 
encourage their compliance. However, the fact the army also classified the population as 
subjects, whilst still recognising their difference from Britons, contributed to the belief 
that the French-Canadians ought to enjoy the same rights and privileges as Britons 
elsewhere in the empire and, consequently, contributed to the moderation employed by 
the army in Canada. Although they were ‘others’ within the British Empire, speaking a 
different language and adhering to different customs and a different religion, James 
Murray evinced a clear respect for the French-Canadians he governed during the military 
occupation. This respect, as well as his earlier experiences, informed his civil governance 
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of the region after the Proclamation of 1763 merged the governments of Montréal, Trois-
Rivières, and Quebec into the single province of Quebec from August 1764.56 
IV. Civil Government in Canada 
The strategic decision to retain Canada at the end of the Seven Years’ War 
represented a shift in British imperial focus from a commercial ‘empire of the seas’ to 
territorial empire.57 It followed the deliberate, more authoritative imperial policy which 
had originated from the Board of Trade in the late 1740s under the Earl of Halifax’s 
presidency: encouraging the expansion of empire through commercially valuable 
colonies, uniform in their governance and subservient to the Crown.58 The pacification 
and militarisation of the Highlands had represented a domestic manifestation of this 
policy as the British sought to ensure internal security. The extension of empire in North 
America after the Seven Years’ War left Britain responsible for two populations of 
‘others’: French-Canadians and Native Americans. With the Treaty of Paris in 1763, 
French-Canadians officially became subjects of the Crown like Britons both at home and 
in the colonies, although those in charge of the military occupation had treated them as 
subjects from the time of the conquest. As British subjects, they were expected to remain 
loyal to the Crown and act with due subjection to parliamentary authority, but they could 
also expect to enjoy the same rights and privileges as Britons. However, they remained 
an ‘other’ population in the eyes of the British imperial elite, significantly different from 
those Britons they now theoretically enjoyed the same rights and responsibilities as. The 
loyalty paradigm suggested that this ‘otherness’ had to be overcome for imperial security 
and stability to be achieved. The process of militarisation that began during the war 
continued as a method of military intimidation in areas where potentially hostile groups 
of ‘others’ resided whilst, as in the Highlands previously, the British ministry sought to 
assimilate rather than accommodate these groups within the empire.  
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The primary aim of the British imperial elite upon the establishment of civil 
government in Canada was the assimilation of the new subjects into an expanded empire 
as a method of guaranteeing a continuing submission and adherence to the Crown from 
them as loyal Britons.59 Anglicisation, the making of the colony English in character, was 
thought to be a necessary prerequisite for assimilation to replace the French institutions 
and overcome its Catholic identity. Assimilation of an ‘other’ population had likewise 
been the goal in the militarisation of the Highlands after the Forty-Five. In that imperial 
fringe, the population had also been categorised as savage, which led the ministry to 
attempt to forcibly civilise the Highlanders through strict limitations on religion, the 
destruction of Highland culture, and significant commercialisation of the region.60 The 
French-Canadians were not considered savage, although their Catholicism led to the 
conclusion that they were not as civilised as Britons, so forcible measures were not 
thought necessary for their assimilation. Further, the Treaty of Paris prevented punitive 
measures against Catholicism as it guaranteed the free exercise of religion to the French-
Canadians, as far as the laws of Britain permitted.61 Whilst this effectively excluded 
French-Canadian participation in public office due to the provisions of the Test Acts, it 
prevented the banning of churches or attempts to forcibly convert the population. 
Assimilation in Quebec was broadly an extension of the policy adopted by army officers 
during the military occupation. However, whilst James Murray had acted in consideration 
of the unique circumstances of Quebec, the ministry’s plan instead applied general 
systems of governance from the thirteen colonies with little consideration of how, or 
indeed if, these would work in practice. It relied upon the timely and sustained settlement 
of large numbers of Protestants in Quebec, the conversion of the Catholic population, and 
the establishment of representative government.  
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Figure 11. Title: The British Governments in North America laid down agreeable to the 
Proclamation of October 7th, 1763. Engraver: John Gibson. Date Created: 1763. © Lionel Pincus 
and Princess Firyal Map Division, The New York Public Library. 
https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47da-f148-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99. 
The map highlights the land reserved for Native Americans as per the Proclamation of 1763.  
 
 
The ministry’s expectations for Canada were set out in the Proclamation of 
October 1763 and the commission and instructions sent to Governor Murray the 
following month. The Proclamation restricted the size of the new province of Quebec 
with the establishment of an Indian “reserve” throughout much of the interior (Fig. 11). 
The Anglicisation of Quebec was directly encouraged as Murray was ordered to do all in 
his power to ensure Quebec resembled the other Protestant colonies of North America, 
with Nova Scotia highlighted as a particular example.62 He was to summon and call a 
general assembly, in the same manner and form as those in the older colonies, as soon as 
the “state and circumstances” of the colony allowed. Until that point, he was given the 
power to “make, constitute, and ordain laws, statutes, and ordinances for the public peace, 
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welfare and good government of our said colonies, and of the people and inhabitants 
thereof, as near as may be, agreeable to the laws of England.”63 The ministry was aware 
Murray could not immediately call an assembly in Quebec due to the small number of 
Protestants: just fifty-six families in Montréal and approximately two hundred throughout 
the whole province.64 However, the Proclamation made specific reference to governance 
through an assembly to attract Protestant settlers to the province.65 Although the 
Proclamation highlighted the governor’s right not to call an assembly until circumstances 
allowed it, the failure to specify what these circumstances might be and the expectation 
that governance through an assembly was to be the norm in Quebec contributed to the 
deteriorating relationship between Murray and the mercantile community in the province. 
Murray’s instructions reminded him that he must ensure freedom of religion for 
French-Canadians, but they also signalled the ministry’s intention that the Catholic 
population “be induced to embrace the Protestant Religion, and their Children be brought 
up in the Principles of it”.66 He was to effect this primarily through the encouragement of 
Protestant settlement: conducting land surveys, establishing planned towns with 
Protestant schools and churches within them, and advertising for settlers: setting quit-
rents low but only granting large tracts of land to those who proposed to live in the colony 
themselves. In addition, the Grenville ministry offered land grants to ex-soldiers to 
encourage them to settle in Quebec.67 To encourage conversion in the short-term, the 
governor requested prayer books and French-speaking missionaries from the Society of 
the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG).68 Murray was also ordered to 
investigate the possibilities for improving the agricultural and manufacturing industries 
in Quebec, including the cultivation of hemp and flax and the improvement of the timber 
and iron industries, and to do all he could to improve the province’s commercial 
situation.69 The steps encouraged by the ministry to encourage Anglicisation and 
                                                 
63 Proclamation of 1763 in Documents, 119-24.  
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assimilation in Quebec bore a resemblance to the steps taken to assimilate Highlanders 
after the Forty-Five, although those relating to religion were milder in Quebec. It was 
hoped the establishment of Protestant schools and churches throughout the province 
would encourage conversion, particularly of the younger generation, and that 
commercialisation would make the population more civilised, thereby affecting closer 
assimilation of the ‘other’ in both imperial fringes. 
The paradigm of loyalty rationalised Murray’s approach to the civil governance 
of Canada. Arguing that the French-Canadians’ adherence to Catholicism was evidence 
of their ignorance,70 he shared the ministry’s aspiration for the Anglicisation of the colony 
to affect the closer assimilation of the population so that they would become loyal 
Britons. However, his experiences during the military occupation led him to believe that 
limiting opportunities for Catholics and using any semblance of force to encourage 
conversion would have an adverse effect on the population. As such, Murray believed 
that some toleration of Catholicism in the short-term was the best method for encouraging 
assimilation. This led him to utilise the flexibility within his instructions when 
implementing civil government in Quebec. He ruled out calling an assembly during his 
tenure as governor as he was concerned that appointing one from the Protestant 
population would give that group an unfair advantage ruling over approximately seventy 
thousand French-Canadians. His instructions had not clarified whether the Test Acts were 
to be extended to Canada, so Murray chose to interpret them as allowing some degree of 
toleration. In addition to appointing French-Canadians to the provincial council, he 
changed the court system to provide a mixture of Canadian civil and English criminal 
law and he allowed French-Canadians to serve on juries and as lawyers.71  
Murray also sought the assimilation of the French-Canadians through 
improvement and the enlightenment of the population. His focus on improvement 
originated from a family involvement through his father Alexander, fourth Lord Elibank, 
who was a founder of the Society of Improvers in the Knowledge of Agriculture in 
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Scotland.72 The interest was shared by James Murray and his elder brother Patrick, fifth 
Lord Elibank, who was a member of the Select Society and part of the celebrated “literary 
triumvirate” consisting of Elibank, Lord Kames, and David Hume.73 Kames was one of 
the commissioners for the annexed estates in the Highlands, encouraging improvement 
and enlightenment as a method of pacification and to increase Scottish prosperity. These 
ideas influenced Murray in Canada where he sought not only to make the colony as 
profitable as possible for the Crown but also to encourage the natural enlightenment of 
the French-Canadians. In a 1762 report on the state of Quebec, Murray highlighted the 
possible advantages Britain could gain if Canada was retained at the peace, noting the 
agricultural potential of the colony should the peoples’ husbandry skills be improved. He 
also argued that the French had concentrated too much on the fur trade at the expense of 
the fisheries, suggesting potential for British growth in that area. Murray’s key 
observation was that the land in and around Quebec was well suited to growing hemp and 
flax, suggesting that “It will be right to turn the thoughts of the People towards the 
Cultivation of this Article so Essential to Great Britain” and encouraging the settlement 
of skilled Europeans to quickly improve that branch of agriculture.74 Murray was 
optimistic about the opportunities available should Canada remain British and he was 
actively considering improvement as a method of assimilation prior to the Treaty of Paris, 
which would continue in its aftermath. When procuring slaves for his own property in 
Quebec, Murray stated that “it is now certain I am to remain in this Country, where I 
propose doing all the good I can, by exciting the People to industry, and promoting the 
improvement of Agriculture by setting a good Example.”75 Similarly to the annexed 
estates in the Highlands, Murray believed that improvement would spread throughout the 
province by example. In both imperial fringes, improvement and enlightenment were 
perceived as methods of naturally leading the population to Protestantism and thereby 
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assimilating more easily within the empire.76 In Quebec, the desire to improve the 
commercial situation of the province further stemmed from a desire to open the region to 
further Protestant settlement, affecting Anglicisation in the long-term.  
Murray requested the toleration he had been practising be formalised through 
legislation, arguing it was the only way to prevent large swathes of the population from 
emigrating.77 At the same time, Murray sent his secretary Hector Theophilus de Cramahé 
to inform the ministry of the steps he had taken and attempt to affect legislative reform 
in Canada. Recognition that the system of government proposed for Canada required 
alteration began during Murray’s tenure in the Board of Trade and, more importantly for 
affecting change, in the Grenville ministry. The attorney and solicitor general provided 
clarification over the position of Catholics in Canada in June 1765, stating that they were 
not subject to the same incapacities, disabilities, and penalties as those in Britain.78 
Murray’s advocacy of toleration and the way he had interpreted his instructions 
influenced government officials to demonstrate early acceptance of the need for some 
level of toleration in Canada.   
The ministry did not give the problem of government in Quebec sustained 
attention until Guy Carleton had succeeded Murray as governor in 1766, but Murray’s 
precedent influenced the steps taken.79 The Rockingham ministry drafted a report to 
consider how best to encourage peace and collaboration between the French-Canadian 
and mercantile populations, stepping back from Anglicisation although questions 
remained regarding how far toleration should be extended.80 The report was a result of 
the recommendations for toleration and changes to government advocated by both 
Murray and Carleton and it represented the beginning of the legislative process that would 
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eventually lead to the Quebec Act of 1774.81 The Quebec Act established rule through a 
governor and appointed council for Canada, although this was still intended to be a 
temporary measure. It also removed reference to religion in the oath of office so that 
Catholics could legally participate in public office in Canada.82 The process of change 
was slow as the issue was frequently laid to the side in favour of domestic issues, 
ministerial changes, and other imperial challenges. But the steps taken by the ministry 
highlight Murray’s, and Carleton’s, influence on imperial policymaking as his assessment 
that government in Quebec could not simply replicate that of the other North American 
colonies was eventually enshrined in the Quebec Act.  
Murray’s actions as civil governor largely stemmed from practicality as the 
sustained levels of Protestant immigration the ministry had expected simply did not 
materialise, which meant Quebec would not be anglicised in the short-term. However, 
his actions were also evidence of a paradigm shift regarding loyalty in the British Empire. 
Murray believed the French-Canadians had the potential to become amongst the most 
loyal subjects to the Crown, informing the Board of Trade that they were: 
…perhaps, the best and bravest Race upon the Globe, a Race who 
would they be indulged with a few Privileges which the Laws of 
England deny to Roman Catholicks at Home, would soon get the better 
of every national antipathy to their Conquerors, and become the most 
faithfull set of men in this American Empire.83 
Murray continued to believe that loyalty was a necessity for imperial security and 
stability, but his experiences as military and civil governor in Quebec suggested that 
assimilation was not a necessary precedent for securing the loyalty of imperial 
populations. As in Scotland, it seemed that an ‘other’ population could display continuing 
submission and adherence to the imperial state without being Britons. This encouraged 
Murray to argue in favour of toleration as an extension of the benevolence he had 
exhibited during the military occupation to remove the French-Canadians natural distrust 
and dislike of their British conquerors.  
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Murray encountered difficulties attempting to separate the civil and military 
spheres as a result of the militarisation of Canada. Although he retained command of the 
garrison of Quebec City, Ralph Burton was given an independent commission as 
brigadier of the northern department with headquarters at Montréal. This left Burton with 
overall command of the troops in Quebec, senior in military rank to Murray, and 
responsible for maintaining military order in Quebec and throughout the lands reserved 
to the Indians in the Proclamation.84 Mutual jealousy over the other’s position coupled 
with the incompatibility of the two positions in Quebec where the military and civil 
spheres could not effectively be separated led to the deterioration of the relationship 
between the two former friends.85 Burton required the acquiescence of the civil 
authorities to carry out the service effectively but the complexities of the situation led to 
accusations from each that the other was interfering in matters out with their authority 
and left Murray convinced that Burton was conspiring with Commander-in-Chief 
Thomas Gage to remove his military authority altogether. Murray’s belief in a plot to 
“turn me out of the army”86 reflects his own insecurity in his position. The poor 
relationship between Murray and Burton compounded the difficulties faced by both and 
was a contributing factor in their recall in 1766.  
Murray had to contend with the same civil-military disputes that were almost 
universal throughout North America during and after the war. Quartering was as 
contentious an issue in Quebec as it was elsewhere, and civilians frequently complained 
about the billeting of soldiers in private houses without consent.87 This was particularly 
common in Montréal, where it was accompanied by complaints of military indiscipline 
and clashes between the military and civil authorities, where merchants dominated the 
justices of the peace due to the ineligibility of Catholics. These disputes came to a head 
during the Walker affair: an assault on fur trader and justice of the peace Thomas Walker 
in December 1764 by soldiers from the 28th Regiment, the subsequent freeing of the 
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accused by that regiment, and disputes regarding where the accused were to stand trial.88 
This incident highlighted the limitations of Murray’s authority as civil governor as he 
claimed he was unable to answer for the behaviour of the troops due to Burton’s military 
authority over them.  
The difficulties Murray encountered, as well as the process of militarisation more 
generally, led Murray to believe it was essential that the governor of Quebec retain 
military as well as civil authority to stabilise government in its early years. He informed 
Thomas Gage that: “I am very sensible that the Civil and Military are separate branches, 
but as it appears to me that the situation of affairs here will for some years to come render 
it expedient that the Governor of this Province shou’d have Command of the Troops in 
it.”89 He argued that the two spheres must overlap until practicable civil governance had 
been established and the military was no longer required to perform some civil duties, 
complaining to the Earl of Halifax that the current situation made it impossible for him 
to obey the ministry’s commands.90 Although the balance was not altered during 
Murray’s governance, the Rockingham ministry implicitly accepted the validity of his 
argument when they gave his replacement Guy Carleton a commission with command 
over both spheres. The two spheres had been separated to encourage Anglicisation and 
representative government, but Murray’s experiences and opinions left the ministry 
convinced that such a separation of authority was not yet possible in Quebec.  
Murray’s governance of Canada brought him into conflict with the mercantile 
community that had moved to Canada after the conquest in the hope of gaining political 
power and dominating the trade. The merchants had been left frustrated when Murray 
and Amherst had refused to let them dominate the trade during the military occupation. 
After the Treaty of Paris, they were incensed by Murray’s failure to call an assembly that 
they believed the terms of the Proclamation demanded and were further frustrated by 
trade regulations that restricted their access to the interior. Drawing on the association of 
Murray with Jacobitism, the merchants accused him of arbitrary rule, which was so often 
associated with Catholicism and the Stuarts. They began a sustained petitioning campaign 
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in both Canada and London to try and facilitate his recall, eventually succeeding in 1766 
when Murray was ordered to London to answer questions about his conduct, although the 
charges against him were eventually dismissed as “groundless, scandalous and 
Derogatory”.91 
For his part, Murray believed the merchants had little interest in permanent 
settlement in Canada or in improving the province for the benefit of the mother-country. 
Describing them as “licentious Fanaticks” and displayers of “malice and envy”,92 Murray 
portrayed them as power hungry and desperate for the removal or subjugation of the 
French-Canadians for the purposes of unbridled ambition. He argued that allowing the 
merchants to control Quebec’s government would not only result in inequality for the 
French-Canadians but would also be contrary to the interests of the mother-country. As 
North American colonists, the merchants in Quebec were originally classified as loyal 
Britons. However, Murray came to view them as an imperial ‘other’ as their actions led 
him to believe that they were attempting to subvert his authority and were acting contrary 
to British imperial interests. With the significant expansion of the British Empire in North 
America after the French and Indian War, the British were no longer responsible for 
governing only Britons who had settled in the colonies but also Native Americans and 
French-Canadians. As militarisation exposed the colonists’ failure to demonstrate 
adherence to the British state, they came to be viewed not as Britons but simply as 
imperial subjects who had to be governed not through negotiation but through increased 
regulation to ensure British imperial security and prosperity.  
V. Conclusions 
 The 1759 campaign against Quebec highlights the continuing influence of the 
Forty-Five on British imperialism in North America, sharing many similarities with the 
earlier campaign. As it had in Scotland previously, the paradigm of civility led the British 
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Army to engage in a campaign of violence against a civilian population during a period 
of active warfare. Whilst French-Canadians were not defined as savages during times of 
peace, unlike Highlanders, the association of the militia with Native Americans led to an 
association with savagery during the Quebec campaign. However, whilst the pacification 
of the Highlands had become even more violent in the short-term after the British victory 
at Culloden, the use of violent tactics ended almost entirely after the British victory at the 
Battle of the Plains of Abraham. This was due to the unique circumstances in Quebec, 
where the British had conquered an external population group rather than defeating an 
internal one. Further, although the British had defeated the French at Quebec, the two 
countries remained at war. As a result, the benevolence paradigm guided Murray’s 
actions during the military occupation as he balanced subjugation with cooperative 
submission to ensure the security of Britain’s newest conquest and to prevent lingering 
resentment amongst the French-Canadians.  
With the move towards territorial empire as demonstrated by the decision to retain 
Canada in the Treaty of Paris, the British hoped Protestant immigration would affect the 
rapid Anglicisation of Quebec. However, Murray recognised that Anglicisation was not 
possible in the short-term and he advocated, and implemented, a policy of toleration and 
accommodation in the short-term, believing that encouraging the enlightenment and 
improvement of the French-Canadians would naturally cause them to turn to 
Protestantism over time. His thoughts mirrored those enlightenment thinkers had 
articulated over the previous decade to encourage the civilisation of the Highlanders. His 
experiences led to a paradigm shift regarding loyalty in the empire as he came to believe 
that Anglicisation and assimilation were not necessary precedents for securing the loyalty 
of imperial populations. His conclusions regarding governance in Canada influenced 
successive ministries, who gave Murray’s replacement increased powers and gradually 
moved away from an assumption that government in Canada should, and would, look 
like government in the other North American colonies, at least in the short-term.  
The expansion of British territory in North America after the French and Indian 
War changed the character of empire there from one that was predominantly white and 
Protestant, with colonists who were viewed the same as Britons at home, to one that 
included French-Canadians and Native Americans who were significantly different to 
Britons. Whilst all these groups were classified as imperial populations, subject to the 
authority of the Crown, not all were considered equal or enjoyed the same rights as 
Britons. The paradigm of loyalty played an important role in guiding the absorption of 
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‘others’ into the empire and governing a new imperial fringe as Murray attempted to 
ensure imperial security. His experiences as military and civil governor led him to believe 
that French-Canadians were likely to become more loyal than the colonists if allowed to 
enjoy some toleration. In identifying a potential threat from the mercantile community, 
Murray simultaneously ‘othered’ the colonists, classifying them as significantly different 
to Britons at home and more like the French-Canadians and Native Americans recently 
absorbed into the empire:  another group that had to be carefully governed. The paradigm 
shift that had begun under Loudoun continued in the aftermath of the war as army officers 
continued to move away from the concept of an “empire of negotiation”.93 
  
                                                 






Chapter Four: Sir Jeffrey Amherst 
 
Figure 12. Title: Jeffrey Amherst, 1st Baron Amherst. Artist: James Watson. Engraving after 





Whilst James Wolfe’s 1759 campaign against Quebec saw him promoted to acting 
major-general with an independent command over operations in that region, overall 
responsibility for the British war effort in North America rested with Jeffrey Amherst. 
Amherst had been posted to the continent upon the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War 
before being granted command of the 1758 Louisbourg expedition, replacing James 
Abercromby as commander-in-chief late that year. Amherst’s early service as a staff 
officer under Sir John Ligonier and the Duke of Cumberland taught him the value of good 
administration.1 His meticulous planning during the winter of 1758-59 contributed to the 
successful campaign against Ticonderoga and Crown Point under his command, although 
he still encountered problems ensuring the provincials were in the field when required, 
preventing desertion, and supplying the necessary provisions, bateau men, and wagons.2 
Amherst focused on ensuring the security of the army as he progressed, ordering the 
strengthening of captured posts. This left the British Army in a strong position at the end 
of the 1759 campaign and the following year Amherst directed the convergence of three 
separate armies on Montréal, forcing the final capitulation of Canada. His success would 
see him elevated to the peerage as Baron Amherst and his greatest victory was celebrated 
in a 1765 portrait by Joshua Reynolds (Fig. 12).  
Militarisation continued as a deliberate policy in North America, including the 
newly conquered Canada, post-1760 as Britain and France remained at war. Amherst had 
to recruit provincials for garrison duty and campaigns in the West Indies and 
Newfoundland, whilst British regulars continued to require quarters and supplies. 
Concurrently, Amherst also sought to prevent illegal trade between colonists and the 
French, to garrison Britain’s vastly increased territory, and to oversee the pacification of 
French-Canadians and Native Americans. Under pressure to significantly reduce military 
expenditure in North America and driven by an overriding sense of cultural superiority, 
Amherst attempted to subjugate the Native American population in order to secure peace 
in the interior. When the measures he implemented contributed to the pan-Indian 
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Uprisings commonly known as Pontiac’s War, which broke out in 1763,3 he finally 
received the permission he had long sought to return to England, although his 
achievements and reputation were somewhat diminished by the ongoing conflict.  
The previous chapter highlighted that the benevolence paradigm led James 
Murray to balance subjugation and cooperative submission when pacifying the French-
Canadians in Quebec after the 1759 conquest. As his experiences led him to reconsider 
how best to ensure imperial loyalty, he began to ‘other’ not only the French-Canadians 
and Native Americans who were now part of the British Empire but also the colonial 
merchants whose imperial loyalty he believed suspect. This chapter investigates 
Amherst’s experiences of pacification and militarisation in the North American interior 
between 1760 and 1763. Focusing on his attempts to integrate Native Americans within 
the expanded British Empire, it first explores Amherst’s formative experiences before 
considering the cultural paradigms driving his western strategy. Amherst’s formative 
experiences fostered a deep-seated sense of cultural superiority evident throughout his 
military career. Investigating the militarisation of the interior demonstrates the continuing 
influence of the Forty-Five on British imperialism in North America as similar steps were 
taken in pursuit of British imperial aims of security, assimilation, and prosperity. The 
paradigms of civility and loyalty influenced how British Army officers interacted with 
Native Americans, but Amherst’s paradigm of superiority was to the fore throughout the 
pacification as he sought, but ultimately failed, to ensure peace in the West.  
II. Jeffrey Amherst’s Cultural Superiority 
Born in Kent in 1717, Jeffrey Amherst was notably different to both the Earl of 
Loudoun and James Murray. Although he had no family ties to nobility to enable career 
progression, his father’s position as a well-respected lawyer facilitated Amherst’s 
boyhood appointment as a page for Lionel Cranfield Sackville, first Duke of Dorset, and 
his subsequent commission as an ensign in the 1st Foot Guards through Dorset’s 
connections.4 Further, as an English Protestant, Amherst was unencumbered by suspicion 
of his personal or family loyalty or by any association with the Highlands or Jacobitism, 
                                                 
3 See: Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 223-68; Calloway, Scratch of a Pen, 66-91; 
Middleton, Pontiac’s War, 17-32. 




which meant there were no barriers to his advancement in the army. He did not feel the 
same pressure as Scottish officers to prove his personal loyalty to the Crown and he 
harboured a sense of cultural civility and superiority stemming from his background and 
connections to nobility. 
As aide-de-camp to Sir John Ligonier, Amherst accompanied his superior to 
England in autumn 1745 with ten battalions withdrawn from the continent to confront the 
Jacobites.5 Ligonier’s troops were deployed in North England to try and cut off access to 
London but the Jacobites managed to evade them as they advanced to Derby before 
deciding to retreat. After the Duke of Cumberland took over the pursuit of the Jacobites 
to Scotland, Ligonier’s troops were kept as a reserve guard in case of a French invasion 
before being sent back to the continent in June for the 1746 campaign. Although Amherst 
did not actively engage the Jacobites, he recorded his thoughts about the rising in his 
personal journal. Upon receiving intelligence that Charles Edward Stuart had landed in 
Scotland, Amherst shared the common sense of disbelief that the rising could pose any 
threat to the Crown, labelling it “the most wild Scheme that ever was hear[d] of”.6 His 
hope that the rebellion would not cause the recall of troops from the continent was 
disappointed within a month. Arriving in England, Amherst documented the fear 
prevalent amongst the population that led to exaggerated accounts of Jacobite activity 
and blamed their advance to Derby on the poor command of Generals Cope and Wade. 
Cope’s defeat at Prestonpans was “irresolute”. Amherst suggested that had Ligonier and, 
presumably, himself commanded the main British Army the Jacobites would never have 
captured Carlisle.7 Amherst’s journal highlights that his position left him privy to 
information about the progress of the rising and the steps taken by the army to extinguish 
it, even when Cumberland’s pursuit of the Jacobites into Scotland left him and Ligonier 
with the reserve troops in England. His repeated labelling of the Jacobites as “villains” 
and “rebels” shows that he shared Cumberland’s opinion that the Jacobites were criminals 
and the army’s subjugation tactics were fully justified by the rules of war.8 
Amherst likely approved of the pacification of the Highlands that followed the 
rising and was well-informed about it. His approval of Cumberland’s command during 
                                                 
5 Louis des Cognets, Amherst and Canada (Princeton: self-pub, 1962), 10. 
6 Personal Journal, April 1745 to August 1746, Amherst Papers.  
7 Personal Journal, April 1745 to August 1746, Amherst Papers. 
8 Personal Journal, April 1745 to August 1746, Amherst Papers. 
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the rising suggests he would have shared his opinion regarding the measures necessary 
to restore peace in the region. In 1747, Amherst was appointed to Cumberland’s staff and 
he formed a close relationship with the duke and his aide-de-camp Joseph Yorke. Both 
Cumberland and Yorke identified themselves as civilised in contrast to the barbarous 
Highlanders and believed, if extirpation or mass transportation were not achievable 
policies, that it was necessary to implement measures to civilise Highlanders in order to 
assimilate them more closely within the British state. Close association with these officers 
would have served to increase Amherst’s own sense of cultural superiority. These 
experiences and associations inevitably shaped Amherst’s attitudes and actions towards 
those he later encountered in North America.  
 
 
Figure 13. Map of the British and French forts in the New York and Canadian interior in January 





During the 1760 campaign, Amherst was careful to ensure the French-Canadians 
were not molested in their homes and, after taking Fort Lévis (Fig. 13), he forbade his 
Iroquois allies from entering the fort, to prevent them from plundering it and scalping the 
garrison, causing all but approximately two hundred of them to desert.9 Amherst sought 
to retain the British Army’s claim of moral superiority and civility that dated from 
France’s failure to prevent the massacre at Fort William Henry in 1757. With the articles 
of capitulation, Amherst agreed that the French-Canadians would be treated as equal 
subjects of the King. However, when it was suggested to him that French-Canadians 
might be recruited to aid the British during Pontiac’s War, Amherst answered that: “The 
Canadians I cannot think of Employing on this Occasion: I would not have them entertain 
an Idea that We must Depend on their Assistance, or do I see that We Do. Nor Do I chuse 
to Trust them with Arms.”10 Despite the success of recruitment as a method of 
assimilation in the Highlands, Amherst refused to employ the French-Canadians as doing 
so would require calling upon the assistance of a population he believed to be less 
civilised and inferior. It was not until Amherst’s recall that formal requests for French-
Canadian troops were made by his successor Thomas Gage. In refusing to recruit French-
Canadians, Amherst evinced his cultural superiority and arrogance.  
Amherst also projected cultural superiority in his interactions with colonists. He 
expressed frustration over the illicit trade some colonists, particularly in New York, were 
carrying out with the enemy. Illicit trade had led Loudoun to implement a trade embargo 
in 1757 to prevent the French gaining intelligence of Britain’s campaign plan.11 Amherst 
was convinced illicit trading with the French colonies reduced the effectiveness of British 
naval blockades, enabled the French to continue to maintain their armies in Canada and 
the Caribbean, and took necessary supplies away from the army. After the conquest of 
Canada, Amherst sought to put an end to such activity, imposing a general embargo from 
April to June 1762.12 He believed those who engaged in illicit trade were demonstrating 
                                                 
9 Cubbison, All Canada, 139-87.  
10 Amherst to Gladwin, New York, 9 September 1763, Amherst Papers vol 2, WCL. 
11 Loudoun to Cumberland, HMS Sutherland, 22 June 1757 in Pargellis, Military Affairs, 372-79; 
Loudoun to the Governors of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Connecticut, 
Rhode Island and Massachusetts, New York, 2 March 1757, LO (AM) 2959, HL; Anderson, Crucible of 
War, 182-83.  
12 See: The Papers of Francis Bernard: Governor of Colonial Massachusetts, 1760-1769, ed. Colin 
Nicolson, vol. 1 (Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 2007), 12; George Louis Beer, British 
Colonial Policy, 1754-1765, Reprint (Memphis: General Books, 2010), 60-63; T. M. Truxes, Defying 
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their disloyalty by acting contrary to the imperial interest. They seemed “Determined to 
try Every means to Carry on a Trade, however Destructive to the Country in General, that 
promises a Considerable profit to themselves.”13 Amherst also accused colonial 
assemblies of delaying or denying compliance with his orders, thereby undermining 
military campaigns. When the Massachusetts Assembly failed to comply with his request 
that they vote to raise five thousand troops for the 1760 campaign, Amherst claimed it 
would be “productive of the worst of Consequences, and perhaps subvert the Wise 
Measures planned at home for the entire Reduction of Canada, and the giving a lasting 
peace to this Country”.14 On numerous occasions Amherst complained that the colonies 
were subverting British authority and not contributing as they ought to the war effort, 
highlighting that he was unhappy he had to negotiate with those he believed owed their 
obedience to the Crown. In May 1760 he complained to Captain-General John Ligonier 
that colonial sloth in providing provincials had prevented him from embarking for 
Montréal,15 and the following year expressed frustration at the “disagreeable necessity” 
that had caused Governor Bernard to promise that the provincials raised would not be 
sent south of Albany. The assembly took such a step to prevent the troops being sent to 
the West Indies, where conditions were poor and mortality rates high, but it left Amherst 
questioning whether “they should immediately withdraw their aid” should they receive 
word of a general peace, leaving Britain’s imperial security at risk.16 Like Loudoun, 
Amherst tended to ‘other’ the colonists as a result of his interactions with them and, in 
doing so, again exhibited his cultural superiority. This would also affect his relations and 
interactions with Native Americans and his attempts to secure peace in the interior would 
fail as he proved himself unwilling to negotiate in the post-conquest period to re-establish 
the “middle ground” as was required.17 
 
 
                                                 
Empire: Trading with the Enemy in Colonial New York (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 139-
55.  
13 Amherst to Francis Bernard, New York, 24 May 1762 in Nicolson, Papers of Francis Bernard, 1:223. 
See also Truxes, Defying Empire, 152.  
14 Amherst to Pownall, New York, 23 March 1759, WO 34, vol 27, Microfilm Reel C-12841, LAC. 
15 Amherst to Jean Louis Ligonier, Albany, 19 March 1760, Amherst Papers.  
16 Amherst to Bernard, New York, 9 April 1761 in Nicolson, Papers of Francis Bernard, 1:101. 
17 White, Middle Ground.  
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Figure 14. Title: A map of the western parts of the colony of Virginia. Date Created: 1754. 
©Library of Congress Geography and Map Division. https://lccn.loc.gov/2013593293.  
The red line illustrates the approximate location of the Allegheny Mountains. In the 1758 Treaty 
of Easton, the British Army promised to vacate the land west of the mountains after the expulsion 
of the French.  
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Barriers to Peace 
While France capitulated at Montréal in September 1760, Britain remained 
concerned about a renewal of hostilities in the western interior. Hitherto, Amherst and 
other officers tended to dismiss France’s ability to incite Native American insurrections 
in the region, viewing the tribes there as conquered peoples. Amherst’s priority for the 
duration of the war was the conquest of Canada, but he gradually came to accept that 
pacification of the western tribes was also necessary for imperial security. There were 
numerous obstacles: colonial land hunger, tensions and hostilities between frontier 
settlers and tribes, tribal ambitions to control the fur trade and the “middle ground”, and 
conflicting ministerial directives. The appointment of the Indian Superintendents in 1755 
had been an attempt to centralise control of Indian diplomacy. The Treaty of Easton of 
1758 was a notable success in bringing colonial representatives and tribes together in 
pacifying the Delaware Valley and borderlands of New Jersey southwards, achieved 
largely by ceding large tracts of land to the tribes.18 Further promises were made to 
preserve Native American hunting grounds west of the Allegheny Mountains (Fig. 14) 
from colonial incursions and to vacate military forts after the defeat of France.19 But by 
the early 1760s, no British policy had been forthcoming to safeguard promises or prevent 
westward migration, and the army remained stationed throughout the interior.  
                                                 
18 Bouquet’s Correspondence with the Delaware Chiefs, Pittsburgh, 1758, Add MS 21655, BL. 
19 Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, 129-45; Anderson, Crucible of War, 267-85.  
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Figure 15. Title: An accurate map of the British Empire in Nth. America as settled by the 
Preliminaries in 1762. Date Created: 1762. ©Library of Congress Geography and Map Division. 
https://lccn.loc.gov/2002622265.  
The Great Lakes Region, Ohio Country, and Illinois Country have been labelled on the map whilst 
the red line indicates the Proclamation Line of 1763. Colonial settlement west of this line was 
forbidden as the interior was reserved for Native Americans.  
 
 
Indian-settler tension was exacerbated by the French and Indian War. After the 
British construction of Fort Pitt in 1758, many of the frontier inhabitants who had fled 
the Ohio Country (Fig. 15) in response to Indian raiding returned with fresh determination 
to settle the interior, whilst other colonists were encouraged to migrate westwards in 
response to the expulsion of the French.20 These colonists took no notice of war-time 
treaties with Native Americans they considered conquered peoples. The brutal frontier 
warfare had fostered hatred of Indians, leading to reciprocal attacks by frontier settlers 
and Native Americans, which was a main cause of the Anglo-Cherokee War of 1758-
                                                 
20 See: Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, 55-73; Kelton, ‘British and Indian War’, 770-71.  
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61.21 Geopolitical realignment in the wake of the French and Indian War undermined the 
“middle ground”, further threatening the peace. The expulsion of the French from the 
Ohio Country meant Native Americans had no choice but to trade and deal solely with 
the British, which dramatically reduced their diplomatic and political influence. 
Recognising the threat to their agency, Native Americans immediately began to call for 
the establishment of a confederacy to challenge British dominance and reclaim their 
lands. They also retained ties to the French in the Illinois Country and attempted to 
persuade the French Army to return to challenge the British.22 When the Treaty of Paris 
made it clear that there would be no restoration of French power, many Native Americans 
believed they had no choice but to go to war with Britain to try and re-establish the 
“middle ground”.  
Despite British promises during wartime negotiations with Native Americans in 
the Great Lakes and Ohio Country (Fig. 15) that the army would vacate the interior once 
the French had been removed, construction was immediately begun to replace the 
abandoned Fort Duquesne with the imposing Fort Pitt after General Forbes’ 1758 victory. 
After the conquest of Canada, Amherst pursued militarisation of the interior and 
pacification of the tribes, aiming to remove any prospect of French intervention. Once 
the terms of the Treaty of Paris became clear, but with no official British ministerial 
policy for the interior forthcoming, Amherst displayed no desire to halt or adapt these 
plans and established settlements and garrisons in key British posts.  
Amherst was given considerable freedom to direct policy in the West, for 
ministerial priorities lay elsewhere as the war drew to a close.23 Having decided to retain 
ten thousand troops in North America in late 1762, of which Amherst was informed in 
February 1763,24 the government left Amherst to distribute them as he wished. His only 
prescribed aim was to preserve the peace; how he did so was largely his choice.25 The 
only point the secretary of state repeatedly emphasised was that Amherst must reduce 
                                                 
21 See: J. Oliphant, Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756-63 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2001), 31-68; Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-
1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 157; Steele, Warpaths, 226-48.  
22 See: Middleton, Pontiac’s War, 33-64; Gregory Evans Dowd, ‘The French King Wakes up in Detroit: 
“Pontiac’s War” in Rumor and History’, Ethnohistory 37, no. 3 (1990): 254–78. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/482446; Fintan O’Toole, White Savage: William Johnson and the Invention of 
America (London: Faber and Faber, 2005), 109-20.  
23 See Gould, Persistence of Empire, 106-47.  
24 Bullion, ‘“The Ten Thousand in America”’, 647-49.  
25 Shy, Toward Lexington, 109.  
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military expenditure, running at £7.5 million for the duration of the war.26 With such 
leeway, Amherst’s own cultural paradigms and attitudes indubitably shaped the 
militarisation policy he devised and pursued. The parallels with Scotland were not 
obvious, but significant: pacification had been dependent upon a large standing army and 
a deliberate process of militarisation, and rationalising measures to maintain British 
security involved civilising “savage” indigenes. Amherst knew that many tribes in the 
Great Lakes region had not truly supported the British Army even when they had 
abandoned the French. Consequently, although he viewed them as a conquered people 
like the French-Canadians and Scottish Highlanders, he recognised they remained a 
potential threat to imperial security if they were not properly pacified, as the Anglo-
Cherokee War seemed to demonstrate.27 He believed intimidation and subjugation were 
vital for security and he had no intention of vacating the interior. Britain’s wartime 
promises were abandoned, causing resentment amongst the Native Americans of the 
Great Lakes.  
British Cultural Paradigms in the West  
As with other populations within the empire, British attitudes towards Native 
Americans were informed by the cultural paradigm of civility. Native Americans, like 
Highlanders, were stigmatised throughout the eighteenth century by a characterisation of 
the entire population as savage. Commentators used comparable terminology to describe 
Native Americans and Highlanders believing there to be clear similarities between both 
groups, although emerging stadial theory placed Native Americans at the very lowest 
level of civility, as hunter-gatherers, with Highlanders placed one level higher, as 
pastoralists.28 As such, Native Americans were considered less civilised than 
Highlanders, more frequently labelled “savages” or “barbarous”, terms generally applied 
to Highlanders during a war. Other dehumanising terms (uncommonly applied to 
Highlanders) were “beasts” and “Hell Hounds,”29 used by Amherst in 1761 and 1763 
respectively; other officers, including James Murray and Henry Gladwin, made mention 
                                                 
26 Bruce P. Lenman, ‘Colonial Wars and Imperial Instability, 1688-1793’, in Marshall, Oxford History of 
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27 Anderson, Crucible of War, 458. 
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29 Amherst to Gage, Albany, 27 May 1761, WO 34, vol 7, Microfilm Reel C-12838, LAC; Amherst to 
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of a “cowardly” and “worthless” race.30 The use of such language emphasises the 
incivility of that population in the eyes of British Army officers who conversely viewed 
themselves as civilised. It reflects both the perceived alienness of the Native Americans 
and the terror they induced amongst colonists and Europeans, such as in the aftermath of 
the 1757 massacre at Fort William Henry. Members of the British Army could, therefore, 
claim that any brutality carried out by them against Native Americans was fully justified 
by the rules of war, which legitimised the use of violent tactics against savages.31 
Jeffrey Amherst was careful that British troops adhered to the rules of warfare in 
subjugating French-Canadians during the 1760 campaign. But he had no qualms in 
sending Major Roberts and his rangers to destroy the Abenaki missionary settlement of 
St Francis in revenge for their capturing a British officer, spurning peace overtures.32 
Amherst had ordered Rogers to spare women and children but expressed no concern 
about those Rogers killed or left to starve.33 Amherst, as well as the British Army more 
generally, was willing to view whole villages, nations, or even confederacies of Native 
Americans as equally guilty for the actions of any individuals who perpetuated violence 
against the British Army. Punishment, he believed, should “fall heavy on the whole 
nation that is accessory to the crime.”34 In such cases, targeting local populations 
indiscriminately was rationalised by their state of savagery and barbarity.  
Although the British Army viewed all Native Americans as savages in theory, in 
practice they did make distinctions, particularly with the Iroquois because of their signal 
diplomatic and military presence. Clan Campbell had an analogous position in Scotland, 
as a loyal, dependable clan, avowedly more civilised than the rebel clans.35 Although the 
influence of the confederated tribes was much reduced after the French and Indian War, 
the British continued to view them differently from the rest of the Native Americans. 
When the Seneca participated in Pontiac’s War, Amherst did not condemn all the Iroquois 
                                                 
30 Murray to Amherst, Quebec, 15 September 1763, WO 34, vol 2, Microfilm Reel B-2637, LAC; 
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31 See Chapter One.  
32 Amherst to Pitt, Crown Point, 22 October 1759, Amherst Papers.  
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and, in reprisal targeted only the Seneca’s settlements and inhabitants.36 In contrast, 
although several groups of Ottawa Indians remained neutral during the conflict, Amherst 
argued that anyone belonging to any of the western nations ought to be put to death as 
“equally guilty of the late depredations…deemed our enemies and used as such not as a 
generous enemy but the vilest race of beings that ever infested the earth”.37 In effect, 
Amherst singled out the five nations of the Iroquois Confederacy for special protection 
despite their close connection to the Seneca whilst condemning all western Indians as 
guilty by association and subject to collective punishment. The Iroquois, however, were 
a major exception and the attitudes of Amherst generally towards Native Americans was 
one inspired by the cultural paradigm of civility that defined them as savage.  
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Figure 16. Map of the interior during Pontiac’s War, 1763-65. See table below for a description 





1 Fort Sandusky captured 16 May 1763 
2 Fort St. Joseph captured 25 May 1763 
3 Fort Detroit, unsuccessful Native American siege, May-
September 1763 
4 Fort Ouiatenon captured 1 June 1763 
5 Fort Miami captured 2 June 1763 
6 Fort Michillimakinac captured 2 June 1763 
7 Fort Venango captured 16 June 1763 
8 Fort Le Boeuf captured 18 June 1763 
9 Fort Presque Isle captured 19 June 1763 
10 Fort Edward Augustus abandoned June-July 1763 
11 Fort Pitt, unsuccessful Native American siege, June-July 
1763 
12 Battle of Bloody Run, 31 July 1763, Native American victory 
13 Battle of Bushy Run, 5-6 August 1763, British victory 




                                                 
38 The information used to plot this map was taken from Dowd, War Under Heaven, 22-147.  
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The paradigm of superiority also played an important role in defining Amherst’s 
attitudes towards Native Americans in the post-conquest period. As highlighted, Amherst 
considered Native Americans to be conquered peoples, subjugated by Crown forces but 
unworthy of, and unentitled to, any rights as subjects of the Crown. Whereas inhabitants 
of Canada, the Floridas, and the Illinois Country Amherst accepted as imperial subjects 
following the Treaty of Paris, Native Americans, he believed, were an inferior group: 
both reliant upon and subject to British authority with no practical or legal alternative but 
to accept subjugation. During the Anglo-Cherokee War and Pontiac’s War, Amherst 
defined Native Americans who fought against the British as rebels, as were the Jacobites. 
Decrying the “barbarous”, “treacherous”, and “vain” schemes of these “villains”,39 he 
saw a clear legal and cultural parallel with the “villains” and “rebels” he had described 
during the Forty-Five.40 Whereas Jacobites were subjects failing to show due submission 
to the Crown and the actions of the army were therefore guided by the loyalty paradigm, 
Native Americans were not subjects but, as an inferior, conquered population they were 
also expected to demonstrate submission to the Crown. In Amherst’s mind, both 
populations owed their allegiance to the Crown yet were manifestly disloyal and as 
savages denied themselves the benefits of the rules of war. He encouraged the targeting 
of entire tribes whose warriors had attacked British posts, advocating the killing of 
women and children, and reintroduced monetary rewards for scalps.41 It was as if 
Amherst was realising Joseph Yorke’s chilling apothegm of wiping a “vile race” of 
rebels,42 when ordering Henry Bouquet “to Extirpate this Exercrable Race” of Shawnee, 
Delaware, Mingo, and Seneca with smallpox to end the siege of Fort Pitt (Fig. 16).43 
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Figure 17. Map of North America after the Proclamation of 1763 highlighting the land reserved 
to Native Americans as well as the new British territories of Quebec and East and West Florida. 
Base map used: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NorthAmerica1763-A.png.  
 
 
In 1761 Secretary of State Lord Egremont had urged that all in North America 
(British colonists, French-Canadians, and Native Americans) be treated “upon the same 
principles of humanity and proper indulgence”,44 whilst the Proclamation of 1763 
demarcated Native Americans living west of the Allegheny Mountains to be under British 
                                                 
44 Lord Egremont to Amherst, Whitehall, 12 December 1761, Amherst Papers, vol 5, WCL. 
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“Protection” (Fig. 17).45 However, British protection remained conditional on the 
maintenance of peace, military control of trade, and Indian acceptance of a vague legal 
status akin to suzerains of the Crown.46 Thus, British officers, including combatants 
Henry Gladwin and Henry Bouquet, instinctively depicted Indians as rebels when 
engaged in violent resistance against the army or colonists.47 “Indian Insurrections”, as 
Egremont’s successor Halifax termed native resistance,48 demanded nothing less than 
their subjugation, and at worst, in the mind of Amherst and others, their extirpation. It 
was generally thought that the Native Americans now had little choice but to accept the 
British as their “protectors” or “father” in place of the French.  
But that was not how Native Americans viewed their relationship to the Crown. 
As William Johnson later noted, it “has been very customary for many People to Insinuate 
that the Indians call themselves Subjects, altho I am thoroughly convinced they were 
never so called, nor would they approve of it.” The Indians had no word that could convey 
the meaning of subjection, Johnson explained, and the very idea of it would “fill them 
with horror.”49 They viewed themselves not as subjects but as allies of the British, 
unconquered neutrals who had negotiated British guarantees for future trading and land 
rights. Native subjection in the interior was not just anathema, but an illusion. The British 
military presence there was weak: garrisons were depleted, fortifications in disrepair, and 
outposts vulnerable to assault.50 Whatever Amherst might think about their cultural 
superiority, soldiers stationed in the interior lived in dread.  
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Policy implemented by Amherst between 1760 and 1763 was largely reflective of 
his prevailing cultural superiority which denied Native Americans independent 
diplomatic agency or moral equality, presuming their predisposition to French 
conspiracy.51 Amherst steadfastly refused to negotiate with Native Americans to ensure 
peace. A savage conquered people, culturally and militarily inferior, their submission and 
allegiance to the Crown he considered non-negotiable. Amherst probably underestimated 
the Indians’ military worth, having little actual field experience working with them, and 
those Iroquois allies he deployed in the Montréal campaign had promptly deserted when 
he denied them an opportunity to plunder. Alliances, for what they were worth, did 
nothing to dilute his firm sense of the superiority of British regulars in all situations.52 
His long-nurtured paradigm of superiority reigned supreme. With the Duke of 
Cumberland, he learned how to pacify and subjugate inferior indigenes. After the 
conquest of Canada, he applied for himself those lessons in pacifying the Ohio Country, 
without actually experiencing the terror of frontier warfare.  
IV. Pacification and Conflict 
The Militarisation of the Interior 
By 1760 the Highland example seemed to suggest the concurrent processes of a 
punitive pacification and the militarisation of an imperial fringe could ensure long-term 
peace and lead to the closer assimilation of a hostile population within the empire. It 
provided a recent blueprint for Amherst to model his western strategy on. Whilst in 
Canada James Murray advocated a policy of cooperative submission and toleration when 
pacifying that population, Amherst’s cultural paradigm of superiority led him to 
implement a subjugatory strategy that sought to militarily intimidate Native Americans 
and force their acculturation. Such a strategy sought to improve that population so that 
they might eventually be assimilated within the empire as subjects.  
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Given control over the distribution of troops, Amherst chose to station the bulk of 
those available in the interior and Canada to counter the continuing threat to British 
imperial security. Following the Highland example, the interior troops were spread 
amongst several garrisons including impressive structures at Fort Pitt, Niagara, Detroit, 
Michilimackinac, and Crown Point and smaller stockades including Miami and Presque 
Isle.53 Troops were expected to improve fortifications and construct or improve roads and 
portage routes to open up access both to and throughout the interior.54 As in the 
Highlands, the army sought not only to provide an implicit threat to Native Americans 
regarding British military might but also to enable the army to respond more quickly to 
future disorders and to keep the garrisons properly supplied. However, Amherst had to 
try and extend control over an area more than four times larger than the Highlands whilst 
simultaneously providing troops for the continuing war effort. Over half of his sixteen 
thousand troops were campaigning in the Caribbean whilst seventeen battalions were 
stationed in Canada, leaving approximately seven hundred and fifty troops from 
Bouquet’s Royal Americans distributed amongst all fourteen interior garrisons.55 
Recognising that the limited numbers left the troops vulnerable, Amherst encouraged the 
development of small settlements around garrisons. By April 1761 approximately 330 
were living in a semi-permanent settlement that included crop fields, a quarry, and a 
sawmill in the vicinity of Fort Pitt.56 
To ministers, Amherst reiterated the necessity of retaining a large military force 
in the interior. When his opinion was sought regarding the best distribution for the twenty 
battalions to be kept in North America after the peace, Amherst identified the Mississippi 
Valley as an ideal location for a secure frontier to keep the “Indians in a proper 
Subjection” and prevent France or Spain making inroads into British territory.57 There 
would not be enough troops to sufficiently garrison the principal interior forts, however, 
without abandoning “all the inferior Forts, [and] the Posts of Communication”. These, 
Amherst suggested, should be granted to “proper People”, likely disbanded soldiers or 
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trusted colonists, on the condition that they be returned to the Crown if required.58 Such 
an arrangement would bolster British interior security by keeping disbanded soldiers 
close to areas of likely disruption, as their settlement upon the annexed estates in the 
Highlands had done previously.  
As in the Highlands, soldiers in North America were utilised as a police force. 
Due to the continuing conflict and the lack of civil legal structures in the interior, Native 
Americans were subject to military law and liable to be tried by court martial or subject 
to wanton violence from soldiers or officers.59 Again, this reflected their contested status 
within the empire. As Native Americans were not considered subjects they did not enjoy 
the same legal rights as settlers, but they were still expected to be bound by colonial and 
military legal frameworks. Amherst demanded that Indians accused of crimes be 
surrendered to stand trial and he supported a death sentence for those found guilty of 
murder.60 When Henry Gladwin sentenced an Indian slave woman to death for her role 
as an accomplice in the murder of her British master, Amherst ordered that the execution 
be public to deter others “from Committing such Cruelties for the Future.”61 To Amherst, 
the imposition of military justice on a savage, inferior, and conquered population was 
necessary and lawful. For Native Americans, however, the failure of the British Army to 
vacate the interior as promised was a betrayal of trust and the imposition of military 
justice appeared to them as an overt threat that the British intended to begin a war of 
annihilation.62 
Mirroring the militarisation of the Highlands, the British Army sought to regulate 
commercial interactions in the interior. Restricting gifts of arms and ammunition sought 
to subjugate Native Americans in the short-term, whilst emphasis on developing and 
regulating colonial-native trade and a desire to civilise the hostile population sought to 
achieve acculturation and, in the longer-term, enable Native Americans’ assimilation 
within the British Empire as subjects. Limiting the diplomatic policy of gift giving 
Amherst believed a sensible and simple way of achieving his ministerial orders to reduce 
expense. The conquered Native Americans, he thought, would have no choice but to 
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accept such a change.63 He also sought to limit native military capabilities, ordering his 
officers to limit the amount of ammunition they gifted Native Americans. The war had 
caused ammunition shortages which British traders were slow to respond to, whilst 
Native Americans struggled to provide enough skins to re-establish their side of the trade. 
Many visited garrisons for assistance, requesting ammunition to enable them to hunt and 
trade. Amherst ordered officers to be “sparing” with ammunition to prevent the Indians 
from causing “mischief”.64 Like the disarming of the Highlanders, limiting ammunition 
sought to limit the populations’ ability to rebel. In North America, however, Native 
Americans relied upon European arms to hunt and would struggle to subsist under 
Amherst’s restrictions.   
Amherst’s aim was not the total disarmament of Native Americans, nor did he 
intend to end gift giving entirely. Rather he viewed it as a method of rewarding those who 
remained peaceful. Any who behaved “ill”, were to “be punished, but not bribed”.65 
Johnson warned Amherst that reducing gift giving would be received badly by Native 
Americans. Gifts were a symbol of status for tribal leaders whilst many Indians had been 
unable to plant crops due to the war and suffered from the loss of the French market and 
the failure of the market economy to recover in the early 1760s.66 Amherst, however, 
believed his policy fair and was convinced that British military superiority meant that any 
Indian rebellion would end in their destruction. Arguing that “these people are certainly 
not to be attached by indulgence”, Amherst emphasised that so long as they accepted 
their subjugation and displayed due submission to the Crown, Native Americans would 
be treated fairly.67  
In restricting gift giving, Amherst also sought to force the Native Americans to 
become more civilised in the long-term by overcoming the inherent laziness he perceived 
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to be a result of their savagery. This reflected eighteenth-century understandings of 
progress and emerging enlightenment ideas of stadial theory that suggested uncivilised 
societies could become more civilised through engagement in commerce.68 Amherst 
believed that a reduction in gifts would force Native Americans to become more self-
sufficient and to hunt more, thereby providing them with skins to trade for other 
necessities. In order to facilitate this, he sought to provide a fair, free, well-regulated 
colonial-native trade. Commerce was to be managed by the army as interior garrisons 
were to become trading posts and officers were expected to prevent colonial merchants 
engaging in fraud. Amherst expected the Indian Superintendents to work closely 
alongside the army and planned to appoint a governor for the interior at the Detroit to 
oversee trade and regulate disputes, although this plan was not implemented.69  
Amherst also sought to encourage the civilisation of Native Americans by 
banning colonial merchants from selling alcohol. Amherst sought to overcome the very 
“Bad Effects” of allowing traders to carry rum, which was believed to encourage Indians’ 
drunkenness and idleness and was blamed for many instances of violence.70 Similar steps 
had been taken during the war as Amherst and other officers tended to blame Native 
American drunkenness for any disturbances within the camps, forbidding the sale of 
alcohol to natives and segregating natives in their own encampments.71 Many Native 
American leaders and the Indian Superintendents supported the measure, agreeing that 
alcohol increased native violence.72 Violence was thought natural to uncivilised, warlike 
peoples like Native Americans and forbidding the sale of alcohol aimed to encourage 
them to become more industrious and civilised. By March 1762, Henry Bouquet could 
comment that the “Salutary Effects of the prohibition of Rum are Sensibly felt” around 
Fort Pitt.73 Commercialisation drove militarisation in both North America and Scotland 
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as the army sought to secure long-term peace and civilise a savage population and earlier 
experiences in the Highlands both directly and indirectly influenced the actions of 
Amherst and the British Army in the North American interior.  
Other civilising measures encouraged by Amherst in the interior focused on 
introducing Protestantism and the English language in native communities, reflecting 
both earlier action in the Highlands and measures taken since the beginning of European 
settlement in North America. Amherst encouraged the civilising missions of the Society 
in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge (SSPCK) and the Society for 
Propagating the Bible in Foreign Parts (SPG).74 He highlighted his approval of ministers 
and schoolmasters being placed amongst the Indians but took no steps himself to provide 
them as he continued to focus on reducing expenditure in the interior.75 As in Scotland, 
such measures were encouraged because civilisation was thought a necessary prerequisite 
for the assimilation of hostile peoples into the Empire, which in turn was assumed to be 
the only way to ensure continuing loyalty to the Crown. Although such an assumption 
was starting to be questioned, particularly in Canada, it continued to influence Amherst’s 
western strategy in the post-conquest period. North America provided a testing ground 
for enlightenment ideas about civilised societies, with earlier experiences pacifying and 
attempting to civilise Highlanders providing models to guide army officers and 
missionaries in their interactions with Native Americans.76 However, in North America, 
the continuation of violence in the interior and Amherst’s superiority paradigm ensured 
that measures aiming to civilise Native Americans remained secondary to those aiming 
to subjugate them during his command.  
                                                 
74 See: Frederick V Mills, ‘The Society in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge In British North 
America, 1730-1775’, American Society of Church History 63, no. 1 (1994): 15-30. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3167830; Margaret Connell Szasz, Scottish Highlanders and Native Americans: 
Indigenous Education in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
2007), 115-61; Calloway, White People, Indians, and Highlanders, 60-87; Eleazar Wheelock, ‘A Plain 
and Faithful Narrative of the Original Design, Rise, Progresss and Present State of the Indian Charity 
School at Lebanon in Connecticut’, Evans Collection, 1763; Commonplace Book Containing Notes on 
America, C. 1747, GD248/471/7, NRS.  
75 Amherst to Johnson, Albany, 22 February 1761, WO 34, vol 38, Microfilm Reel C-12843, LAC. 
Amherst’s belief that civilising Native Americans was beneficial to British imperial security was shared 
by other army officers, including James Abercromby. See Abercromby to Pitt, Albany, 24 May 1758, 
CO5/50, ff.75-96, TNA. 




Despite the militarisation of the interior, Amherst continued to receive regular 
reports of Native American violence during the post-conquest period. Indian traders and 
backcountry families were frequently murdered by Indians,77 whilst officers at Fort Pitt 
and elsewhere reported the killing and scalping of soldiers and the general criminality of 
the Indians at British garrisons.78 This encouraged Amherst to continue his subjugatory 
strategy, believing it the only way to ensure the total submission of the savage and inferior 
population. As well as frequent violence, Amherst received regular reports of Indian 
discontent from Superintendent Johnson, who warned him that the Indians were “very 
Jealous [and] uneasy at the coolness and indifference which they think is shewn towards 
them”, leaving Johnson “apprehensive that something not right” was brewing amongst 
them.79 Rumours that the Indians were plotting an attack on British garrisons were 
common but Amherst’s cultural paradigm of superiority led him to dismiss such reports. 
“Mischief,” would “fall on their Own hands with a powerfull and heavy hand” and the 
Indians, he thought, were “not so blind, as not to see the protection they Enjoy from the 
King”.80 Whilst Amherst thought it unlikely that the Native Americans would choose to 
refute British authority, which he believed they were reliant upon, he remained convinced 
that British military superiority meant that even if a united attack was staged it would not 
represent a serious challenge to British imperial security.  
When general conflict did break out, in the Anglo-Cherokee War of 1758-61 and 
Pontiac’s War, 1763-65, Amherst once again demonstrated his determination to 
subjugate those involved. After the Cherokee broke a peace concluded with South 
Carolina in 1759, Amherst ordered British regulars to “punish these Savages so as to 
deter them from Commencing Hostilities, and Exercising their Barbarities on His 
Majesty’s Subjects.”81 Colonel Montgomery was ordered to destroy Cherokee towns, 
stores, and crops and when his expedition failed to force Cherokee submission, James 
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Grant was ordered to continue the fire and sword campaign the following year so that the 
“savages” were reduced “to the absolute necessity of suing for Pardon and peace”.82 
Amherst was determined that neither Montgomery or Grant negotiate an end to the 
hostilities, the inferior population was to be made to surrender in order to demonstrate 
their acceptance of British authority. He was concerned that acting leniently would 
encourage others to join a pan-Indian movement against the British.83 However, British 
success in forcing the Cherokee to sue for peace did not prevent the pan-Indian uprisings 
Amherst had been determined to prevent as the Indians of the Great Lakes and Ohio 
Country attacked British garrisons during the summer of 1763.   
Upon the outbreak of Pontiac’s War, Amherst’s cultural superiority not only 
encouraged him to continue his policy of subjugation but also to refuse offers of Native 
American military assistance. Sir William Johnson and his deputy George Croghan 
informed Amherst that many Native Americans remained in the British interest: the 
Iroquois, excepting the Seneca, the Canadian Indians, and the Stockbridge Indians, with 
the latter two offering military service. Amherst refused all such offers, informing Henry 
Bouquet that all he desired from the Canadian Indians was “their Remaining Quiet, for I 
never will put the Least Trust in any of the Indian Race.”84 In a letter to Johnson, he 
emphasised his belief of the military inferiority of Native Americans, ordering him not 
to assemble the Canadian Indians as it would “give them Room to think themselves of 
more Consequence than they really are.”85 He did not think the British required their aid 
and did not trust their proclaimed loyalty to Britain, believing they would turn on his 
army as soon as it was favourable to do so. Johnson warned Amherst that if he did not 
utilise the Indians he risked their joining Pontiac’s rising.86 Amherst’s over-reliance on 
British regulars elicited criticism at home. Secretary of State Halifax delivered a thinly 
veiled criticism stating that whilst he was sure Amherst had good reasons for declining 
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the services of willing Indians, in his “inferior” judgement they seemed useful to the 
service.87  
Amherst’s subjugation of Native Americans and his militarisation of the interior 
failed to keep the peace because the inferior population refused to act as they were 
expected to, and Amherst’s policies encouraged them to unite against British authority 
rather than keeping them in a state of due submission. Amherst returned to England whilst 
Pontiac’s War remained ongoing, without having managed to chastise the Indians into 
suing for peace as he had intended. His failure did not diminish his belief in British 
superiority, however, and he left his successor Thomas Gage with instructions for 
“crushing the Indian Insurrection [and] punishing those Tribes who have so ungratefully 
Attacked their Benefactors.”88 However, Gage’s own cultural paradigms led him to view 
Native Americans, and the reasons for Pontiac’s War, differently from Amherst and to 
push for a strategy of accommodation, not acculturation, in the interior.  
V. Conclusions 
 Jeffrey Amherst’s brief experience of the Forty-Five, documented in his personal 
journal, highlighted that he shared the common perception of the Jacobites as “rebels” 
and “villains” against whom the British Army was fully justified in using violent and 
repressive tactics to force their submission. A decade serving under Cumberland likely 
strengthened both this understanding and Amherst’s personal sense of British cultural 
superiority that led him to comparatively view all those he encountered in North America 
as morally, militarily, and culturally lesser. This included the French-Canadians whose 
assistance he refused during Pontiac’s War and the colonial settlers he ‘othered’ through 
accusations they failed to display due adherence to the Crown by subverting the war 
effort. It was, however, particularly relevant for his interactions with Native Americans 
as Amherst attempted to secure peace in the interior.  
Questions about the loyalty and identity of population groups within the British 
Empire, raised due to the association of Highlanders with the Forty-Five, continued to be 
asked after the conquest of Canada as Britain claimed a vast extension to its territory in 
the North American interior and assumed responsibility for the Native Americans who 
resided within it. Various barriers to peace in the West including colonial land 
                                                 
87 Halifax to Amherst, Whitehall, 11 November 1763, Amherst Papers, vol 7, WCL. 
88 Amherst to Gage, New York, 17 November 1763, Amherst Papers, Box One, WCL.  
178 
 
encroachment, the realignment of the “middle ground”, and the army’s continuing 
presence ensured the Native Americans remained a potentially hostile people. As the 
British Army sought to pacify that population, the cultural paradigms of civility and 
superiority were to the fore in guiding Amherst’s western strategy.  
The labelling of Native Americans as savages led to a parallel in the treatment of 
them and Highlanders during periods of warfare. As the rules of war provided 
justification for employing the tactics of savages in warfare against such peoples, 
Amherst and other army officers rationalised their use of fire and sword tactics by 
highlighting the savagery of their opponents. Further, as the civility paradigm posited that 
a savage population collectively required punitive measures, the army felt vindicated in 
classifying entire nations, groups, or confederacies of Native Americans as guilty by 
association for hostilities carried out. Officers encouraged the use of systematic violence 
to force their submission. Native Americans were not only considered savage, they were 
also thought to be an inferior population, subject to British authority but unentitled to any 
rights as imperial subjects. Although few British Army officers or government ministers 
shared Amherst’s conviction that Native Americans, as a conquered population, posed 
little threat to British security, his denial of imperial rights to that population was broadly 
accepted. Further, as Amherst was given freedom to direct the militarisation of the 
interior as he saw fit due to other ministerial priorities in London, his paradigm of 
superiority was very important for shaping the strategy adopted.  
Militarisation in the North American interior mirrored the earlier militarisation of 
the Highlands as the British Army retained a significant military presence in an imperial 
fringe to assert control over a hostile population whilst concurrently seeking to regulate 
commercial interactions and civilise savages. Civilisation was thought to be a necessary 
prerequisite for the eventual assimilation of ‘others’ within the British Empire. Although 
James Murray’s move towards accommodation in Canada at the same time suggested the 
beginning of a move away from the assumption that assimilation was a necessity for 
imperial populations to be able to demonstrate continuing loyalty, Amherst’s 
militarisation of the interior highlighted that it remained common at that juncture. 
However, the superiority paradigm ensured that the subjugation of Native Americans 
remained Amherst’s priority to force their acceptance of their subjugated status, so 
civilisation remained a secondary, and much longer-term, aim.  
Amherst’s primary aim was to ensure imperial security in a fringe that was 
vulnerable both to internal attack from Native Americans and external attack from France 
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or Spain. That his subjugatory strategy was unable to prevent conflict breaking out in the 
West highlights the failure of his cultural assumptions and left his successor, Thomas 
Gage, no choice but to reconsider British strategy in the interior in light of his own 







Chapter Five: Thomas Gage 
Figure 18. Title: General Thomas Gage. Artist: John Singleton Copley. Date Created: c.1768. © 
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When Jeffrey Amherst was granted leave to return to England in late 1763, 
Thomas Gage was given temporary command of the British troops in North America. His 
position was made permanent the following year when Amherst was chastised for failing 
to contain Native American rebellion throughout the Great Lakes and Ohio Country and 
confirmed he had no desire to return to America. Pontiac’s War was ongoing when Gage 
assumed the command and therefore his first major task was to end the conflict and pacify 
the Native Americans. The previous chapter highlighted the difficulties the British Army 
faced when attempting to ensure peace in the backcountry and govern the disparate 
indigenous populations. Amherst’s attempted subjugation of the Native American 
population, influenced by the earlier pacification of the Highlands and driven by his 
cultural paradigm of superiority, had failed, provoking Pontiac’s War. Gage continued 
the process of militarisation but not Amherst’s subjugation strategy, moving towards 
accommodation and diplomacy in an attempt to bring long-term peace to the interior and 
to bring Native Americans into the imperial fold. At the same time, Gage struggled to 
assert imperial authority in the older colonies as colonists balked at successive British 
attempts to tax them. He was recalled in June 1775 after failing to prevent the outbreak 
or spread of rebellion, sailing for England that October.  
This chapter considers Gage’s experiences of pacification, militarisation, and 
governance from 1763 until the eve of the American Revolution, taking the study of the 
British Army’s experiences in North America in the pre-revolutionary period to its 
conclusion. It first considers Gage’s military experience, before exploring the problems 
the British faced in pacifying the western interior and the impact of militarisation on 
British relations with the colonists in the face of a deepening imperial crisis. Gage’s 
formative experiences illuminate the enduring influence of the Forty-Five on British 
imperialism in North America. As commander-in-chief, considerations of identity and 
loyalty were as important as imperial security in driving the pacification of Native 
Americans and the militarisation of colonial governments, as they had been twenty years 
earlier in the pacification and militarisation of the Scottish Highlands. Gage’s pacification 
of Native Americans aimed to bring them under military governance, but the cultural 
paradigm of civility was altogether less important than it had been for Amherst in Gage’s 
efforts to reconcile the ‘otherness’ of the Indians to British imperial authority. In military 
affairs, British officers had learned to tolerate the independent-mindedness of the 
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colonists, so long as their insubordination in the ranks and truculent resourcing of the 
provincial regiments did not undermine the war effort. The controversies over 
parliamentary taxation complicated matters, however, and demonstrated colonists’ 
failure to display due adherence to Parliament. Throughout the late 1760s, Gage came to 
view the colonists as a potential military threat, which required strong management: 
colonists were expected to submit to imperial authority, whilst Gage and other British 
officials called for reform of colonial government. From a military perspective, Gage’s 
advocacy of tighter imperial control mirrored his understanding of the pacification and 
militarisation of the Scottish Highlands and reflected earlier calls of British officers who 
had begun to ‘other’ the colonists in response to their lacklustre war effort. When 
challenged on and by the imperial fringe, Gage reiterated the paradigm of loyalty as he 
sought to assert British authority.  
II. Thomas Gage, the Forty-Five, and the French and 
Indian War 
Born at Highmeadow, Gloucestershire, in 1719 or 1720, Thomas Gage was the 
second son of Viscount Thomas Gage, Member of Parliament for Tewkesbury. The 
Gages of Firle were Roman Catholic recusants whose continued adherence to 
Catholicism led to a loss of status and wealth during the late sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Despite being fined and imprisoned for recusancy, John Gage was created a 
baronet in 1622 by James I in return for maintaining a regiment of foot.1 Thomas Gage 
senior converted to the Church of England in 1715 to enable his appointment as an MP 
and was given the title Viscount Gage in 1720. Although he raised his children Anglican, 
Viscount Gage converted back to Catholicism shortly before his death, suggesting he 
personally continued to adhere to the faith.2 Whilst there is no evidence to suggest 
Thomas Gage ever practised Catholicism, the legacy of the family’s financial hardships 
and rejection from public life due to their faith likely had a lasting impact on him. Like 
James Murray, whose family ties to Jacobitism haunted him throughout his career and 
affected his attitudes and actions, it is likely Gage felt compelled to prove his personal 
loyalty to the Crown through assertions of imperial authority in the places he was active. 
                                                 
1 John Richard Alden, General Gage in America: Being Principally a History of His Role in the 
American Revolution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), 3. 
2 S. F. Wise, ‘Gage, Thomas’, DCB, Vol 4, 2003, see DCB online.  
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A thirst to prove personal loyalty, as well as a focus on upholding the authority of the 
Crown, is depicted in John Singleton Copley’s 1768 portrait of the general (Fig. 18) that 
Christopher Bryant suggested deliberately recalled the earlier pacification of the 
Highlands and was intended as a warning to the colonists.3 Gage commissioned the 
portrait himself at a time when he and the army had taken up residence in Boston to 
prevent expected rebellion and a paradigm shift had led him to view the colonial settlers 
as potentially hostile ‘others’. Bryant noted the similarities in the Gage painting and the 
widely disseminated engraving of the Battle of Culloden by Luke Sullivan (1746), after 
Augustin Heckel, including civilian settlements placed upon a hill in the background 
(representing the local population), the distinctive line of three regiments of infantry, and 
the mounted dragoons facing the viewer in the foreground.4 The lack of an enemy in the 
Copley portrait points towards the success of British arms in Scotland where the rebellion 
was crushed, the region occupied, and the population pacified, hinting that Gage was 
ready to crush the population and suppress rebellion in Massachusetts.  
Gage’s advancement in the army was typical of younger noble sons. Joining the 
army in 1741 he was aided by the patronage of his elder brother William, second Viscount 
Gage, and William’s political allegiance with Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle. 
He was appointed a captain of the 62nd Foot in 1743 and served on the continent as aide-
de-camp for William Anne Keppel, second Earl of Albemarle, during the War of the 
Austrian Succession. His regiment was recalled to Britain in November 1745 to meet the 
Jacobite threat, and Gage was present at the Battles of Falkirk and Culloden, and in the 
aftermath. He typified the “Old Cullodeners” as fellow officer Eyre Massey labelled them 
in personal letters penned in North America.5 By 1751, Gage was lieutenant-colonel of 
the 44th Foot, one of two regiments of regulars sent to North America in 1755 to join 
Braddock’s expedition against the French in the Ohio Country. Gage attracted some 
unjustified criticism of his handling of the advance guard following the Battle of 
Monongahela,6 attributing the disaster to a failure to deploy irregular troops on the 
column’s flanks.  
                                                 
3 Christopher Bryant, ‘Copley’s Portraits of General Thomas Gage and Samuel Adams’, Firle Estate, 
2016, http://firle.com/john-singleton-copleys-portraits-christopher-bryant/.  
4 Bryant, ‘Copley’s Portraits of General Gage and Adams’. 
5 Quoted in Alden, General Gage, 14. 
6 John W. Shy, ‘Gage, Thomas (1719/20-1787)’, ODNB, 2004, see ODNB online; Preston, Braddock’s 
Defeat, 284-85. Preston’s recent work highlighted that the criticism levelled at both Braddock and Gage 
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He also drew lessons from his earlier experiences in the Highlands. Gage saw 
little military action during Loudoun’s command, but the challenges of adapting to 
warfare in North America preoccupied him. He was aware of the important role 
Loudoun’s 64th Regiment had played in the Forty-Five securing roads and routes of 
communication throughout the Highlands, scouring the countryside for intelligence, and 
harrying Jacobites.7 Loudoun’s men were primarily Highlanders, familiar with the harsh 
local weather and difficult terrain, and perhaps the best suited of all British soldiers to 
deal with Jacobite raids from the interior.8 Gage favoured training regulars in irregular 
techniques in North America and creating light infantry capable of harassing the enemy 
and protecting the main bodies of troops. Gage and Loudoun were both firm advocates 
of irregular warfare and, in December 1757, Loudoun gave Gage permission to raise the 
80th Regiment of Foot of five hundred light infantry, to be trained in irregular warfare by 
experienced officers.9 Raised at his own expense, the regiment provided Gage with his 
long-sought-after colonelcy and reiterated his commitment to developing irregular 
warfare.  
Gage’s military experience in North America exposed him to numerous logistical 
problems and the frustrations of dealing with civilian authorities, from which, like many 
officers, he emerged an advocate of closer imperial regulation.10 Braddock had 
diplomatic and administrative powers in the colonies alongside his military command, as 
did Loudoun, Abercromby, Amherst, and Gage in succession. The colonies were clearly 
made subordinate to the commander-in-chief, in keeping with the reformist agenda of the 
Earl of Halifax, president of the Board of Trade, as they were ordered to contribute to a 
war fund administered by Braddock.11 In the wake of Braddock’s defeat, Gage called for 
the reform of the governments in Pennsylvania and Maryland, like Braddock favouring 
direct taxation to preclude the necessity of negotiating requisitions from the colonial 
assemblies that preoccupied his superiors.12 By the time he was appointed commander-
                                                 
was unjustified. He argued that the British defeat reflected the weakness of the British Empire attempting 
to engage in warfare so far from its centre. See p.8.  
7 See Chapter One.  
8 Russell, ‘Redcoats in the Wilderness’, 637-40.  
9 Thomas Gage, Proposal for Raising a Regiment of Light Armed Foot, 22 December 1757, LO (AM) 
5066, HL; Loudoun to Pitt, New York, 14 February 1758, CO5/49, ff.1-14, TNA.  
10 Preston, Braddock’s Defeat, 73-126.  
11 Preston, Braddock’s Defeat, 76. 
12 Alden, General Gage, 36; Preston, Braddock’s Defeat, 284. 
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in-chief in 1764, Gage had a wealth of military and political experience and his early 
conduct of military affairs in North America was shaped by his formative experiences.  
In the Forty-Five, Gage learned about pacifying hostile populations as aide-de-
camp to the Earl of Albemarle, Cumberland’s replacement as commander of the British 
troops in Scotland from August to December 1746. Albemarle shaped the early stages of 
pacification, disdainful of the Highlanders and in favour of a punitive, repressive policy. 
Gage remained in the Highlands for some time, likely stationed in Inverness with 
Batereau’s 62nd Regiment under the command of Major General Blakeney, and during 
that period he would have been engaged in efforts to capture Jacobite fugitives and 
Charles Edward Stuart.13 Gage’s close association with Albemarle meant he would have 
been aware of the latter’s rationale that the subjugation of the Highland population was 
necessary to prevent future risings but also that cultural assimilation was required to 
ensure future loyalty. Gage drew upon these lessons when, as military governor of 
Montréal, he pacified French-Canadians following the conquest of 1760. Unlike the 
Highlanders, the French-Canadians were not rebels; nor did Gage initially expect Canada 
to be retained after the peace. Thus, his earlier experiences from Scotland required 
adaptation to these new circumstances. However, both were defeated peoples, and both 
required pacification to ensure imperial security. Gage’s moderation boded well with the 
town’s inhabitants, as had James Murray’s in Quebec, and pacification seemed likely to 
avoid the repression the British had deemed necessary in the wake of Culloden.14 
Pontiac’s War of 1763-65 and the protests of the colonial settlers from 1765 to 1774, 
presented quite different challenges in military governance although, as in Montréal, 
Gage’s cultural paradigm of loyalty demanded all imperial populations display due 
submission and adherence to the Crown.  
                                                 
13 Taylor, Military Roads in Scotland, 178. Taylor highlighted that Batereau’s were one of two regiments 
kept at Inverness, but he did not specify how long the regiment remained there. Certainly, they would 
have returned to the continent with Albemarle in early 1747 if they had not returned previously.  
14 Wise, ‘Gage, Thomas’; Alden, General Gage, 55-58. Gage, Murray, and Ralph Burton were given 
freedom to govern autonomously and did vary in their administration of justice, with Murray 
implementing the Canadian system and Gage and Burton ruling through military courts. There were, 
however, no radical differences in the governance of the three Canadian regions and all governors 
followed a general policy of moderation. 
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III. The Problem of the West 
Pontiac’s War: A Changing Attitude to Pacification  
Gage’s priority as commander-in-chief was to end Pontiac’s War and pacify those 
Native Americans who had participated in it. He took command of the 1764 campaign, 
acting on Amherst’s instructions to strike into the interior, sending detachments under 
Henry Bouquet and John Bradstreet against Indian settlements. However, Gage adapted 
Amherst’s plans in accordance with his different approach to pacification, requesting two 
hundred French-Canadians for the provincial corps and Native American recruits from 
Superintendent Johnson.15 Whilst the deployment of French-Canadians mirrored the 
British Army’s raising of Highland regiments after the Forty-Five, raising Native 
Americans was a stark break with Amherst, who had refused all offers of Indian 
assistance. Unlike Amherst, Gage had significant battle experience fighting alongside and 
against Native Americans, at the Monongahela and Ticonderoga, and had worked closely 
with Indian allies who ranged the forests and screened regular columns whilst on the 
march.16 And, unlike Amherst, Gage was well aware of the Indians’ de facto 
independence. He repeatedly referred to Pontiac’s War as a “conflict” or “war” rather 
than a rebellion or insurrection, both when discussing the army’s progress with his 
subordinates and in letters to the ministry.17 This suggests Gage recognised the 
independent status of the tribes and nations, accepting they were unconquered and a 
genuine military threat. Writing to Henry Bouquet, Gage discussed the case of a colonial 
settler, Gershom Hicks, who Bouquet believed had been living voluntarily with Indians 
following his captivity and had joined in their depredations. Gage noted: 
Both he and his Brother has been in Arms and You will endeavour to 
get what proofs you can of this, that they may be tried as Traitors to 
their Country. But then Tryals must be in the Country below by the 
                                                 
15 Other commanders also advocated recruiting French-Canadians and Native Americans, the former by 
James Abercromby and the latter, not unexpectedly, by Superintendent Johnson. Regarding French-
Canadians see: Gage to Amherst, Montreal, 12 July 1763, ff.299-300, WO 34, vol 5, Microfilm Reel B-
2639, LAC; Abercromby to Amherst, London, 10 Jan 1764, CO5/65, ff.87-90, TNA. Regarding Native 
Americans see: Orders Sent to the Officers Commanding on the Communication to Fort Pitt, 8 March 
1763, Add MS 21656, f.7, BL; Johnson to Amherst, Johnson Hall, 4 August 1763, f.391, WO 34, vol 39, 
Microfilm Reel B-2657, LAC; Johnson to Gage, Johnson Hall, 30 December 1763, Gage Papers, vol 11.  
16 Preston, Braddock’s Defeat, 269-322; Anderson, Crucible of War, 240-49.  
17 Gage to Johnson, New York, 26 December 1763, Gage Papers, vol 11; Gage to Johnson, New York, 12 
January 1764, Gage Papers, vol 12; Gage to Bouquet, New York, March 1764, Gage Papers, vol 16; 
Gage to Bouquet, New York, 4 April 1764, Add MS 21638, ff.293-4, BL. 
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Civil Magistrate to whom they should be given up. The Military may 
hang a Spy in Time of War. But Rebells in Arms we tried by the Civil 
Courts at least I saw this Practised in Scotland by General Hawley and 
the Duke of Cumberland.18 
To Gage, it was not the Indians who were rebels, but renegades like Hicks, who should 
suffer the penalty of law. He had similarly written to Henry Gladwin regarding Jesuits 
accused of stirring up the Indians to act against the British. Gage argued that “future peace 
and tranquillity requires that examples should be made of the most guilty of those, who 
have acted traitorously in any shape, against their Sovereign, you must bring the most 
guilty to trial and execute them if condemned.”19 Colonial settlers and French inhabitants 
who aided Native Americans militarily were, in Gage’s eyes, traitors to the King. No 
mention was made of Native Americans suggesting that, at that juncture, Gage did not 
view them either as subjects of the Crown or as conquered peoples subject to British 
authority. Unlike Amherst, whose superiority paradigm drove his interpretation, he did 
not see a legal parallel between Native Americans in arms and the Jacobites.  
Gage recognised Native Americans’ agency in the decision to go to war with the 
British. He understood the Indians would blame French influence when suing for peace, 
but in a letter to the Earl of Halifax of January 1763 explained the Indians’ own reasons 
for going to war. 
The Savages have been induced to combine so readily against us, not 
only by their Attachment to the French, and the Jealousies infused in 
them by that People, of our bad Designs against all the Indian Nations; 
But thro’ Motives of Policy, which would have engaged More 
enlightened Nations to take Measures, tho’ perhaps better concerted, of 
the Same Nature. They saw us sole Masters of the Country, the Balance 
of Power broke, and their own Consequence at an End. Instead of being 
courted by two Nations, a Profusion of Presents made by both, and two 
Markets to trade at, they now depend upon one Power.20 
                                                 
18 Gage to Bouquet, New York, 15 October 1764, Add MS 21636, ff.43-5, BL. General Henry Hawley 
replaced Sir John Cope as commander-in-chief of the British troops in Scotland in December 1745. He 
kept his title despite Captain General Cumberland’s arrival in Scotland the following month but served 
under Cumberland at Culloden and during the pacification that followed, before returning to the continent 
in July 1746. Alastair W. Massie, ‘Hawley, Henry’, ODNB, 2006, see ODNB online.  
19 Gage to Gladwin, New York, 25 April 1764, Gage Papers, vol 17.  
20 Gage to Halifax, New York, 7 January 1764 in The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with the 
Secretaries of State, and with the War Office and the Treasury, 1763-1775, ed. Clarence E. Carter, vol. 1 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), 9-11. See also Gage to Johnson, New York, 12 January 1764, 
Gage Papers, vol 12.  
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Gage clearly ascribed agency to the Native Americans, accepting they had “Policy” and 
were acting rationally in response to the fear the British were now “sole Masters” and in 
control of trade. At the same time, he was being pressed by Secretary of State Halifax to 
put a “Speedy End to the Hostilities of the Indians.” Halifax was open to “Opinion” in 
both Britain and America suggesting that “neglect” of the Indians, “owing to an apparent 
Contempt of their Consequence, either as Friends or Foes”, was behind “present 
Hostilities.”21 This offered an indirect criticism of Amherst, following his return to 
Britain, and Halifax took pains to stress that Gage should be his own judge of the matter. 
Of course, should Gage fail to pacify the tribes he could expect similar condemnation.  
It was the paradigm of loyalty that influenced Gage’s interpretation of the 
situation and drove his pacification strategy. His recognition of the Indians’ autonomy 
left him aware that the army first had to secure their submission to the Crown. Gage 
believed this would be best achieved through military intimidation during the war: 
forcing the Indians to sue for peace and obtaining proper satisfaction for the murders they 
had committed. This again highlights the continuing influence of the Forty-Five on the 
British Army, as the primary aim of the army in the Highlands had been to obtain the 
submission of those involved in the rising. However, whilst the long-term pacification of 
the Highlands focused on civilisation, improvement, and assimilation to ensure 
Highlanders demonstrated continuing submission and adherence to the Crown, in the 
North American interior Gage believed accommodation of Native Americans would be 
the most effective strategy to ensure long-term peace. This reflected a paradigm shift 
regarding loyalty within the British Empire that was a result of the interactions of the 
army in Scotland and North America over the previous two decades, as well as the 
transformation of a predominantly Protestant, British Empire into a much more diverse 
empire after the French and Indian War. The loyalty paradigm had assumed that 
assimilation of ‘other’ populations into the empire as Britons was vital to achieve loyalty 
to the Crown. By the mid-1760s, however, such an assumption was being questioned, 
leading Gage to believe that the assimilation of Indians was not essential for that 
population to display continuing submission. As such, he hoped reform of Britain’s 
Indian policy might serve to accommodate the Indians by removing grievances related to 
colonial land encroachment and trade,22 thereby encouraging them to remain loyal.   
                                                 
21 Halifax to Gage, Whitehall, 14 January 1764 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 2:9-10.  
22 Watson, ‘Holding the Line’, 156-92.  
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Whilst Gage was convinced that military action alone would never reduce the 
Indians’ military capabilities, their submission during Pontiac’s War was considered 
essential. Gage ordered Bouquet to progress as far into the Native American settlements 
as he could. He demanded that no ceasefire be made unless the hostile nations gave 
satisfaction for the murders they had committed, surrendered all captives, and attended a 
congress with Johnson to sign a treaty.23 The peace Johnson concluded with the 
Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo expressed the Indians’ 
…desire to be admitted as Children of the Great King of England and 
to be stiled such for the Future, deeming themselves thereby closer 
Linked to the British Crown to whom They will pay all due Submission 
and Subjection, so far as the same can be consistent with the Indians 
native Rights.24 
The Indians attempted to ensure continuing agency with the assertion that subjection 
ought to be consistent with native rights, but the British viewed the treaty as a full 
acceptance of British authority.25 Although the Native Americans were still not 
considered subjects, Gage, Johnson, and the British Army now viewed them as being 
more closely linked to the British than ever: an imperial population of ‘others’. Just as 
James Murray was recognising the extent to which the French-Canadians, now British 
subjects but still imperial ‘others’, had to be accommodated and negotiated with to ensure 
loyalty and imperial security, Thomas Gage and the British were coming to a similar 
conclusion regarding the need to accommodate Native Americans within the governance 
of the empire. They were to be considered when policies were made and protected from 
colonial ills and, in return, they were expected to obey the authority of the King and his 
imperial agents.  
 
                                                 
23 Gage relaxed the demand for satisfaction later in the campaign. Middleton, Pontiac’s War, 167-82; 
Gage to Bouquet, New York, 4 April 1764, Add MS 21638, ff.293-4, BL; Bouquet to Gage, Fort Pitt, 26 
September 1764, Add MS 21637, ff.64-7, BL; Bouquet to Gage, Fort Pitt, 30 November 1764, Add MS 
21637, ff.77-80, BL. 
24 Copy of a Conference and a Treaty with the Shawnese, Mingoes and Delawares of the Ohio, Johnson 
Hall, 4 July 1765, CO5/65, ff.276-90, TNA.  
25 Middleton, Pontiac’s War, 181-82. Middleton highlighted that Superintendent Johnson said nothing 
about the Indian’s assertion that subjection ought to be consistent with native rights, suggesting he 
recognised the conflict between how they and the British would interpret the treaty but chose to let each 
interpret it as they would.  
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Figure 19. Title: A new map of the western parts of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland and North 
Carolina… Contributors: Thomas Hutchinson and T. Cheevers. Date Created: 1778. ©Library of 
Congress Geography and Map Division. https://lccn.loc.gov/74696155. The locations of Fort de 
Chartres (army headquarters in Illinois), Fort Detroit, and Fort Pitt are labelled.  
 
The main lesson of Pontiac’s War was that diplomacy was required to pacify the 
Native American population, not subjugation as Amherst believed. The British 
government and British military commanders, including Gage, appreciated the military 
threat that Native American nations and tribes posed individually, and more so if united 
in a confederacy.26 The Indians represented a much greater active threat to the British 
Army and to imperial security than the Scottish Highlanders or French-Canadians had 
previously. Recognition of the weakness of British military power on the imperial fringe 
favoured accommodation in British-Indian relations.27 Diplomacy, gift-giving, and 
negotiation were the preferred tools in the army’s occupation of the West, as 
demonstrated by the strategy advocated by Gage to secure the French forts in the Illinois 
                                                 
26 Dowd, War Under Heaven, 249-76.  
27 Anderson, Crucible of War, 634.  
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Country. The commander believed a quick occupation necessary to bring an end to 
Pontiac’s War and ensure future peace. The Indians had been supplied with provisions 
and ammunition from the French inhabitants in that region and Gage thought a British 
presence would sever that supply line and make it impossible for the Indians to continue 
the war.28 After the failure of the first military expedition to occupy Illinois in early 1764, 
Gage encouraged the distribution of presents rather than the use of force to enable the 
army’s progression. Despite his commitment to diplomacy, Indian hostility during 
Pontiac’s War ensured the continued failure of British expeditions.29 
It was only after Britain had made peace with the Shawnee and Delaware Indians 
that a 1765 expedition under Lt. Fraser and Indian agent George Croghan took possession 
of Fort de Chartres (Fig. 19). Croghan was eventually able to secure a peace with Pontiac 
and the warring nations at Detroit (Fig. 19) in September 1765 (where once again the 
Indians were addressed as ‘children’ rather than ‘brothers’ of the British). The Indians, 
however, continued to assert their agency in negotiations by arguing that although the 
British had claimed possession of the land through the French cession, the French had 
never bought or won the territory from the Indians. Whilst they would permit the British 
to take control of the French forts, they expected gift-giving to continue and would not 
accept settlement in what they continued to consider their land. Richard Middleton 
highlighted that such a situation was unprecedented in the British Empire: the British 
hitherto had never negotiated permission to occupy a region that they felt it was their 
right to occupy, as they did with the Illinois Country under the Treaty of Paris.30 The 
laboured British attempts to occupy Illinois highlights the limits of Britain’s imperial 
reach in North America. Gage’s orders that his officers provide presents and request 
permission to take control of the posts shows he recognised the army’s weakness, which 
further cemented the shift away from subjugation, acculturation, and assimilation and 
towards accommodation for guaranteeing the long-term loyalty of Native Americans to 
the Crown and, thereby, ensuring imperial security.  
                                                 
28 Gage to John Bradstreet, New York, 30 April 1764, Gage Letters. 
29 Middleton, Pontiac’s War, 183-200; The Critical Period, 1763-1765, eds. C. W. Alvord and Clarence 
E. Carter (Springfield: Trustees of the Illinois State Historical Library, 1915), 162–272. 
30 Middleton, Pontiac’s War, 188.  
193 
 
The Army as an Instrument of Empire 
The end of Pontiac’s War meant the British were no longer at war with any Native 
Americans, although some remained hostile. Thomas Gage retained responsibility for 
integrating tribes within the empire, encouraging their loyalty and obedience whilst 
providing the protection they were due as “children” of the King. Throughout the pre-
revolutionary period, the army retained control over Indian affairs, with superintendents 
John Stuart and William Johnson subordinate to Gage, although regularly consulted by 
him, Johnson more than Stuart.31 This meant the army had to absorb the expense of Indian 
management which, although only approximately 3 percent of army expenditure in North 
America in 1767, still accounted for approximately £20,000 p.a.32 Gage was ultimately 
responsible for implementing policies regarding Indian affairs and the West that were 
agreed upon in London, including militarisation and later retrenchment.  
As Peter J. Marshall highlighted, imperial issues were never more important than 
domestic or European issues which meant the ministry was often distracted from setting 
colonial policy. Further, responsibility for colonial affairs was split between a number of 
departments and ministers (including the Board of Trade, Secretary of State for the 
Southern Department/Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1768, and the Secretary at 
War) which meant there was frequent disagreement regarding policy decisions.33 
Between 1763 and 1775 frequent changes of government meant seven different men 
filled the secretarial post responsible for the colonies, several of whom had very different 
views regarding issues such as the regulation of commerce and western settlement. As 
such, it took several years for the formulation of a general plan. The ministry sought 
information from a wide range of imperial agents in the colonies and in London, but 
Thomas Gage remained their main source of intelligence and his opinion was sought 
frequently. Ministerial priorities and disagreements, alongside the lack of an obvious 
revenue stream in the wake of colonial opposition to taxation, meant Gage also had 
considerable freedom to direct government policy as he saw fit, with the ministry 
providing strategic direction and leaving Gage to provide details on the ground.34 
                                                 
31 Watson, ‘Holding the Line’, 162. 
32 Peter Marshall, ‘Colonial Protest and Imperial Retrenchment: Indian Policy 1764-1768’, Journal of 
American Studies 5, no. 1 (1971): 2. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27670623.  
33 Marshall, Making and Unmaking, 58, 74.  
34 Clarence E. Carter, ‘The Significance of the Military Office in America, 1763-1775’, AHR 28, no. 3 
(1923): 475–88. https://doi.org/10.2307/1836407.  
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Gage was fully aware that the primary reason for Amherst’s recall was his failure 
to prevent an Indian war and the resultant increase in military spending Pontiac’s War 
had occasioned. Gage’s decisions regarding Indian affairs were therefore influenced by 
concerns of imperial security and economy. His priorities were to prevent future conflict 
with Native Americans and reduce military expenditure and he managed to achieve both. 
Expenditure for the army in North America fell from £437,125 in the 1763-64 financial 
year to £363,319 in 1774-75 and showed a general downward trend over that period, 
except for two years of high costs in 1770-71 and 1771-72. Peter D. G. Thomas suggested 
that in those years the Treasury was trying to meet colonial arrears.35 Gage also 
successfully prevented another Native American conflict involving the British Army, as 
Dunmore’s War of 1774 broke out after the army had been removed from the interior.  
  
                                                 
35 Peter D G Thomas, ‘The Cost of the British Army in North America, 1763-1775’, WMQ 45, no. 3 
(1988): 510–16. https://doi.org/10.2307/1923647.  
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Figure 20. Title: Cantonment of the forces in North America 11th Octr. 1765. Date Created: 1765. 
©Library of Congress Geography and Map Division. https://lccn.loc.gov/gm72002043.  
The map highlights that in 1765, twenty companies were stationed in the interior: nine at Illinois, 
two at Michillimakinac, seven at Detroit and Niagara, and two at Oswego. Three regiments plus 
twelve companies were stationed in Canada, two regiments in West Florida, and seven companies 
in East Florida. The remainder of the troops were kept throughout the older colonies with the 
majority in Nova Scotia, New York, and Pennsylvania.  
 
 
Gage believed there were several steps the British could take to prevent future 
conflicts, largely accommodating Native Americans within the empire whilst continuing 
the process of militarisation. Like Amherst, he favoured establishing military settlements 
at British forts to advance pacification of local populations, securing tracts of land as part 
of the peace negotiations during Pontiac’s War. Writing to Halifax in April 1764, Gage 
noted that Johnson had persuaded the Senecas of Chenussio to cede a tract of land around 
Fort Niagara and sought another at Fort Pitt.36 Gage granted the land to British soldiers 
to enable a permanent military presence around the forts; the garrisons were intended to 
                                                 
36 Gage to Halifax, New York, 14 April 1764 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 1:24–2; Sosin, 
Whitehall and the Wilderness, 72. 
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intimidate Indians in the interior and grow much of their own food, saving costly portage. 
The creation of settlements at strategic locations had also occurred in the Highlands. 
Disbanded British soldiers and sailors had been settled upon the annexed estates of the 
Jacobite rebels, ensuring a permanent military reserve in the region that echoed the 
Roman Empire. The peace treaties signed by the Shawnee and Delaware included land 
cessions and the Delaware were required to allow soldiers to pass through their territories, 
further opening the region to the British military.37 Gage believed military settlements 
would entrench the British Army in the backcountry. In 1766 he suggested to Secretary 
of State Henry Seymour Conway that a military governor be appointed to oversee the 
distribution of land grants in Illinois to anyone willing to transport themselves with a 
year’s supplies on condition they undertake military service when required.38 Gage also 
organised exploration and surveying of the interior, both for logistical reasons and to 
intimidate the native and French inhabitants.39 Concurrently, he recognised it was not 
possible for the British Army to hold all their interior forts. He proposed a policy of 
limited retrenchment: abandoning the smaller posts the Indians had overrun at the 
beginning of Pontiac’s War. Recognising the limits of British military power, Gage 
concentrated his troops in the most defensible garrisons (Fig. 20). In March 1765 he made 
it clear to Governor Penn that regulars would not be deployed to Fort Augusta after the 
provincial garrison was disbanded.40 Limited retrenchment would be a main pillar of 
Gage’s militarisation strategy over the following years and influenced the ministry’s 
eventual adoption of a general policy of retrenchment.  
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Figure 21.  Title: A new map of the western parts of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland and North 
Carolina… Contributors: Thomas Hutchinson and T. Cheevers. Date Created: 1778. ©Library of 
Congress Geography and Map Division. https://lccn.loc.gov/74696155. The locations of the 
illegal settlements in the Indian reserve at Post Vincent and Redstone Creek are labelled.  
 
Gage only supported the construction of interior settlements for military purposes 
and where the British Army had the consent of the Indians to create them. He was against 
the purchase of Indian lands and western expansion of the colonists, believing there to be 
plenty of opportunity for settlement within colonial boundaries and particularly in the 
new British territories of Canada and the Floridas. Gage recognised that land 
encroachment increased native discontent, causing violence and making it more difficult 
to maintain law and order in the interior.41 As such, he supported the creation of a 
permanent boundary line separating the two populations and protecting Indian hunting 
grounds. Whilst the temporary boundary line established in the Proclamation of 1763 was 
in force, part of the army’s role in the West was to remove those illegal settlers and 
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attempt to police the interior, bringing to justice natives and settlers guilty of attacking 
one another. The army employed force to remove colonists at Redstone Creek and Post 
Vincent (Fig. 21) amongst other places, destroying encampments.42 Whilst the army was 
generally successful at removing illegal settlers, Gage was aware that they would likely 
simply return the following year in larger numbers, better prepared to defend themselves. 
Limited numbers meant the army could only react to established settlements, by which 
time they had often caused discontent and violence. Removing the settlers showed that 
the army was willing to accommodate Native Americans within the empire by protecting 
native land rights but the failure of the British to find a permanent solution to land 
encroachment ensured it remained a consistent source of tension throughout the pre-
revolutionary period. Colonists were left believing that the British Army was protecting 
Indians at their expense whilst illegal settlements caused reciprocal violence between 
natives and settlers.  
It was impossible for the army to prevent interior violence and officers found it 
difficult to identify perpetrators and bring them to justice. Few colonists believed a settler 
ought to be punished for murdering an Indian, so communities rarely surrendered 
suspects. When someone was arrested they were often either found not guilty or were 
sent to stand trial in the east, leaving the Indians without satisfaction.43 Recognising that 
attacks on Indians and a perceived lack of justice jeopardised peace, Gage expressed his 
regret at the situation. In a letter to Superintendent Johnson of 1766 regarding a 
disturbance in which several Indians had been killed, Gage stated that he had “desired 
Capt. Murray to tell them [Indians at Detroit] that I am very sorry they could not get up 
with them [the murderers] after they committed the vile deed, and put them to death, 
which would have given me as much satisfaction as themselves.”44 Seeking to 
accommodate the Indians, Gage began to suggest that the army would not complain if the 
Indians took their own revenge upon those who attacked them, so long as any revenge 
was proportionate. He ordered his subordinate Captain Murray not to “retaliate upon the 
Indians”45 if they caught and killed those responsible for several murders near Fort Pitt, 
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explaining that “it is always best-when they [Native Americans] take immediate 
satisfaction [for murder]: For we must expect they will at length be roused by so many 
repeated murders, for which they have never been able to get any satisfaction, or probably 
ever will.”46 He hoped that if the British ignored acts of revenge it would prevent frontier 
violence from spilling into a general conflict involving the army.  
The ministry had signalled its intention to accommodate Native Americans within 
the empire with the Proclamation of 1763 and had long been considering a wider Plan for 
the Future Management of Indian Affairs. The details of the Plan closely resembled the 
proposals drawn up by Halifax in 1754 when president of the Board of Trade47 and were 
presented to the Indian superintendents and colonial governors in the summer of 1764.48 
The Plan aimed to create a trade that was open to all British and French-Canadian subjects 
in North America and regulated by the Crown through a new Indian department in full 
control of Indian affairs: colonial laws relating to trade were to be repealed and the 
military’s role in the commerce was to be limited to garrisoning trading posts. Slightly 
different rules were to govern commerce in the northern and southern districts but, 
generally, trade was to be fixed at certain towns or garrisoned posts and carried on under 
the direction of the superintendents or their subordinates assisted by commissaries, 
smiths, and interpreters. Traders would require licences, credit for Indians was strictly 
limited, the sale of alcohol banned, and tariffs were agreed upon for goods.49 The Plan 
proposed to give Indians greater rights than they had previously enjoyed by allowing their 
evidence to be admissible in both criminal and civil courts, allowing them to seek redress 
for fraud and violence, as was already the case in New England. Indians were still not 
viewed as subjects, but such a proposal highlights that they were less often viewed simply 
as savages and increasingly as an imperial population who were not only considered 
subject to British authority but were also to be accommodated within imperial structures.  
With assimilation no longer assumed necessary for imperial populations to 
demonstrate continuing loyalty to the Crown, the civility paradigm was altogether less 
important in the militarisation of the interior. The 1764 Plan highlights that imperial 
                                                 
46 Quoted in Watson, ‘Holding the Line’, 209. See also O’Toole, White Savage, 268–70.  
47 Beaumont, Colonial America, 127-50; R. Jacobs, Wilbur, ‘Edmond Atkin’s Plan for Imperial Indian 
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control of commerce continued to be thought essential in the pacification of Native 
Americans, as it had been in the pacification of the Highlands. In the interior, however, 
its primary aim was to remove Indian grievances relating to the trade, thereby preventing 
hostilities by accommodating Indians within the empire and encouraging their imperial 
loyalty. Civilising the savage population did remain a secondary aim and was encouraged 
in the 1764 Plan. Point eight stated that it should be recommended to the Society for 
Propagating the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG) to appoint four missionaries in each trade 
district to reside at the trading posts.50 Just as the Society in Scotland for Propagating 
Christian Knowledge (SSPCK) was expected to build schools and churches to encourage 
the spread of Protestantism and the English language, the SPG was similarly expected to 
convert and civilise Native Americans at trading posts.  
The Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs was never official British 
imperial policy, nor was it even debated by Parliament, and it was sent to the colonies for 
consideration and comment only.51 It had been expected that the Plan would be financed 
through a duty imposed upon the fur trade, which required an act of parliament for 
authorisation. However, by late 1765, following the controversy over the Stamp Tax, 
there was little enthusiasm for introducing further colonial taxation.52 No other policy on 
Indian affairs was issued until 1768 and so Gage directed the implementation of an ad 
hoc strategy that reiterated both the 1764 Plan and the Proclamation of 1763, imposing 
regulations which did not require parliamentary authorisation or significant financial 
investment. These included: confining trade to specific towns or posts, continuing the 
requirement for traders to apply annually for a licence, and setting tariffs on goods being 
sold.53 Gage remained in favour of regulating the Indian trade, despite the opposition of 
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traders and many Indians.54 By 1767, however, he realised that long-term regulation of 
commerce would require considerable military expenditure and the expansion of the 
military throughout the interior, which would contradict his policy of limited 
retrenchment. In letters to the Indian superintendents and the ministry Gage noted that 
regulation of commerce as per the 1764 Plan was likely impossible, though he still 
believed some regulation both possible and necessary to prevent hostilities resulting from 
colonial mismanagement of trade.55 
As Gage implemented an ad-hoc strategy in the West, various ministers and the 
Board of Trade, an advisory government body on colonial affairs, reconsidered Britain’s 
American priorities in the wake of colonial opposition to taxation. Gage’s policy of 
limited retrenchment influenced the plans of Secretary at War Lord Barrington, Secretary 
of State, the Earl of Shelburne (1766-68), and Secretary of State, the Earl of Hillsborough 
(1768-72) as well as the advice given to ministers by the Board of Trade, all of whom 
requested his opinion on the future direction of western policy. All were in favour of the 
removal of the army from the West, either through its withdrawal behind the 1763 
boundary line as per Barrington’s 1766 plan or through further retrenchment, advocated 
by Shelburne in 1767.56 Eventually, a policy of retrenchment was settled upon and in 
1768 Gage was ordered to abandon most forts in the interior and station the bulk of his 
army in Quebec, Nova Scotia, East Florida, and the middle colonies.57 He was to decide 
for himself which forts were necessary for British security and to manage the timing of 
the removal of the troops. The Grafton ministry failed to decide whether to keep a military 
presence in Illinois, requesting Gage’s opinion on that matter. Despite him immediately 
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expressing a preference for its abandonment, and the forming of its inhabitants into a 
militia for protection, it was not until late 1771 that the North ministry came to a positive 
decision to do so.58 Ministerial preoccupation with reducing American expenditure led 
Barrington, Shelburne, and Hillsborough to ignore Gage’s opinion that the army should 
play a role in the regulation of commerce. Although Shelburne had wanted to disband the 
Indian department entirely before his removal from office, it was decided in 1768 to task 
the department with continuing Indian diplomacy, overseeing land purchases, and 
agreeing upon a permanent boundary line.59 Management of Indian trade, however, was 
returned to individual colonies. The issue of the establishment of interior colonies divided 
ministers. Although some shared Gage’s opposition to western expansion there were few 
concrete steps taken to rule out the establishment of new colonies, even after the Indian 
superintendents were ordered to fix a boundary line in 1768.60 
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Figure 22. Title: Cantonment of His Majesty's forces in N. America according to the disposition 
now made & to be compleated as soon as practicable taken from the general distribution dated at 
New York 29th. March 1766. Contributor: Daniel Paterson. Date Created: 1766. ©Library of 
Congress Geography and Map Division. https://lccn.loc.gov/gm72002042.  
The forts highlighted in yellow had been abandoned by 1768. One regiment remained at Illinois, 
abandoned 1772, but most British troops were in New York, Nova Scotia, and Canada. In 1768 
troops would be moved to Boston.  
 
Gage implemented the official policy of retrenchment from 1768, abandoning 
posts at Louisbourg and Forts Amherst, Frederick, Cumberland, and Annapolis within 
months of receiving his instructions (Fig. 22).61 However, his abandonment of the West 
was hindered by the ministry’s indecision regarding Illinois and by the failure of the 
colonies to take control of the Indian trade. This meant the army had to continue 
absorbing the costs of Indian management and accommodation.62 That expense, 
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alongside rising discontent in the eastern seaboard colonies, left the North ministry 
convinced that the status quo was not sustainable by the early 1770s. In 1774 the final 
troops were removed from the interior as the British abandoned the West. At the same 
time, the perceived failure of the colonies to jointly manage Indian trade and control the 
frontier left the ministry in favour of returning control to the Crown by annexing the 
Indian reserve to one colony.63 The Quebec Act granted it to Quebec (Fig. 23), explaining 
that due to the Royal Proclamation “a very large Extent of Country, within which there 
were several Colonies and Settlements of the Subjects of France, who claimed to remain 
therein under the Faith of the said Treaty, was left, without any Provision being made for 
the Administration of Civil Government therein”.64 It is likely the ministry also favoured 
granting the territory to Quebec due to the Crown having more direct control there 
because the Quebec Act had formalised government through a council rather than an 
assembly. This would save the necessity of convincing assemblies to grant money for 
regulating Indian trade and preventing land encroachment. This step signalled the 
ministry’s agreement with Gage that some level of trade regulation was necessary to 
accommodate Native Americans within the empire and ensure their loyalty to the Crown. 
Gage’s experiences implementing successive British policies in the West from 1763 had 
a significant effect on shaping the commander’s attitudes towards both the Native 
Americans and the colonial North American settlers the army encountered in the interior.  
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Figure 23. Map of North America in 1774 highlighting the area put under the management of the 
Province of Quebec.65 Base map used: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NorthAmerica1763-A.png. By 1774 the army had 
completely abandoned the West.  
 
“Lawless Banditti”: The ‘Othering’ of Frontier Settlers 
During the French and Indian War, British military officers had often viewed 
colonial settlers in a military, rather than civil, light. This was because the conflict 
impinged upon civil life in a variety of ways and to a much greater extent than previous 
conflicts had. Ordinary civilians played an important role in the war effort: fighting as 
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regulars or as part of the provincial or militia units, supplying the army with food, 
wagons, ammunition, etc., and building roads.66 Colonists on the frontier were at frequent 
risk of Indian raids. This fostered their hatred of Indians and the creation of groups, 
including the Paxton Boys of Pennsylvania and Augusta Boys of Virginia, who 
indiscriminately attacked Indians, enjoying widespread popular support for their 
actions.67 All colonists were expected not to trade with the French during the war but 
widely ignored such orders. British Army officers generally regarded the colonists as 
insubordinate and selfish as they were thought willing to hamper the British war effort 
for personal gain. They firmly believed the colonies had not contributed enough to the 
war effort and a paradigm shift caused them to view the colonists as significantly different 
from Britons at home, an ‘other’ within the empire. The continued militarisation of the 
backcountry in the aftermath of the war and the increasing violence between Native 
Americans and frontiersmen destabilised relations between the army and the colonists, 
entrenching such an understanding.  
During and after Pontiac’s War, many frontiersmen made it clear they viewed all 
Indians as an enemy and believed pre-emptive attacks necessary for their own protection. 
William Johnson noted they were willing to act not only against Indians but against any 
who traded with them, provided them with presents, or protected them in any way.68 
Johnson’s assessment highlights the fragility of Gage’s pacification plan in the interior, 
which relied upon accommodation. Colonists’ hatred of Indians rendered violence 
inevitable and left the pacification in danger unless the army could keep it in check. 
Backcountry settlers believed the British Army was protecting Indians at their expense, 
whilst traders complained about the restrictions placed upon the Indian trade between 
1764 and 1768. They argued the restrictions made it impossible for them to participate 
and gave French traders living in the interior an advantage as the latter were not restricted 
to trading at specific posts and could wander amongst Indian villages to sell their goods.69 
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Other colonists and land speculators were frustrated by British attempts to restrict western 
settlement. Gage, meanwhile, was convinced such steps were necessary to maintain 
peace.  
Gage was angered by the perceived inaction of assemblies. He had expressed 
frustration at the shortcomings of the assemblies during Pontiac’s War when only New 
Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania provided any troops.70 Gage had 
further been enraged by accounts of the violence of frontiersmen whilst the British were 
attempting to negotiate an end to Pontiac’s War. He had informed the governors of 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia that: 
I must leave to your Determination what Steps it will be Necessary to 
take to pacify the Indians, and to give them Satisfaction for the Murder 
of the Shawnese in Augusta County, Something will be proper to be 
done in it, or We shall be in Danger of losing all the Fruits of our 
Expeditions and Treaty’s.71 
Gage was concerned the violence might make it impossible to come to a peace with the 
Indians. He further believed the actions of the Paxton Boys (who attacked and killed 
twenty Conestoga Indians in two separate attacks in December 1763 before marching 
towards Pennsylvania the following month to protest the government) and the fact they 
faced no punishment for their actions, instead gaining concessions from the assembly, 
had encouraged similar violent acts.  
 Frustration continued after Pontiac’s War. Although some assemblies passed 
laws forbidding settlement on Indian lands they made no effort to remove those who 
disobeyed either their own laws or the Proclamation of 1763. A law enacted by the 
Pennsylvanian assembly in 1768 threatened execution to anyone illegally occupying 
Indian lands, but Gage doubted it would have any effect unless backed by a strong 
military presence to forcibly remove those breaking the law.72 The failure of the colonies 
to take responsibility for the management of Indian trade after 1768 led to further Indian 
discontent and forced the army to absorb most of the costs of Indian affairs. To Gage, the 
assemblies were displaying imperial disloyalty and he urged the government to persuade 
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them to contribute, exclaiming that “if the Americans will not pay, to save their own 
Scalps, they deserve to lose them.”73 Colonial assemblies did not want to begin absorbing 
the costs of managing a system that had, since the war, been covered by Parliament. 
Further, the legislatures were motivated by self-interest. Those who had little contact with 
Native Americans saw no value in contributing to a common fund or agreeing regulations 
for Indian affairs, whilst others believed they could strike the best deal if negotiating 
individually with the various tribes and nations. Colonial governors did not believe that 
the assemblies could be induced to create a uniform system of Indian management, and 
in the wake of opposition to the Townshend Acts and the reestablishment of colonial non-
importation, the ministry proved unwilling to encourage them to hold a general congress 
regarding the issue.74 Indian complaints about trade continued, while the British 
continued to bear the expenses of managing Indian affairs and compensating Indians to 
prevent a rupture in British-Indian relations. Gage, in common with other British 
officials, regularly complained of the inaction of colonial assemblies, accusing them of 
being self-interested and ignorant about imperial security. Accusing colonial authorities 
of purposefully disrupting the service, Gage exhibited the paradigm shift that caused the 
colonists to be seen not as Britons but as disloyal ‘others’ within the empire. Such a shift 
had begun under Loudoun during the French and Indian War and was solidified in its 
aftermath. At the same time as frontier settlers believed the British were failing to respect 
their rights as Britons by protecting the Indians at their expense, Gage and the British 
Army were ‘othering’ the colonists as they failed to display the necessary subjection and 
obedience to imperial authority.  
Thomas Gage placed much of the blame for frontier violence on the colonists, not 
only due to their Indian hating but also for continuing land encroachment which enticed 
the Indians to violence. On several occasions both Gage and Johnson highlighted the ill-
conduct of the settlers, suggesting their actions threatened to bring on a general conflict. 
In 1771 Gage claimed that “The Inhabitants on the Frontiers I think in general, have 
occasioned almost every Serious Quarrell we have had with the Indians, by encroaching 
upon their Lands or intruding in their hunting Grounds.”75 He did not think the Indians 
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had been blameless in disputes, as repeated theft of settlers’ livestock had increased 
suspicion of Indians. However, often the British placed blame upon the colonists for 
causing disputes in the interior, arguing that if the colonists caused a war then the British 
Army ought to stay out of it. In 1774 Gage noted his approval of the removal of the army 
from the interior, as “If the King has no posts in the interior country the vagabonds must 
themselves support the mischief they are creating and which our posts cannot prevent.”76  
Gage supported colonists and natives settling disputes amongst themselves. He 
encouraged his officers to treat the Indians with civility and kindness, hoping that if they 
were provoked to conflict they would “let their resentment fall upon the guilty.”77 This 
suggests that Gage believed the frontiersmen who attacked Indians and illegally settled 
in the interior had forfeited the rights and protections they were due as British subjects. 
If the colonists failed to demonstrate adherence to the Crown by enabling the army’s 
accommodation of Native Americans, Gage felt no responsibility to protect them should 
their actions provoke war. Both he and other British imperial agents began to equate 
frontier settlers more with Native Americans than with Britons at home, as highlighted 
by the language adopted. Illegal settlers were “lawless banditti” whilst Indian traders 
were often labelled “lawless and licentious”. In contrast, Indians were less often 
described as “savages” than as “drunken and insolent”.78 Language reminiscent of 
rebellion and savagery, previously used in both Scotland and North America, although 
never to describe colonial settlers, was also used to describe both groups. All who 
committed murders in the interior, whether Indians or settlers, were described as 
“villains” who acted in a “wantonly cruel” or “barbaric” manner.79 The British Army 
labelled both groups as uncivilised, suggesting that the frontier inhabitants had regressed 
from a state of civilisation to barbarism.  
Gage had been explicitly clear that he did not view the backcountry settlers as 
Britons but rather as disloyal ‘others’ failing to show due submission to British authority 
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in his response to frontier violence in Pennsylvania that had been sparked by the Paxton 
Boys’ murder of the Conestoga Indians in late 1763. He had informed Governor Penn: 
If any Shadow of Law or Justice remains in Pensylvania, I am confident 
that you will leave no Method untried, to bring these Lawless Villains 
to condign Punishment. I have not heard that any Man has been killed, 
and it may therefore be better that the Officer prevented His Men from 
Firing; but if he had returned the fire of those Ruffians, and killed as 
many as he was able, I conceive He would have Acted consistent with 
the Laws of his Own, and of every other Civilized Country.80 
Gage suggested that the Pennsylvanian frontiersmen were rebels and traitors and that, as 
such, the army officer involved in the incident would have been within his rights to punish 
them with death whilst they were openly in arms. By emphasising that such action was 
within the laws of all civilised countries, he further suggested that the frontiersmen 
themselves were not civilised and were acting in a way consistent with savagery. To 
Gage, this again justified the use of lethal force as he had witnessed earlier in his career 
in Scotland and North America. As the army continued to encounter problems with 
interior settlers, colonial governors and government officials also highlighted the settlers’ 
failure to act with due submission to the Crown, describing them as being guilty of 
inhuman barbarities.81 When they could not restore order through legal methods such as 
the arrest and trial of those suspected of murder or illegal settlement, British imperial 
agents appeared willing to use troops against settlers, utilising similar tactics as they had 
previously against Scottish Highlanders and Native Americans to try and gain the total 
submission of groups of disloyal ‘others’. Whilst the colonists generally were still viewed 
as subjects of the Crown and Native Americans still did not enjoy the full rights of 
subjects, Thomas Gage and many within the British Army demonstrated the paradigm 
shift that influenced how they identified colonists. Lines of distinction between frontier 
inhabitants and Native Americans were blurred as colonists were treated as having 
forfeited the rights and protections they were due as British subjects. Further, both groups 
were viewed as distinct from Britons and rather were viewed as populations of ‘others’ 
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whom the British had to effectively manage to prevent a conflict which threatened 
imperial security. 
IV. The Imperial Crisis, 1765-75 
Calls for the reform of colonial affairs had originated in the late 1740s, with initial 
steps taken by the Board of Trade during the Earl of Halifax’s presidency. War 
interrupted the Board of Trade’s programme, and its powers were curtailed by Secretary 
of State William Pitt in the early 1760s, but the difficulties faced by various commanders-
in-chief during the war led to further calls for the implementation of a uniform system of 
governance and a more authoritative imperial policy. This continued in the aftermath of 
the war as Thomas Gage and others hoped to strengthen royal authority in the colonies. 
However, the ministry’s imperial priorities in the aftermath of the war centred on security 
and economy: protecting Britain’s territorial gains by stationing regulars in North 
America and reducing military expenditure through a colonial contribution to the cost. In 
addition, the post-war period was one of political instability with five men holding the 
position of First Lord of the Treasury in the seven years after the fall of John Stuart, Earl 
of Bute, in April 1763.82 As such, rather than a root and branch reform of colonial affairs, 
various ministries focused their efforts on economy, seeking to tax the colonists to 
contribute to imperial defence.83 Colonial opposition to the 1765 Stamp Act, combined 
with a change of ministry, caused Parliament to repeal the measure whilst simultaneously 
asserting its authority to legislate for the colonies through the 1766 Declaratory Act. The 
legislation of 1764 and 1765 forced colonists to consider constitutional questions, leading 
them to re-evaluate the imperial relationship.84 Although opposition to British measures 
was not universal, it was widespread, and the belief that Parliament did not have the 
authority to tax the colonists because the colonists were not represented in Parliament 
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drove protests.85 Recognising that the cost of keeping the army in the colonies had been 
an important contributing factor to the decision to tax the colonists, opposition to the 
army also began to increase from 1765. Colonists argued that the late war had been fought 
for British, not colonial, aims and that the presence of the army was of no benefit to the 
older colonies, so they ought not to be expected to contribute towards its upkeep.86 
Further attempts to tax the colonists were met with opposition, influencing the decision 
to move soldiers to the east, ensuring that militarisation impinged more directly upon 
colonists’ lives. The initial aim of militarisation in the eastern seaboard colonies was 
notably different from that in Scotland, Canada, and the interior as the colonists had not 
been at war with Britain and therefore did not require pacifying. However, as Parliament 
attempted to assert its sovereignty, Thomas Gage came to view the colonists as a potential 
threat to imperial security and over the following decade the British Army was expected 
to pacify hostile colonists to ensure imperial security, although by late 1774 Gage had 
actively begun to prepare for the possibility of conflict.  
Thomas Gage and Imperial Reform 
Thomas Gage was responsible for continuing the process of militarisation in 
North America from 1764, which increasingly focused on the eastern seaboard colonies 
due to the developing imperial crisis and the adoption of a policy of retrenchment in the 
West. In addition, he was expected to keep the ministry informed of the political situation 
in the colonies. Throughout the pre-revolutionary period, as well as acting as an imperial 
agent, Gage acted as an imperial reformer. His earlier experiences with a hostile 
population in Scotland and working with recalcitrant colonists in North America led him 
to believe that reform of the relationship between the mother-country and the colonies 
was necessary to ensure imperial security and guarantee colonial loyalty. Both this belief 
and Gage’s ideas regarding the steps the government ought to take were developed 
throughout the imperial crisis in response to his experiences implementing militarisation 
and the army’s interactions with colonists. Gage’s ideas for reform were similar to those 
of Massachusetts governor Francis Bernard as well as the earlier ideas of reformers that 
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had inspired Halifax.87 All these imperial reformers warned that Britain was in danger of 
losing the colonies if action was not taken to impose a uniform system of governance, 
strengthen the hand of royal authority, and assert parliamentary authority.88  
The ideas for reform emerging in the post-war period had their origins in Halifax’s 
earlier programme but the developing constitutional crisis and personal preference led to 
variations in the ideas put forward. Francis Bernard, in a pamphlet written in 1764 and 
adapted the following year, emphasised Parliament’s supremacy and proposed the 
extension of royal authority through the establishment of a civil list. Whilst Bernard 
accepted the colonies were virtually represented in Parliament he embraced the 
possibility of giving them formal parliamentary representation, and he also raised the 
possibility of an inter-colonial union. Likewise, although he acknowledged Parliament 
had the right to tax colonists, Bernard suggested it would be prudent for the provincial 
legislators to be given the responsibility of raising internal taxes.89 Although some of 
Bernard’s suggestions received the support of individual ministers at various points 
during the imperial crisis, most of his ideas were quietly ignored in London.90 Other key 
imperial reformers, including Bernard’s lieutenant and successor Thomas Hutchinson 
and his predecessor Thomas Pownall, agreed with some aspects of Bernard’s plan whilst 
putting forward ideas of their own. Neither agreed that the colonists were virtually 
represented. Hutchinson believed this meant Parliament ought not to impose taxes on the 
colonies, whether internal or external, and rather should defer to the colonial legislatures 
for such matters, whilst Pownall emphasised that colonials were entitled to the same 
rights as Britons at home.91 Bernard recognised some of the same colonial rights 
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emphasised by Hutchinson and Pownall but his focus was on Parliament’s supremacy 
over the colonists and its right of taxation, even if he felt it imprudent to introduce 
taxation in 1764. This led Bernard to view colonial assertions of no taxation without 
representation and challenges to parliamentary authority as precursors to rebellion.  
Thomas Gage’s understanding of the imperial relationship was much closer to 
that of Bernard than of Hutchinson or Pownall and was influenced by the cultural 
paradigm of loyalty. Gage favoured asserting colonial dependence on the mother country 
and strengthening royal authority to encourage colonists to demonstrate due submission 
to the Crown. He was convinced of the supremacy of Parliament and was therefore of the 
opinion that Parliament had the right to tax and legislate for the colonists as it saw fit.92 
Unlike Bernard, he had no qualms about the timing chosen to implement taxation and 
saw no reason for inter-colonial union or parliamentary representation for colonists. Gage 
was more explicit about the colonial situation and his beliefs for imperial reform than is 
generally suggested in the historiography, where he is often accused of weakly presiding 
over the imperial situation and failing to properly inform the ministry about colonial 
opposition. He was guarded in his communications as he knew he would be held 
accountable if an idea he suggested failed. Further, he was aware of the unstable nature 
of British politics at that time and recognised that extreme views could lead to his recall 
upon a ministerial reshuffle. Despite these challenges, Gage repeatedly emphasised 
Parliament’s supremacy and right of taxation. He also argued in favour of strong 
legislative measures and a show of military strength to keep the colonies properly 
subjected and remove colonial opposition.  
During the Stamp Act crisis of 1765-66, Gage first hinted at three separate, yet 
connected, themes regarding the political situation in the colonies and the issue of 
imperial reform. These themes, again influenced by the loyalty paradigm, would be 
developed throughout the imperial crisis as he returned to them repeatedly in his 
correspondence. The first theme was Gage’s concern that the colonists were attempting 
to assert their independency from the Crown and taking steps towards an open rebellion 
against imperial authority. Writing to General Robert Monckton, outgoing governor of 
New York, Gage asserted that: 
The Province never declared their Sentiments of Independency so 
openly before and they state their Grievances, (if in reality they have 
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any) in such a way that I do not see how it will be possible to relieve 
them. They push matters so closely to the Point, that the Subject seems 
to be, whether they are Independent states, or Colonys dependent on 
Great Britain.93 
Gage believed the Stamp Act riots were evidence of colonial disloyalty and required a 
strong response from the ministry to assert parliamentary authority and colonial 
dependency. Gage remained in favour of Parliament imposing taxes upon the colonies 
rather than allowing the colonists to establish their own revenue collection measures. He 
would continue to warn imperial agents in the colonies and government officials about 
the independency in the minds of the colonists throughout the imperial crisis.  
The second, related theme of Gage’s correspondence was his frustration at the 
civil authorities for not calling for military aid and his desire for a punitive response to 
episodes of colonial disorder. He believed military intimidation would cause the colonists 
to demonstrate imperial loyalty, informing Barrington that: 
No Requisition has been made of Me for assistance, which I, must 
acknowledge I have been sorry for, as the disturbances which have 
happened, have been so much beyond riots, and so like the forerunners 
of open Rebellion, that I have wanted a pretence to draw the troops 
together from every post they cou’d be taken from, that the Servants of 
the Crown might be enabled to make a stand in some spot, if matters 
should be brought to the Extremitys.94 
Gage believed it was only a short step from the present rioting to rebellion. Reliant upon 
information from Bernard to gauge the situation in Boston, Bernard’s fatalistic reporting 
of the two Stamp Act riots led the commander to believe that, even at that early stage, 
Bostonians were ready to rebel. As such, he wished for a strong military presence in the 
affected colonies to react if conflict did break out. Further, he believed the presence of 
the troops would intimidate the colonists into submission and would enable the 
implementation of the Stamp Act. This belief was strengthened by his experiences in the 
Highlands, where the presence of the military in potentially hostile regions had 
contributed to the restoration and continuation of peace since 1746. Whilst the colonists 
continued only to riot, Gage could not legally act without a request from civil authorities 
or a ministerial order. He was clear the colonists had not yet crossed the line into open 
rebellion that would allow him to act upon his own initiative and send in troops without 
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the approval of civil magistrates. Instead, he implicitly hinted to the ministry about the 
need for a military strategy to force the colonists to submit to parliamentary authority. 
The third theme first hinted at by Gage during the Stamp Act crisis and developed 
over the following decade was his understanding of the colonists’ identity. When 
highlighting the thoughts of independency amongst the rioters he inferred that the 
colonists did not view themselves as Britons but as Americans. He himself labelled them 
as Americans throughout the imperial crisis.95 Gage also suggested that the situation of 
governance in the colonies had been an important factor in causing the colonists to 
identify, and act, so differently to Britons at home. Amid the crisis he remarked to James 
Grant, governor of East Florida: 
I sincerely wish the Lands you have lately obtained may be settled by 
another Race of People, than those who inhabit the other parts of the 
Continent; And that Your present form of Government [by a governor 
and council], may never be changed to any that Shall Incline more to 
the Side of Democracy, We may then hope, that the Mother Country 
may in Time reckon, that She has One Loyal, and Affectionate Colony 
in America.96 
Emphasising colonial disloyalty and disaffection allowed Gage to make implicit 
reference to the inherent differences between the colonists and Britons, ‘othering’ the 
former. He believed that preventing governance by assembly in the new colonies was the 
best way to prevent those who settled in them from developing a similar disconnect with 
the mother-country. During the imperial crisis, and even after the Battles of Lexington 
and Concord, Gage viewed the colonists as subjects of the Crown. As subjects, he 
believed colonists were required to demonstrate their subjection and submission to the 
Crown and their failure to do so influenced the reforms he advocated. The fact he viewed 
the colonists as subjects also led him to proclaim that any attacks by colonists upon 
soldiers would be treated as an act of rebellion.  However, subjecthood was not 
synonymous with Britishness, as interactions with Scottish Highlanders and French-
Canadians had previously demonstrated. Prior to the war, colonists had generally been 
classified as Britons, the same as those living in Britain. However, Gage’s formative 
experiences led him to question that interpretation as early as 1765 and his attitude and 
                                                 
95 This is evident throughout the Gage Papers, American Series, at the William Clements Library.  
96 Gage to Grant, New York, 26 April 1766, Gage Papers, vol 51.  
217 
 
understanding would be developed further during the imperial crisis and reflected in the 
advice he gave the ministry regarding imperial reform and pacification.  
Militarisation 
Militarisation had begun in the older colonies during the French and Indian War, 
causing colonists to begin to question their place within the empire in response to 
requisitions for troops, supplies, etc. and to define their understanding of military and 
civil spaces in response to British requests for quarters. A backlash against the billeting 
of regulars, but not provincials, in private homes suggested the colonists viewed British 
soldiers as unwelcome aliens in their civil space and led to sustained barrack building 
efforts in numerous colonies throughout the course of the war. This separated regulars 
from the civilian population but in turn blurred the division between military and civil 
spheres within the city at large. Although this led to tension and instances of violence 
between soldiers and colonists, it also ensured the colonial cities and towns that played a 
sustained role in quartering the troops became martial spaces, largely reconciling 
themselves to the presence of soldiers.97 After the war, most troops were stationed within 
the newly conquered territories, Nova Scotia, or throughout the interior. However, the 
army’s headquarters remained at Albany, New York, and small numbers of troops also 
remained in Philadelphia, Charleston, and New York City. These troops had to be 
quartered and supplied by the province and all colonies were expected to quarter and 
supply regulars passing through. Whilst Pontiac’s War continued Gage also requested the 
colonies raise provincials and provide and transport supplies to the interior posts.  
The Proclamation of 1763 signalled that the British Army had taken control over 
the interior, but Thomas Gage and the ministry believed the colonies continued to share 
responsibility for protecting it. In addition, Gage believed the colonies ought to support 
those troops who remained garrisoned in colonial towns as the wider purpose of retaining 
the army in North America was to secure the region, which benefitted the colonists as 
well as Britain. Colonial assemblies and civilians, however, recovering from a long and 
economically damaging conflict, did not consider it their responsibility to provide men 
or supplies to overcome rebellion in a region that the Proclamation banned them from 
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settling in or reaping financial reward from.98 They likewise generally disagreed that they 
should be required to quarter or supply troops stationed in their own colonies when they 
did not believe there was any need for them to be there: the threat lay in the newly 
acquired territories and in the interior and so British troops ought to only be kept in those 
regions.99  
The army had frequently encountered difficulties securing quarters for the 
regulars during the French and Indian War. The threat of taking quarters by force had 
proved successful, if contentious, under Loudoun whilst in the later years the ministry 
allowed the colonies to pass their own annual Mutiny Acts which, combined with the fact 
regulars were generally stationed in towns boasting barracks, removed many complaints. 
Gage did not think such a solution was sustainable in peacetime as the older colonies felt 
secure enough to refuse to pass annual bills.100 This was apparent in both Albany and 
New York City as early as 1764. In Albany, the colonists pulled down buildings and 
objected to the presence of troops in the city, whilst in New York City the mayor refused 
to provide firewood for troops waiting for ships to return them to England, citing the lack 
of a Mutiny Act for his action.101 As such, Gage recommended the alteration of the 
Mutiny Act and its extension to North America, or the drafting of a new law specifically 
for the colonies that would allow him to quarter troops in barracks, public houses, or 
private homes depending on the army’s requirements. His desire to include a section 
permitting the quartering of troops in private homes stemmed from a wish to have one 
law governing quartering in all the North American colonies, old and new, and a 
recognition that in areas without barracks or sufficient public houses, like Montréal and 
St. Augustine, billeting in private homes remained a necessity. The ministry responded 
with the American Mutiny Act or Quartering Act, in 1765, although they removed any 
reference to the quartering of troops in private homes in response to opposition from 
colonial agents and members of parliament. As such, the act failed to answer the purpose 
Gage had hoped it would. The Quartering Act explicitly ordered colonial civil authorities 
to quarter the troops in barracks where available and, where not, first in public houses 
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and then in uninhabited houses, barns, and buildings. Its seventh provision ordered 
assemblies to pay for certain necessities for soldiers whilst they were quartered within 
the colony.102 Quartering represented the militarisation of North America, and it would 
become a more difficult aspect of the process as colonial opposition to the presence of 
the army increased in response to British taxation.  
Colonists were against the Quartering Act as they feared it was a method of 
forcing upon them troops they did not believe they required. Further, when details of the 
Stamp Act became widely known colonists linked the two acts, claiming both sought to 
collect taxes to finance a standing army that threatened their liberty.103 Until 1766 only 
approximately one hundred soldiers were garrisoned in the old colonies in New York 
City, Albany, and Charleston. That year another three regiments were sent into garrison 
in Philadelphia, New Jersey, and New York. Pennsylvania immediately complied with 
the Quartering Act whilst New Jersey complied with most of its provisions. Gage 
continued to encounter problems in New York, however. In 1765 he informed Secretary 
of State Henry Seymour Conway that whilst the assembly had not directly rejected the 
act, they were doing all in their power to evade it: refusing to pay for supplies for troops 
quartered in barracks they argued belonged to the Crown, agreeing to pay marching 
expenses but only after the expense had been incurred, and agreeing to pay for firewood 
but ignoring all the act’s other provisions.104  
Gage also had problems requisitioning supplies from the southern colonies. The 
Quartering Act left the British Army responsible for the costs of quartering and supplying 
the army in the interior but required the colonies in closest proximity to pay for the 
transportation of men, provisions, and military stores to the forts.105 Georgia’s assembly 
initially refused compliance with the Quartering Act, relenting only when Gage 
threatened to remove the regulars from the province. South Carolina, meanwhile, refused 
to comply with the Quartering Act and pay transportation costs, but the assembly did 
obey its own quartering law which provided salt, clothing, and military stores for the 
regulars in its interior forts at a great saving to the Crown. It also provided regular grants 
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to maintain the posts.106 The cost of militarisation in that region was partly met by the 
colonies but the experience highlighted colonial willingness to undermine British 
authority. At that juncture, Gage was willing to accept colonies like South Carolina and 
New York subverting parliamentary authority as he was still able to continue the 
militarisation of the country. However, Gage was worried that no colony would continue 
to cover quartering costs for much longer. This helped convince him of the necessity of 
imperial reform that would force the colonies to adhere to parliamentary legislation. 
Warning Secretary at War Lord Barrington that the colonies continued to test the limits 
of imperial authority in January 1766, he urged the vigorous implementation of acts of 
parliament to assert authority over them.107 
Gage had ultimate authority, and therefore bore ultimate responsibility, for 
decisions about the army taken in the colonies. He could station troops wherever he 
thought appropriate but could not set his troops against civilians without explicit 
instructions from the magistrates. As such, he sent troops to Albany in 1765 at the request 
of Lieutenant Governor Cadwallader Colden to quell disorders, although the civil 
magistrates did not call for their use during the Stamp Act crisis.108 The following year 
New York’s civil magistrates did request a regiment to quell riots in Duchess County. 
Informing Secretary of State Conway of an incident in July 1766, Gage noted a skirmish 
had taken place between soldiers and rioters, with a small number killed or wounded on 
either side. The ringleaders were imprisoned, and the magistrate commended “the 
Regiment greatly, as well for their Spirit and readiness in Apprehending the Rioters as 
for the Strictness of their Discipline.”109 By September the presence of the army had 
helped pacify the province and Gage removed the extra troops he had sent there the 
previous year. Generally, however, civil magistrates and even colonial governors refused 
to request the use of troops to quell disorders in case doing so provoked violence.  
As well as his legal responsibility, Gage had orders from Whitehall only to use 
force as a last resort and to encourage civil, rather than military, resolutions to 
disturbances.110 This left him largely powerless to act in response to the disturbances over 
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colonial taxation in 1765. Gage was, however, proactive in ordering his subordinates to 
act should the colonists cross the line from mobbing and rioting into open rebellion. In 
1766 he instructed Major Browne in New York: 
…if these Sons of Liberty fire upon You, You will not then trouble 
yourself about Orders, [and] I am to desire if they dare fire upon the 
King’s Troops, [and] become Rebels that You will give them a good 
Dressing, [and] beat these Sons of Liberty into Loyal Subjects.111 
Gage was explicit that if colonists attacked the army in its role as an instrument of empire 
then they were rebels and the army was justified, in accordance with the rules of warfare, 
in killing or capturing them as the situation allowed. Highlighting their disloyalty, he 
emphasised the need for swift, punitive measures, as the army had pursued in the 
Highlands, as the best method of restoring peace and bringing the colonists back into a 
state of due submission. The apparent success of such measures ensuring peace in the 
Highlands and encouraging the loyalty of that population provided a clear precedent for 
Gage in North America. His advocation of military intimidation, which would continue 
over the following years, suggests he believed the Rockingham ministry had erred in its 
decision to repeal the Stamp Act and that it ought to have been enforced by the army. 
However, Gage was determined not to provoke rebellion and ordered his troops to behave 
with the strictest regard to discipline. He was also determined that the troops would not 
be used by civil authorities for their own ends. When Lieutenant Governor Colden was 
forced to take shelter in Fort George with a military guard, where he was repeatedly 
surrounded by Stamp Act rioters, Gage warned Colden that ordering the soldiers to fire 
upon the mob would likely provoke a general insurrection.112 He was determined not to 
risk a general conflict stemming from the army being used improperly by civil authorities 
and to ensure his troops only responded to incidents that directly threatened imperial 
authority.  
By 1767 the Chatham ministry was ready to move further away from an empire 
of negotiation and towards one of closer regulation with parliamentary supremacy 
established, like imperial reformers such as Gage and Bernard had been advocating. 
Aware of New York’s continued resistance to the Quartering Act, Parliament 
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implemented the New York Restraining Act and signalled its desire that any disobedient 
colonies be pacified through legislative measures, militarisation and, if necessary, 
military action.113 The move towards punitive measures in London emboldened Gage in 
his demand for full compliance with the Quartering Act and by 1768 most colonies were 
requisitioning supplies for troops stationed within them, even if they refused to admit 
parliamentary authority when doing so. Many colonists were angry at being forced to 
comply with the Quartering Act through the threat of their assembly being suspended and 
when the Townshend Acts (1767-68) introduced new taxes on various items they again 
protested being asked to finance the stationing of regulars amongst them when such 
troops threatened their liberty.114 The colonial disorders in the wake of the Townshend 
Acts solidified Gage’s opinion that the colonists were acting disloyally and moving 
towards independence and he informed Barrington that he believed they would only 
acknowledge the King of Britain as their King as long as it remained convenient to do 
so.115 
During the period 1765-68, Gage came to believe that Boston was the centre of 
colonial unrest and supported Massachusetts Governor Francis Bernard’s calls for troops 
to be sent there. Discussing recent attacks on customs commissioners in Boston in June 
1768, Gage suggested that if the people of England reacted to the news with indignation 
then he believed the ministry could “not Act with too much Vigour…the Moderation and 
Forbearance hitherto shewn by Great Britain, has been Construed into Timidity, and 
served only to raise Sedition and Mutiny, to a higher Pitch”116 Claiming moderation had 
failed, he advocated a strategy of military intimidation and, if required, punitive measures 
to gain colonial submission. Based in New York, Gage relied upon the reports of 
governors as to the state of their provinces, so his opinion about the generally rebellious 
state of Boston was shaped by Governor Bernard. Bernard’s manufacturing of a sense of 
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crisis was instrumental in influencing Gage’s opinion that Bostonians were ready to stage 
an armed insurrection and required military pacification to restore order, as well as the 
ministry’s decision to send troops to the town.117 Bernard had wanted to use troops to 
reassert royal authority during the Stamp Act crisis, although he ultimately decided 
against such a move. He continued to petition the ministry with reports of the failings of 
royal authority in his province and again requested troops to restore order in the wake of 
opposition to the Townshend Acts in 1768.118 The ministry ordered Gage to send two 
regiments from Nova Scotia and sent another two regiments from Ireland in the wake of 
the attacks on Boston’s customs commissioners. Demonstrating agreement with 
Bernard’s assessment of the situation in Boston, Gage praised the ministry’s decision to 
send the troops, claiming it had caused the Bostonians, and the colonists more generally, 
to calm their protestations. He also used it as evidence to support his developing strategy 
of military intimidation, and force if necessary, arguing that such a response was the best 
way to quell the “Spirit of Sedition, which has so long and so greatly prevailed here.”119 
The British occupation of Boston led colonists to question why so many British 
troops were quartered there rather than in the new colonies or in the interior, increasing 
opposition to the presence of the army. This encouraged further disobedience of the 
Quartering Act and increased civil-military tension.120 This was not limited to the New 
England colonies as although South Carolina was no longer at the expense of supplying 
the interior forts due to retrenchment, in 1769 the assembly refused to quarter regulars in 
Charleston as per the stipulations in the Quartering Act.121 Bostonians meanwhile, who 
had rarely been troubled with the necessity of quartering troops, argued that the British 
decision to station troops in the town was designed to oppress them. Whilst the assembly 
ignored the Quartering Act and refused to pay for necessities, the council invoked it to 
their advantage to frustrate the army. They refused to find buildings to quarter the troops, 
arguing the act stipulated they were to be housed in public inns after the barracks were 
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full.122 Gage refused to utilise quartering in inns due to concern it would cause violence 
between civilians and soldiers, but his seizure of disused buildings led to complaints he 
had ignored the act and arbitrarily quartered his troops amongst the populace. In 1769, 
Gage highlighted his lack of trust in the civil authorities to act in the imperial interest, 
suggesting disloyalty was inherent in all levels of colonial society. He claimed that he 
“foresaw from the Beginning the Oppression and Tyranny that would be exercised over 
the troops by the Civil Magistrates; and was not without Apprehension that it might be 
carried such lengths as to drive the soldiers to an open Revolt.”123 
Newspapers reported the damaging impact of the occupation on the city and 
played an important role in exporting colonial grievances from province to province. 
They were often guilty of exaggerating reports and focusing entirely on violence on the 
part of soldiers. In 1769 Lt. Col. William Dalrymple, commander of the troops in Boston, 
informed Gage of a quarrel between civilians in which no soldiers had been involved. 
Gage noted it gave him: “very great pleasure that you say none of the military were 
concerned in the fray, though the newspapers would make people believe they were, and 
that swords were drawn.”124 Such articles added to the narrative of the oppression of the 
army which remained a feature of colonial discontent during the imperial crisis. In both 
Boston and New York, the posting of troops as sentries increased the visibility of the 
army and, correspondingly, increased interactions and tensions between soldiers and 
civilians without helping to maintain order in the city.125 Colonists and soldiers frequently 
mocked and jeered one another, and violence regularly broke out between the two groups.  
The difficulties the army faced in Boston during its occupation of the city left 
Gage convinced of the need for stronger measures to remove what he perceived as 
entrenched colonial disloyalty. He encouraged Parliament to give the King power to 
nominate the members of the governor’s council in Massachusetts and to appoint colonial 
magistrates. He believed this would make the holders of these positions loyal subjects 
who would do their duty and call on the aid of the military when necessary.126 When 
Parliament did not adopt the measures he suggested, and in fact partially repealed the 
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Townshend Duties, Gage accused the Grafton and North ministries of ceding to all 
colonial demands and failing to apprehend the leaders of the “Seditious” movement in 
Boston.127 It would not be until 1774, after he had returned to England on leave and 
discussed the situation in the colonies in person with the King and several ministers, that 
Parliament would implement measures that resembled some of the strategies Gage had 
been advocating.  
The colonists’ reaction to the Townshend Duties also solidified Gage’s 
understanding that they were not Britons but rather potentially hostile ‘others’ who 
represented a significant threat to the British Empire. Discussing the non-importation 
agreement and a concern that colonists might attack British merchant ships, Gage 
informed Lt. Col. Dalrymple in Boston that: 
If any Accident happens to the Goods, the Proprietors will from their 
Consequence at Home, be better able to procure redress, and shew the 
British Nation the American Provinces are no longer British, for French 
or Spaniards would do no more upon the Eve of a War with Great 
Britain, than to prohibit all Trade with her.128 
Gage had already made it clear that he believed the colonists were not Britons and he had 
come to view and treat them simply as one more group of imperial ‘others’. However, 
this letter not only provides explicit evidence of his own attitude but also his hope that 
the people of Britain would come to accept this interpretation. It suggests Gage believed 
a change in attitude amongst the ministry and public was required before the ministry 
would pursue the punitive path he believed necessary to subjugate the colonists and 
restore imperial order. He continued to emphasise the ‘otherness’ of the colonists 
throughout the imperial crisis, making it clear he did not view them as partners in a 
negotiated empire as the colonists had believed they were, but rather as subordinates 
equal in status to the French-Canadians and Native Americans who also comprised 
Britain’s North American Empire.  
Civil-military tension culminated in the Battle of Golden Hill, New York, on 19 
January 1770 and the Boston Massacre of 5 March 1770. Whilst no one was killed in the 
earlier engagement, in Boston British soldiers killed five civilians after firing upon them 
without orders in a state of confusion whilst under attack by clubs, stones, and snowballs 
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from a mob. It led to the immediate removal of the troops to Castle Island and eventually 
out of Massachusetts altogether.129 The Boston Massacre was the bloodiest episode of 
military-civilian violence prior to the outbreak of the American Revolution and both it 
and the Battle of Golden Hill contributed to growing anti-redcoat settlement. Whilst it 
did not lead to the removal of troops from all cities in the older colonies, it caused most 
colonists to view the British Army as a foreign presence and increased resistance to the 
Quartering Act. In turn, Thomas Gage increased the number of troops quartered in the 
new colonies and threatened to remove troops from colonies including New Jersey and 
New York if the assemblies refused to supply them.130 The army had been sent to Boston 
to police the city and pacify the colonists in the wake of demonstrations against British 
authority. Whilst it seemed they had achieved this aim by 1769, Bostonians remained 
opposed to their presence and the massacre provided the spark to facilitate their removal. 
Gage was left frustrated at the situation in Boston, but he remained convinced that the 
presence of the army in the thirteen colonies was necessary to ensure imperial security.  
The Boston Massacre, and the anti-redcoat sentiment it encouraged, strengthened 
Gage’s belief that the colonists were but one step away from rebellion and he suggested 
it was necessary that the military authorities in North America be granted increased 
powers. He claimed the current situation left the army of little use in any colony for 
quelling disorder due to the reluctance of the civil magistrates to employ them for that 
purpose. He informed Hillsborough that: 
When the Troops first arrived indeed at Boston, the People were kept 
in some awe by them; but they soon discovered, that Troops were 
bound by the Constitutional Laws, and could only Act under the 
Authority, and by the Orders of the Civil Magistrates; who were all of 
their Side. And they recommenced their Riots, tho’ two or three 
Regiments were in Town, with the Same unbridled Licentiousness as 
before.131 
Gage’s initial hope that the sending of troops to Boston would be enough to intimidate 
the colonists into displaying due submission to the Crown had proven false. He 
complained that civil authorities were often on the same side as the rioters and refused to 
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call for military aid to maintain or restore order. This suggests a desire for greater powers, 
so the military could bypass disloyal civil magistrates. Gage had previously made it clear 
he would have no hesitation ordering the troops to fire upon rebels in accordance with 
the rules of war, but his correspondence highlights he continued to feel unable to act pre-
emptively whilst colonists remained on the side of rioting rather than rebellion. Instead, 
he requested a ministerial order that would provide military authority to bring the 
colonists into line. The cultural paradigm of loyalty ensured that his primary concern, as 
an agent of empire, was the management of various populations within the empire, their 
submission to the Crown, and their compliance with imperial directives.  
The Coercive Acts of 1774 were implemented in response to continuing colonial 
refutations of parliamentary supremacy and the Boston Tea Party of December 1773, 
when colonists protested the 1773 Tea Act by dumping tea from East India Company 
ships into the harbour.132 The Coercive Acts closed the port of Boston and removed the 
customs house to Salem until the town agreed to pay compensation for the tea. The acts 
also moved powers from the assembly to the governor, asserted imperial control over the 
selection of assemblymen, provided Gage with further powers regarding quartering, and 
allowed trials for certain crimes to take place in England.133 The assertion of imperial 
control and the removal of powers from the hands of the assembly to the governor were 
steps that Gage and other imperial reformers had repeatedly urged. Gage’s appointment 
as Governor of Massachusetts merged the military and civil commands, giving him 
greater powers to use the troops to curb colonial violence, although the ministry 
continued to advocate violence only as a last resort.134 However, by 1774 the situation 
had deteriorated, and disaffection was far more general than the ministry, and even the 
commander-in-chief, recognised. The colonies united in their opposition to what they 
termed the Intolerable Acts and re-established their continental congress and non-
importation agreements.135 Taking up residence in Boston, Gage concentrated 
approximately two thousand troops in that city in response to Massachusetts’s failure to 
adhere to the Massachusetts Government Act. Delaying pre-emptive military action, he 
nonetheless prepared for hostilities, requesting more troops from Britain. Informing 
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Secretary of State Lord Dartmouth that the people of Boston were talking of setting up 
their own government, he blamed the situation on the failure of successive ministries to 
take vigorous action and suggested that nothing less than the total conquest of the New 
England provinces would ensure obedience to the Coercive Acts.136 As he awaited 
reinforcements, Gage questioned how many French-Canadians and Indians Guy 
Carleton, governor of Quebec, would likely be able to raise if war broke out,137 exhibiting 
a willingness to use ‘other’ imperial populations to pacify hostile colonists.  
At the same time as Gage consolidated his forces in Boston, he once again 
‘othered’ the colonists. In 1774, a committee ordered by the continental congress accused 
the British Army of preparing for war against the colonists. In response Gage claimed 
that it was “highly exasperating, as well as ungenerous even to hint that the Lives, 
Liberties, or Property’s of any Persons except avowed Enemies are in Danger from 
Britons; Britain can never harbor the black Design of wantonly destroying or enslaving 
any People on Earth.”138 Disputing the accusations of the committee with comments 
about Britain’s virtue and justice as a nation not only emphasised that the colonists were 
not considered Britons but also served as a warning that their lives and liberties would be 
in danger if they took their protests to the next stage and became enemies to the Crown. 
Gage’s militarisation of the eastern seaboard and his ideas for imperial reform were 
influenced by the paradigm shift that had caused him to view the colonists as ‘others’, 
and as potential rebels, by the late 1760s. Whilst the attitude of most Britons to the 
colonists only changed during the course of the Revolutionary War,139 the attitude of 
Thomas Gage, and many within the British Army in North America, had been 
significantly altered well before the conflict broke out.  
V. Conclusions  
Thomas Gage approached the pacification of Native Americans during and after 
Pontiac’s War in a different manner to his predecessor because he had a different 
understanding of that population’s place within the post-conquest British Empire. Whilst 
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Amherst had viewed Native Americans as militarily and culturally inferior and a 
conquered population, Gage recognised both the threat they posed and the independence 
from the Crown they continued to enjoy. Gage did not draw the same parallels of rebellion 
between Native Americans and Jacobites as Amherst, which left him with the 
understanding that a full military submission was required from those hostile Native 
Americans to tie them to British authority through recognition of the British King as their 
“father”. Recognising that diplomacy, not subjugation, was the best method of securing 
long-term peace in the interior, Gage sought to accommodate Native Americans within 
the expanded British Empire through the implementation of a fair Indian policy after the 
war. At the same time, militarisation of the interior provided a continuing threat should 
Native Americans attempt to renew the conflict. Whilst the British Army had not felt the 
need to accommodate Highlanders within the empire, militarisation, commercial reform, 
and steps designed to improve and enlighten the population bore resemblance to those 
taken in Scotland, highlighting the continuing influence of the Forty-Five on British 
imperialism in North America.  
Gage’s militarisation and governance of the West was driven by concerns of 
security and economy but was hampered by the ministerial indecision and rising colonial 
discontent. Gage kept the ministry informed of the situation in the interior and had some 
influence on ministerial policy, although his advice was by no means the only influencing 
factor. His advocacy of a policy of limited retrenchment in the West influenced the 
eventual decision to adopt a policy of retrenchment from 1768, which saw the army fully 
evacuated from the interior in 1774. The civility paradigm played a less important role in 
governing how the British defined imperial populations as a paradigm shift led to a 
different understanding of imperial loyalty that suggested populations could demonstrate 
continuing submission and adherence to the Crown without assimilation. Such a shift 
came about as a result of the army’s engagement in militarisation throughout the empire 
and in reaction to the changing composition of the empire in the wake of the French and 
Indian War. As such, whilst Native Americans continued to be viewed as ‘others’, they 
increasingly came to be regarded as an imperial population that had to be considered and 
accommodated and as generally equal in status to Highlanders, French-Canadians, and 
even colonial settlers. At the same time, another paradigm shift, begun under Loudoun, 
led Gage to view the colonists as fundamentally different from Britons at home. Whilst 
the British Army attempted to accommodate Native Americans by preventing colonial 
land encroachment and regulating settler-native trade, they failed to accommodate 
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colonial settlers within an imperial framework that did not accept their claims for western 
expansion. Gage blamed those who attacked Indians and illegally settled upon Indian 
lands for interior violence and believed that they had forfeited the rights and protections 
they were due as British subjects, further entrenching the view of colonists as ‘others’ in 
the eyes of the British Army in North America.  
Both paradigm shifts also influenced Gage’s attitude towards colonial settlers in 
the eastern seaboard and his opinion regarding how Britain ought to respond to the 
imperial crisis of 1765-75. Colonial opposition to the introduction of taxation caused 
Gage and the British Army to view the colonists as a potentially, and sometimes overtly, 
hostile population group that had to be successfully pacified to restore order and imperial 
authority in the British Empire. As early as 1765, Gage asserted the ‘otherness’ of the 
colonists when warning that they were taking serious steps to assert their independency 
from the Crown. He strongly supported Parliament’s decision to tax the colonists, firmly 
believing it had the authority to do so and he advocated strong legislative measures, as 
well as a show of military strength, to prevent rebellion. Suggesting the subjugation of 
the colonists was necessary to reassert parliamentary authority and encourage colonial 
loyalty, Gage demonstrated that he viewed the colonists as being but one step away from 
rebellion. The attitudes of Thomas Gage and the British Army were shaped by the process 
of militarisation in North America and their encounters not only with colonial settlers but 
also with French-Canadians and Native Americans. In addition, earlier experiences of 
militarisation in the Scottish Highlands provided a precedent for pacifying such 
population groups that represented a potential threat to the British Empire. When the 
British Army first went to North America the colonists were firmly viewed as Britons 
and were not thought to pose a threat to the future security of the empire, although there 
were some who warned of the possibility that the colonists would begin to make moves 
towards independence. The experiences of warfare, pacification, and militarisation over 
the following two decades had a profound effect on the army officers who lived through 
them. The colonists emerged from the French and Indian War believing that they had 
been partners in the great victory and with renewed confidence in the concept of empire 
by negotiation. However, years before the American Revolution broke out Thomas Gage 
and the British Army were determined that the colonists were ‘others’, not Britons, and 










This dissertation set out to examine how militarisation influenced the attitudes of 
British military officers towards various imperial population groups in the period from 
the Jacobite Uprising of 1745-46 to the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War in 
1775. Using a biographical, case-study approach, it examined the experiences and 
encounters of British Army officers in Scotland and North America, discussing the 
cultural paradigms that influenced their encounters with Scottish Highlanders, French-
Canadians, Native Americans, and colonial North American settlers. A qualitative 
investigation of private and official correspondence, military and government dispatches, 
and state papers illustrated the paradigm shifts affecting officers’ attitudes towards those 
they encountered, their opinions regarding imperial reform, and how they implemented 
empire in imperial fringes. Changes in attitude led officers to develop a markedly 
different understanding of imperial identity, and particularly the identity of colonial 
settlers, long before such a change became widespread in Britain. At the same time, 
paradigm shifts led officers to reconsider their conception of the imperial relationship and 
to advocate imperial reform whilst also affecting how they implemented militarisation, 
particularly pacification, on the ground as they sought to ensure imperial security.  
Focusing on the army’s implementation of militarisation rather than the financial and 
manpower costs of warfare provides a cultural understanding of the role these important 
agents of empire played in eighteenth-century imperial transformations.  
Militarisation strategy in North America during and after the French and Indian 
War highlights the lasting impact of the Forty-Five on British imperialism in North 
America. Fundamentally, the experiences of the Forty-Five provided a precedent for the 
army to draw upon and adapt in response to the unique conditions and challenges they 
faced in another imperial fringe. Waging war in Scotland provided the army with lessons 
about recruitment and military service, tactical adaptations and the use of irregular 
warfare, and supplying an army in a remote region that they took with them to North 
America during the French and Indian War. John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, 
found it necessary to negotiate with Highland elites to achieve his campaign goals in the 
Highlands and he used this principle in North America to try and encourage colonial 
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participation in the war effort through recruitment, military service, and quartering. Other 
officers and the Indian Superintendents likewise negotiated with Native Americans to 
persuade them to ally themselves with the British or to remain neutral, illustrating the 
impact of the Forty-Five on British actions during the French and Indian War.  
Army officers drew parallels of savagery between Highlanders, French-
Canadians, and Native Americans during periods of combat. Guided by the civility 
paradigm, characterising their enemy as savages sought to justify the army’s failure to 
adhere to the rules of warfare during fire and sword campaigns that did not distinguish 
between combatants and non-combatants. Such campaigns aimed to end conflicts, punish 
the entire population for the actions of those who had taken part, and force the total 
submission of the population to the Crown. Whilst the association of French-Canadians 
with savagery was only temporary, direct and lasting parallels were drawn between 
Highlanders and Native Americans. This led to the encouragement of indiscriminate 
violence and subjugation during war and as a method of pacification and the adoption of 
state-sponsored commercialisation and improvement measures in the longer-term.  
Cultural imperialism was implemented in the Highlands through militarisation. 
The maintenance of a significant military force in the region, coupled with the building 
and improving forts, roads, and bridges, ensured a military threat remained should the 
hostile population renew hostilities. Concurrently, opening the region to commercial and 
social influences from the Lowlands and England and establishing improvement 
initiatives sought to assimilate the population more closely within the British Empire, and 
thereby become and remain loyal to the Crown. Likewise, in North America 
militarisation first sought to prevent renewed hostilities from French-Canadians or Native 
Americans and mirrored the earlier process undertaken in Scotland. Adapted to suit the 
circumstances the army was confronted with after Pontiac’s War, Thomas Gage 
attempted to use militarisation strategy to accommodate Native Americans within the 
British Empire by controlling the actions of frontier inhabitants before removing the army 
from the interior altogether. Gage also attempted to control the actions of the colonists in 
the older colonies and prevent them from engaging in hostilities against the Crown when 
extending militarisation there from the mid-1760s, although this ultimately proved 
unsuccessful at preventing rebellion.  
Thomas Gage’s belief that militarisation was the best strategy to ensure hostile 
populations demonstrated continuing submission to the Crown led him to make repeated 
suggestions that troops ought to be stationed in the older colonies to intimidate colonists 
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into remaining peaceful. It also influenced his belief that military action ought to be used 
to pacify colonists should they engage in further disorders or cross the line from rioting 
to rebellion. Considering the role of militarisation in both imperial fringes in the decades 
before the American Revolution, this dissertation found that the Forty-Five influenced 
how the British Army waged war and pacified hostile populations during the French and 
Indian War and Pontiac’s War. Further, the army’s formative experiences in Scotland 
affected officers’ actions during the pre-revolutionary period in North America. Although 
militarisation was adapted in response to American conditions and the changing 
circumstances in that imperial fringe, it clearly took inspiration from the Highland 
precedent. This extends the analysis of Geoffrey Plank, who found that pacification in 
Scotland influenced how the British Army pacified populations throughout the British 
Empire,1 by highlighting the various ways that the army drew lessons from the Forty-
Five and by demonstrating that its influence continued at least until the American 
Revolution. Future studies could extend this investigation both geographically and 
chronologically. This dissertation did not examine the influence of the Forty-Five on the 
West Indies or India, for example, nor did it consider its influence during the 
Revolutionary War itself. Comparisons could also be drawn with the militarisation 
process embarked upon in Ireland during the seventeenth century to further demonstrate 
the development and adaptation of such processes throughout the British Empire.  
Interactions between British military officers and the imperial populations they 
encountered in Scotland and North America illustrate the cultural attitudes of individual 
officers in the mid-to late-eighteenth century. Interactions were guided by various 
cultural paradigms that influenced how officers viewed themselves and the world around 
them. Most officers and government ministers shared a common understanding of the 
civility paradigm during the Forty-Five, and it guided reaction to the rebellion. 
Characterising all Highlanders as savage, the civility paradigm suggested that 
subjugation during and after the conflict was necessary to secure Highlanders’ 
submission to the British state. As highlighted, the civility paradigm also influenced the 
army’s reaction to warfare against French-Canadians and Native Americans. As civility 
was thought necessary before a population could assimilate within the empire and 
become loyal, long-term militarisation strategy aimed to affect the civilisation of 
Highlanders and Native Americans. However, the importance of the civility paradigm for 
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guiding the interactions of military officers decreased over the period under investigation. 
In part, this was because steps taken to civilise Highlanders were perceived to be working 
by the 1760s, which led to them being classified as savages less often, whilst the 
emergence of the ‘noble savage’ in poetry and literature posited savagery as a positive 
state as such populations had not been corrupted by commercial society. More 
importantly, though, it was the changing understandings of imperial loyalty and identity 
that led to the reduction in the importance of the civility paradigm for guiding interactions 
in both Scotland and North America.  
The loyalty paradigm had also played an important role during and after the Forty-
Five. British Army officers viewed the Jacobites as disloyal ‘others’ who failed to display 
due submission to the Crown. Loyalty was thought essential to guarantee imperial 
security and stability. ‘Others’ were only thought able to become loyal if they assimilated 
into the British Empire as Britons, participating in the imperial venture and demonstrating 
adherence to the Crown. Britishness, then, was thought a necessary goal for imperial 
populations in the mid-eighteenth century. The first step to guarantee loyalty was the 
initial submission of disloyal ‘others’, which drove the army’s determination to gain the 
total submission of Highlanders, French-Canadians, and Native Americans during 
conflicts. The loyalty paradigm also played an important role in encouraging the 
civilisation of Highlanders and Native Americans as a first step to affecting their 
assimilation within the empire, and the Anglicisation of French-Canadians for the same 
reason. However, army officers’ experiences of militarisation in both imperial fringes, as 
well as the changes to the constitution of the empire in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ 
War, caused a paradigm shift that affected officers’ understandings of loyalty. 
Highlanders and French-Canadians demonstrated continuing submission and adherence 
to the Crown without having fully assimilated as Britons, suggesting that assimilation 
was not a necessary prerequisite for imperial populations to be considered loyal. In 
addition, the Highland example had shown that empire did not need to be a process of 
negotiation with imperial populations but rather ought to emphasise parliamentary 
supremacy. As such, it did not matter if imperial populations were not British so long as 
they displayed due submission. To achieve loyalty Parliament could, and did, impose 
regulation and militarisation implemented by imperial agents. However, the shift also 
encouraged the accommodation of ‘others’ within the empire as a method of 
strengthening their ties with Britain. As army officers sought to accommodate French-
Canadians and Native Americans, however, they failed to effectively accommodate 
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colonial North America settlers who continued to view themselves as partners in empire 
rather than simply imperial subjects.  
Army officers played an important role as agents of empire, with officers on the 
ground often given freedom to implement militarisation, although as Jeffrey Amherst 
discovered they would quickly be recalled if their efforts were judged to have had an 
adverse effect. This freedom allowed officers’ own cultural paradigms to influence their 
encounters with imperial populations. Whilst Amherst’s superiority paradigm failed to 
keep the peace in the interior, the paradigm of benevolence caused Murray to balance 
subjugation with cooperation in Quebec to encourage the conquered French-Canadians 
to accept British rule. Reflecting the paradigm shift regarding loyalty, and his own 
experiences, Murray believed that some toleration of Catholicism to allow French-
Canadians to participate in the empire would cause them to become, and remain, loyal 
imperial subjects. The paradigm shift also led Thomas Gage to abandon Amherst’s 
subjugatory strategy in the interior in the aftermath of Pontiac’s War in favour of 
accommodating the Native Americans within the empire. Protecting Indians from 
colonial land encroachment and trade abuses would encourage them to continue to 
demonstrate their submission to the Crown. From the 1760s, Highlanders, Native 
Americans, and French-Canadians all came to be identified as imperial ‘others’ who were 
to be governed in such a way as to ensure their loyalty to the Crown, therefore 
guaranteeing imperial security. 
When the British Army was first sent to North America in 1755 in response to the 
French and Indian War, the colonies were thought of as an extension of Britain, and 
colonists were part of the inclusive British identity.2 However, studies by Peter J. 
Marshall and Stephen Conway demonstrated that colonists came to be viewed as 
significantly different from Britons at home. Although the roots of this change were dated 
to the French and Indian War, its solidification for the majority of Britons was argued to 
have occurred during the American Revolutionary War.3 This dissertation found that such 
a change in attitude had solidified in the minds of those British military officers 
implementing militarisation and governance on the ground in North America well before 
the outbreak of the Revolution. It did so because of a paradigm shift regarding colonists’ 
identity which had its roots in the earliest stages of the militarisation process in North 
                                                 
2 Colley, Britons.  
3 Marshall, ‘A Nation Defined by Empire’; Conway, ‘From Fellow Nationals to Foreigners’  
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America and influenced how numerous military officers viewed and interacted with 
colonial settlers. As colonists were viewed as Britons, army officers expected them to act 
as loyal imperial subjects and respect the royal prerogative to facilitate the war effort. 
When officers encountered difficulties gaining colonial compliance, they came to 
characterise the colonists as disloyal with regards to the war effort. In doing so, they 
consciously began to ‘other’ the colonists, viewing them as significantly different from 
Britons at home.  
This was initially confined to the military sphere as Britain attempted to 
successfully prosecute the war against France. However, the absorption of populations 
that were viewed, to some degree or another, as imperial subjects but were identified as 
being significantly different to Britons at home made Britain’s empire much more 
diverse. As Britain sought to govern and accommodate these disparate populations, 
colonists increasingly came to be viewed simply as one more imperial population that 
had to be governed and accommodated within this expanded empire and who were 
expected to submit to British authority. This crystallised the paradigm shift that left 
colonists viewed not as Britons but as ‘others’. And, as colonists failed to demonstrate 
due submission and adherence to the Crown during the imperial crisis, they came to be 
viewed as potentially hostile ‘others’ who were close to rebellion. The paradigm shift that 
led the British Army to view colonists as ‘others’ rather than as Britons influenced army 
officers’ interactions with that population throughout the entire period from the French 
and Indian War to the American Revolutionary War. Whilst histories of the American 
Revolution have tended to focus on the French and Indian War, and the resultant changes 
to Britain’s empire, to explain transformations in British imperial policy, this dissertation 
has demonstrated the longer-term, cultural roots that influenced the understandings and 
attitudes of British military officers during the imperial crisis.  
The paradigm shifts regarding loyalty within the empire and the identity of 
colonists affected officers’ understanding of the imperial relationship and their opinions 
regarding the management of imperial populations. Peter J. Marshall’s investigation of 
the unmaking of empire concluded that the French and Indian War caused Britain and the 
colonies to develop divergent understandings of empire. Whilst the latter had their belief 
in an empire of cooperation and negotiation confirmed by the joint enterprise, Britons 
came to reject that concept due to the perceived failure of the colonies to pull their weight 
during the conflict, although there had been calls for imperial reform, and even some 
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steps taken to affect change, even prior to the war.4 Closer regulation of a potentially 
hostile population appeared to have been successful in the Highlands by the mid-1750s 
as no further Jacobite risings had occurred. From the beginning of the French and Indian 
War, British Army officers began to question whether the ‘empire of negotiation’ in fact 
encouraged colonists to act disloyally and fail to pull their weight in the war effort. 
Reacting to the perceived disloyalty, officers began to advocate closer regulation of the 
colonies, similar to that affecting positive change and ensuring imperial security in the 
Highlands. Arguing that colonists were close to asserting their independence from the 
Crown, such calls were made by successive commanders-in-chief as well as other army 
officers throughout the duration of the war. When colonists objected to Parliament’s 
attempts to introduce taxation and closer regulation from 1764, Thomas Gage encouraged 
ministers to enforce regulation. He implied his disappointment with Parliament’s repeal 
of the Stamp Act and encouraged legislative measures to limit the powers of disloyal 
colonial assemblies. Further, Gage argued that military force ought to be used to restore 
order if required. Gage’s position hardened as he came to believe that resistance was 
moving towards open rebellion and he suggested that subjugation was required to reassert 
parliamentary authority and force the colonists to display due submission to the Crown.  
Army officers sought to influence ministerial policy both regarding the imperial 
crisis and the governance of the empire more generally. Some of their suggestions do 
appear to have affected the steps taken by the ministry. Whilst further research is required 
to fully investigate the influence of army officers on imperial policymaking, some initial 
assessments can be made. James Murray’s military and civil governance of Quebec seems 
to have played an important role in influencing ministerial thought regarding that 
province. Murray repeatedly argued that the civil and military spheres could not be 
separated in the short-term and the ministry granted his successor, Guy Carleton, control 
of both. It seems likely, therefore, that Murray’s argument and experience were important 
for convincing the ministry to make this change. Further, Murray’s opinions regarding 
the proper method of government for Quebec, and his early advocacy of toleration and 
accommodation, rather than Anglicisation and assimilation, were shared by Carleton and 
set in motion the debates that would eventually result in a policy of accommodation with 
the Quebec Act of 1774. Numerous army officers were forthcoming with their opinions 
regarding the need for closer imperial regulation from 1755 onwards. Likewise, they 
                                                 
4 Marshall, Making and Unmaking; Beaumont, Colonial America.  
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documented their changing attitudes towards colonists in their correspondence with 
government officials. This means the government was aware how those on the ground in 
North America assessed the situation both during the war and throughout the pre-
revolutionary period. Thomas Gage expressed frustration when successive ministries 
failed to follow his advice about what steps should be taken both in the interior and the 
eastern seaboard colonies, demonstrating that ministers certainly did not always act upon 
officers’ suggestions. The strength of officers’ attitudes and understandings, however, 
likely did influence ministers generally as they moved away from an empire of 
negotiation in the post-war period towards an assertion of parliamentary authority. This 
dissertation has highlighted several areas where the evidence suggests that army officers 
did manage to play a role in affecting changes to imperial governance in the post-conquest 
period. Further research is required to investigate the extent of their influence compared 
to other imperial agents at home and in the colonies as well as in comparison with other 
factors contributing to ministers’ decision-making process.  
This dissertation investigated how militarisation was implemented in Scotland 
and adapted in North America and how it influenced the army officers who implemented 
it, both with regards to their attitudes towards imperial populations and their 
understandings of what empire was and how it ought to be implemented. Considering the 
cultural paradigms that drove the actions of the army has highlighted the prevailing 
beliefs and assumptions that underpinned British imperialism in the mid-to late-
eighteenth century. It concluded that militarisation caused paradigm shifts that 
fundamentally altered how British Army officers understood the concept of imperial 
loyalty and how they identified colonial settlers. In doing so it illustrated the enduring 
influence of the Forty-Five on the British Army in North America. The cost of the Seven 
Years’ War and the extent of Britain’s victory in it is often credited with causing the 
imperial crisis which led to the Revolutionary War.5 This dissertation found that longer-
term, military interactions dating back to the Forty-Five also played an important role in 
causing transformations in eighteenth-century British imperial policy through the actions 
and influence of army officers who acted as agents of empire. It has provided historians 
with a deeper understanding of how this important group understood, and reacted to, the 
imperial crisis.  
  
                                                 






Appendix One: British Regiments in Scotland 
and North America 
 
Regiments of foot that served in 
Britain during the Forty-Five and in 
North America between 1755-75 





Regiment name and number during the 
Forty-Five1 
1st St Clair’s, 1st (Royals) 
14th Price’s 14th 
15th Harrison’s 15th 
27th Blakeney’s 27th 
28th Bragg’s 28th 
42nd Murray’s 43rd Highlanders (Black Watch) 
44th Lee’s 55th 
46th Murray’s 57th 
47th Lascelles’ 58th 
48th Ligonier’s 59th 
62nd Second battalion of Barrell’s 4th 
69th Second battalion of Houghton’s 24th 
 
Until 1751, regiments in the British Army were commonly named after their 
colonel. In the early 1740s, numbers were allocated to each regiment based on length of 
service to prevent confusion when regiments changed hands.2 As such, during the Forty-
Five regiments were known by either name or number. The move from name to number 
was completed by a royal warrant of 1751, which also saw the regiments renumbered, 
accounting for the discrepancies in the above table for the 43rd, 44th, 46th, 47th, and 48th 
regiments. When the army was expanded upon the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, 
                                                 
1 The Regiment names were taken from Stuart Reid, Cumberland’s Culloden Army 1745-46 (London: 
Osprey, 2012), Kindle.  
2 Reid, Cumberland’s Culloden Army, loc. 51.  
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several existing regiments were split, and their second battalion became an independent 







Appendix Two: Timeline of the French and 
Indian War1 
  
1753 French soldiers begin constructing forts in the Ohio Country to 
prevent British settlement in the region claimed by both countries. 
October–December 
1753 
Virginia sends George Washington to order the French to vacate the 
Ohio Country, but Washington is rebuked. 
April 1754 The French take control of the Forks of the Ohio and begin 
construction of Fort Duquesne 
May 1754 A Virginian expedition, under George Washington, to remove the 
French from the Ohio Country defeats a French force in an 
engagement at Jumonville Glen. Washington constructs Fort 
Necessity at Great Meadows. 
June-July 1754 The Albany Congress fails to repair the Covenant Chain with the 
Iroquois Indians. 
3 July 1754 Washington’s force is defeated at the Battle of Fort Necessity. The 
French destroy the fort and Washington and his force retreat to Wills 
Creek. 
September 1754 The Newcastle ministry secures approval for two regular regiments, 
under Major General Edward Braddock, to be sent to North America 
the following year to remove French fortifications in the Ohio 
Country and other areas of the interior claimed by Britain. 
May-June 1755 Colonel Robert Monckton sets out for Nova Scotia, forcing the 
French surrender of Fort Beauséjour on 16 June before embarking on 
the removal of the suspect Acadian population. Over seven thousand 
Acadians are removed and dispersed throughout Britain’s North 
American colonies. 
May-July 1755 Major General Braddock and 1,300 British regulars and colonial 
militia set out against Fort Duquesne but are defeated at the Battle of 
the Monongahela on 9 July. Braddock succumbs to his wounds from 
the battle four days later and the British force retreats to 
Philadelphia. 
September 1755 William Shirley, governor of Massachusetts, becomes commander-
in-chief of the British troops as a result of Braddock’s death. Shirley 
decides against continuing his campaign against Fort Niagara. He 
orders the strengthening of Fort Oswego and returns to military 
                                                 
1 The information for this timeline was taken from Anderson, Crucible of War.  
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headquarters at Albany, New York, to plan the following year’s 
campaigns. 
9 September 1755 Colonel William Johnson’s force has several engagements with the 
French that come to be known as the Battle of Lake George. The 
British emerge victorious, but Johnson decides against continuing to 
challenge the French at Crown Point. 
January 1756 The Newcastle ministry appoints John Campbell, fourth Earl of 
Loudoun, as commander-in-chief to replace Shirley. The British war 
effort is expanded as two more regular regiments are ordered to 
North America and four new battalions of regulars are ordered to be 
raised in the colonies. 
May 1756 General Montcalm arrives in Quebec with several hundred troops to 
take charge of the French war effort. 
17 May 1756 Britain officially declares war on France as fighting spreads to 
Europe, the West Indies, and India. The loss of Minorca to the 
French sets in motion the fall of the Newcastle ministry. 
23 July 1756 Lord Loudoun arrives in New York to take control of the British war 
effort, but the 1756 campaigns are already underway. 
10-14 August 1756 The French, under Montcalm, lay siege to Fort Oswego and its 
outpost Fort Ontario, forcing the British to surrender on the 14th 
August. Montcalm’s Indian allies kill and scalp between thirty and 
one hundred soldiers and civilians, taking more captive. 
August 1756 Major General Daniel Webb, dispatched to reinforce Fort Oswego, 
hears of its surrender. Believing rumours that the French intend to 
advance further, Webb orders the destruction of Fort Bull and 
retreats to the German Flatts. Britain’s anticipated expedition against 
Crown Point is abandoned and Loudoun orders the provincial 
soldiers to strengthen Fort William Henry. 
8 September 1756 Colonel John Armstrong and 300 provincial soldiers destroy the 
Delaware town of Upper Kittanning as revenge for the Indians’ 
destruction of Fort Granville, killing Captain Jacobs and recovering 
approximately eleven captives. 
March 1757 Lord Loudoun orders an embargo on all colonial ships leaving port to 
prevent the French learning of British plans for an attack upon 
Louisbourg. The embargo causes economic difficulties throughout 
the colonies and increases colonial discontent. It is lifted on 27 June. 
20 June 1757 Loudoun and a force of 6,000 troops embark for Halifax intending to 
lay siege to Louisbourg. Its capture is the campaign’s primary aim. 
4-9 August 1757 The French, under Montcalm, lay siege to Fort William Henry, 
forcing the garrison’s surrender. Major General Webb decides 
against sending reinforcements from Fort Edward during the siege in 
case both forts are lost, which would threaten Albany. The day after 
the surrender, France’s native allies kill approximately 185 soldiers 
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and civilians and take 300-500 prisoner in what would become 
known as the ‘Massacre of Fort William Henry’. 
4 August 1757 Loudoun’s offensive against Louisbourg is abandoned when he and 
Admiral Francis Holburne learn it is guarded by three French 
squadrons. Loudoun returns to New York to begin planning the 1758 
expeditions. 
30 December 1757 Secretary of State William Pitt recalls Loudoun, replacing him as 
commander-in-chief with his deputy James Abercromby. Jeffrey 
Amherst is given the temporary rank of Major General in America 
and granted control of a renewed campaign against Louisbourg, 
whilst Brigadier John Forbes is granted command of an expedition 
against Fort Duquesne. Pitt also encourages colonial cooperation 
with the war effort by agreeing to subsidise colonies for soldiers and 
supplies and by giving provincial officers rank directly under that of 
regulars with an equivalent rank. 
8 July 1758 Abercromby’s force is defeated at the Battle of Ticonderoga 
(Carillon) and fails to take the French fort at Lake Champlain. 
However, Montcalm’s French troops cannot take advantage of the 
British defeat as they are short on provisions after successive harvest 
failures. 
26 July 1758 Louisbourg surrenders after a six-week siege. Amherst refuses to 
grant the garrison honours of war, citing the massacre of Fort 
William Henry. Brigadier General James Wolfe takes charge of an 
expedition to destroy French villages along the St. Lawrence to 
prevent them supplying the French at Quebec. Although most 
inhabitants escape, approximately one hundred are taken prisoner 
and sent to France. 
27 August 1758 Lieutenant Colonel John Bradstreet and a force of approximately 
3,000, mostly provincials, capture and destroy Fort Frontenac at 
Lake Ontario. Abercromby refuses to grant Bradstreet permission to 
launch a further expedition against Fort Niagara. 
26 October 1758 Negotiations between British colonial governors and the 
representatives of thirteen Indian nations conclude in the Treaty of 
Easton. Large tracts of land are ceded to the Indians in return for 
promises of neutrality in the conflict against France. Indian 
diplomacy leading to the Treaty of Easton is a vital aspect of Forbes’ 
campaign against Fort Duquesne, enabling his army’s progress. 
October 1758 At least thirty Cherokee warriors are killed by frontiersmen on their 
return from service with Forbes. These murders are a major 
contributing factor in the Anglo-Cherokee War of 1759-61.  
23 November 1758 The French abandon Fort Duquesne and the British occupy it the 
following day, renaming the area Pittsburgh. British troops begin the 
construction of Fort Pitt on the site of the old French fort the 
following spring. 
1759 The Cherokee declare war on Britain. William Henry Lyttleton, 
governor of South Carolina, sends a provincial force of 1,100 men 
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against the Cherokee, taking twenty-nine chiefs hostage, but fails to 
secure peace. 
July 1759 A British force under Brigadier General John Prideaux sets out to 
capture Fort Niagara. The Iroquois Indians provide aid to the British. 
Although they refuse to take an active role in the siege, their 
presence encourages France’s Indian allies to abandon them. 
Command passes to Sir William Johnson upon the death of Prideaux 
and the British capture the fort on 25 July. 
July-August 1759 General Amherst, now commander-in-chief of the British forces, 
stages an attack on Fort Ticonderoga, capturing it on the 26 July. His 
troops progress to Lake Champlain and Amherst orders the 
construction of Fort Crown Point upon the site of Fort St. Frédéric, 
which the French had destroyed upon their retreat. 
June-September 
1759 
A British force of 8,500 troops, under Wolfe, lays siege to Quebec. 
Despite suffering defeat in the Battle of Montmorency on 31 July, 
Wolfe’s troops are victorious in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham 
on 13 September. Both Wolfe and his opposing commander, 
Montcalm, are killed. France surrenders the city on the 18 September 
and Brigadier General James Murray takes control of the British 
garrison. 
4 October 1759 Rogers’ Rangers attack the Abenaki village of St. Francis, killing 
many of the inhabitants and destroying the settlement. The raid was 
revenge for the Abenaki capturing a small British party led by 
Captain Quinton Kennedy and refusing overtures of peace. 
20 November 1759 The British win an important naval victory at Quiberon Bay, 
establishing British naval supremacy and ending the threat of a 
French invasion of Britain. This victory enables Britain to prevent 
France from reinforcing the army in Canada with men or supplies. 
January-March 
1760 
Cherokee warriors lay siege to Fort Prince George in an attempt to 
free the captive chiefs, whilst concurrently raiding frontier 
settlements. The garrison of Fort Prince George massacres the Indian 
chiefs after their commander is killed and Cherokee warriors extend 
their frontier raiding. 
28 April 1760 The British are defeated at the Battle of Sainte-Foy, outside of 
Quebec, during which both armies have an effective strength of 
approximately four thousand. The French lose 22% of their force 
killed or wounded whilst the British lose 28%. As a result, Murray 
orders his troops to retreat into the city and the French lay siege to it. 
April-July 1760 1300 regulars, under Colonel Archibald Montgomery, respond to the 
Anglo-Cherokee War. Montgomery’s troops attack the Lower 
Towns, burning five villages and killing or capturing over one 
hundred warriors. The Cherokee retreat to the Middle Towns and 
Montgomery’s expedition fails to force their surrender. The regulars 
return to Charleston in July and Fort Loudoun is captured by the 
Cherokee the following month. 
13 May 1760 French commander François Gaston de Lévis, 
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Chevalier de Lévis, raises the siege of Quebec when British supply 
ships reach the city carrying provisions and reinforcements. 
July-September 
1760 
Murray’s force travels up the St. Lawrence River towards Montréal, 
gaining the submission of the settlements en route. Arriving below 
the town on 1 September, the fleet awaits the arrival of Amherst and 
Brigadier General William Haviland. 
August 1760 Haviland and his force of 3,500 troops lay siege to Île-aux-Noix from 
19-28 August before continuing overland towards Montréal. At the 
same time, Amherst successfully lays siege to Fort Lévis from 16-24 
August before progressing towards Montréal by boat. 
8 September 1760 Marquis de Vaudreuil, governor-general of New France, surrenders 
Canada to the British. 
25 October 1760 King George II dies, and his son George William Frederick succeeds 
him as King George III. 
January-July 1761 An expedition of regulars under Lieutenant Colonel James Grant 
marches against the Middle Towns of the Cherokee. His troops burn 
all fifteen towns and destroy vast swathes of the country before 
returning to Fort Prince George. 




France captures Newfoundland but an expedition under Lieutenant 
Colonel William Amherst reconquers it on 18 September. 
10 February 1763 After Britain and France agree preliminaries in November 1762, the 
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